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**CITIZEN'S PERCEPTION AND USE OF
GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY:
EFFECTS ON CITIZEN TRUST AND PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT**

A Dissertation in

Public Administration

by

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the past few decades, governmental transparency has become a hot topic within public administration. However, very limited quantitative research has been conducted questioning if governmental transparency, or at least a citizen's perception or use of governmental transparency, is beneficial for governmental agencies and its citizens. Ultimately, this dissertation's goal is to add to a very limited set of U.S. public administration transparency literature.

To achieve this goal, this dissertation first analyzes current governmental transparency publications and research focusing on specific relationships between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency, public trust in government, and public participation. To test these relationships, a 2009 survey conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International for the Pew Internet and American Life Project is used. With this robust data set, this research study finds that a relationship between governmental transparency perception and a citizen's trust in government does exist, but the relationship is extremely weak in a negative direction (transparency pessimism). Furthermore, a relationship between governmental transparency perception and a citizen's participation in government also exists, but the relationship is also extremely weak in a negative direction.

The key finding in this research is that a statistical significant, positive relationship exists between governmental transparency use and citizen participation. Higher governmental transparency use leads to increases in citizen participation. Public administrators should be aware of this relationship to enhance overall public participation in government. When publishing governmental transparency data, a public administrator must know their audience since, as this research reveals, governmental transparency is a driver to citizen participation.

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Chapter 1

Transparency – Introduction and Background

“The importance of transparency in the global context can serve as a new strategy for governance, capable of establishing trust at a distance, and thus potentially supporting extended solidarities by civil society” (Holzner & Holzner, 2006, p. 114).

1.1 Transparency Introduction

Interest in transparency within public administration is on the rise. Although the U.S. Freedom of Information Act has existed since 1966, transparency has only recently become a popular topic in public administration and public policy literature (cf. Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Bannister & Connolly, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2014a; French, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, Proumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012; Kim & Lee, 2012; Lathrop & Ruma, 2010). Governmental transparency occurs more frequently now than in the past (Meijer, 2013; Royo, Yetano, & Acerete, 2013; Thomsen, 2013). For example, in a recent newspaper article, the sub-headline on the cover page read, “The governor, voicing concerns about transparency in Corbett’s appointments, removes the open-records director and moves to stop nominations” (Thompson, 2015). The governor in this case is Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf. Surprisingly, Wolf picked transparency as his first major issue to tackle just a couple days into office. Events like this demonstrate that transparency is a significant topic that is gaining attention in the field of public administration. Although the term, transparency, is not new, the focus and increase in relevance are.

1.2 Transparency Definition

To understand transparency, a definition must be provided. Appendix A provides governmental transparency definitions found within current public administration literature.

These governmental transparency definitions are split between a traditional definition of governmental transparency and a definition through the lens of a citizen's perception.

The commonality in traditional governmental transparency definitions is the availability of hidden data, or at least not yet seen data, to an outside party. In general, various public administration authors offer "sunshine" as a seminal analogy for governmental transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b; Veal, Sauser, Tamblyn, Sauser, & Sims, 2015). From a historical perspective, Davis's governmental transparency definition as "lifting the veil of secrecy" (1998, p. 121) is a simple description found in several public administration scholarly articles (Meijer, 2013). Davis's definition has been expanded upon over time. For example, a decade after Davis's definition, Meijer (2009) offers a definition of not only what governmental transparency is, but what it needs to do.

Applied to the field of Public Administration, two types of [transparency] definition exists. The first type is a description definition... Transparency can be described through three elements: an observer, something available to be observed and a means or method for observation. A second type of definition has a more normative nature... Transparency as 'to open up the working procedures not immediately visible to those not directly involved in order to demonstrate the good working of an institution'. This type of definition not only indicates what transparency is, but also what it needs to do; demonstrate the good working of an institution (Meijer, 2009, p. 258).

More recently, governmental transparency is defined as a governmental "tool." Heald (2012) is the first to introduce this idea into public administration literature; later, Scarlett (2014) and Cucciniell, Belle, Nasi, and Valotti (2015) defend this concept of governmental transparency as a tool.

Transparency is discussed as a tool for enhancing the accountability of governments, as a principle to be implemented in order to reduce corruption, and a means for making information on government performance more readily available (Cucciniello et al., 2015, p. 572).

In sum, based on traditional governmental transparency definitions in public administration, governmental transparency is the idea of *providing citizenry data in a timely and accurate manner in order that the provider of data can be held accountable*. Timely and accurate are key constructs included in this definition but are not found in other transparency definitions. Why include timely and accurate wording in this dissertation's traditional definition? These two attributes are usually lacking within governmental transparency but must be performed to be truly transparent. Many citizens and outside organizations complain that public agencies are not timely and accurate (Brito, 2011). Also, these two attributes purport to build trust and public participation with the citizenry, which are critical goals of governmental transparency (Kim & Lee, 2012).

However, a traditional definition of governmental transparency is not enough; it is only one aspect of governmental transparency. The second, and more important, aspect of governmental transparency is a citizen's perception of governmental transparency. Within Appendix A, governmental transparency definitions related to a citizen's perception are also found. Governmental transparency is not simply about what data or how much data that a governmental agency releases; instead, *governmental transparency is how a citizen feels (positively or negatively) about the release of governmental transparent data*. Oliver (2004) encapsulates a citizen's perception of governmental transparency stating, "Transparency, as currently defined, is letting the truth be available for others to see if they so choose, or perhaps think to look, or have the time, means, and skills to look" (p. 3). Oliver's statement implies perception and use are required for full understanding of governmental transparency. This dissertation focuses on both aspects. Per Meijer, Grimmelikhuijsen, Nell, and Lentz (2014), a

citizen's perception of governmental transparency can be positive or negative based on what and how a governmental agency presents its transparent data.

Governmental transparency, providing data on the operations of government, may be goal for its citizens, (de Fine Licht, 2014a; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; Loretan, 2013; Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015); however, a citizen's perception of governmental transparency is a more enhanced method to understand actual governmental transparency (de Fine Licht, 2014a). Since various public administration experts recently advocate that perception of governmental transparency is an enhanced measure of governmental transparency than actual governmental transparency (Meijer et al., 2014), this dissertation focuses on the relationship between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency, public trust, and public participation.

1.3 Transparency Background

The history of transparency is viewed in two different ways, through a data publication lens and through a chronological lens. Looking through a data publication lens, the United States (U.S.) is currently in the "fourth revolution" of transparency (Holzner & Holzner, 2006). The first revolution was the invention of writing. The second revolution was the alphabet. The third revolution was Gutenberg's printing press. Now, the fourth revolution is the Internet. The Internet allows the expansion of transparency through e-government and social media (Eaves, 2010).

Looking through a chronological lens, the first basic concepts of transparency are found in ancient Chinese history; however, the notion that the public has a right to governmental data dates back to the Enlightenment era. Born during the Enlightenment era, British philosopher and reformer, Jeremy Bentham, is credited as the first person to profess and push for transparency in

government (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Meijer, 2009). Although transparency was occasionally debated in Europe after the Enlightenment era, it was not until directly after the Great Depression that U.S. governmental transparency was questioned (Roberts, 2004).

After the Great Depression, the U.S. significantly expanded the Federal government due to many New Era programs. During that period, public policy power and control shifted from the legislators to the bureaucrats. Bureaucratic influence on public policy creation and implementation grew (Roberts, 2004). A phenomenon called “The Administrative State” began (Waldo, 1948). Although directly after World War II, new processes and regulations suppressed the expansion of bureaucratic power, citizens continued to question the intent of public administrators. At this time, citizens were fearful of how bureaucrats influenced public policy. A citizen’s positive perception of governmental transparency was nearly nonexistent (Roberts, 2004).

By the end of the 20th Century, transparency in public administration became increasingly important in Europe, while U.S. interest in transparency lagged behind (Curtin & Meijer, 2006; Fung, Graham, & Weil, 2007). What sparked the European’s interest in transparency so early on? The answer is New Public Management (NPM; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). NPM ushered in the era of the *Hollow State* due to governments contracting out of various governmental goods and services (Frederickson & Frederickson, 2006). NPM was the beginning of governmental privatization. NPM’s goal was to increase governmental efficiency while reducing costs. With NPM, accountability between government and private industry was required. Therefore, transparency of NPM was paramount in order to demonstrate accountability (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012).

In parallel with NPM advancements, the Internet's importance and popularity increased. Suddenly, the citizenry could easily access any governmental data *if* it is published for public viewing. The cost to publish data on the Internet is much lower than paper publications; hence, the Internet gives governmental agencies the ability to increase transparency at a lower cost (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011). However, different expertise is required for Internet publication, which many governmental areas initially lacked (Curtin & Meijer, 2006), especially within local governments (Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins, 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). Regarding transparent, governmental websites, Europe again led in this area and the U.S. lagged behind (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen, Proumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013).

Heightened attention to U.S. public administration transparency did not begin until early in the 21st Century (Thomsen, 2013). By the late 2000s, many citizens started to believe that transparency created good governance. Providing information to the public produces a more informed public. More information means better understanding of public policy, which leads to increased public participation; at least that was the original theoretical premise (de Fine Licht, 2014a). Recently, because of issues like WikiLeaks (e.g. leaked governmental information that was kept from the public) and confusion from the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), awareness for the importance of transparency has increased (Bannister & Connolly, 2011).

1.4 Transparency Events

Grimmelikhuijsen, Welch, and Heald categorize governmental transparency in public administration into three separate events, decision-making transparency, policy content transparency, and policy outcome transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013;

Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012; Heald, 2006b). *Decision-making transparency* concerns the amount of openness provided during public policy creation and decision-making. Providing committee meeting minutes is an example of decision-making transparency. Meeting minutes can illustrate how and why a particular alternative is selected and who is in favor or against the alternative. Holding open committee meetings for public observation is another example of decision-making transparency. Decision-making transparency has been operationalized the most of the three separate event types (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012).

Policy content transparency is information that the government provides regarding enacted public policy. Details include what problem the legislation is solving, how the legislation is being implemented, and what specific citizens the legislation affects. Currently, transparency event data are usually published on governmental web sites (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).

Policy outcome transparency provides ongoing metrics to show how well an implemented public policy performs over time. The main driving force for this transparency event is NPM. These data can hold private contracting firms accountable for results and costs (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). For policy outcome transparency, transparent data timeliness is critical.

1.5 Transparency Research Areas

In general, public administration transparency diverges into two major research areas. The first public administration transparency research area concerns the relationship between governmental transparency and public trust. The fundamental belief is that higher governmental transparency will produce increased public trust. The current technical premise is that transparency and public trust are positively correlated. By increasing any of the three

transparency events, decision-making transparency, policy content transparency, or policy outcome transparency, public trust will also increase (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). The amount of transparency in a governmental agency is the independent variable; citizen's trust is the dependent variable. The major research question in public administration transparency is: Is public administration transparency increasing public trust in government? However, this dissertation's author argues that the investigation should not specifically focus upon governmental transparency, but a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and what effect a citizen's perception has on the public's trust in government.

The second public administration transparency research area concerns governmental transparency and public participation (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a; Kim & Lee, 2012). The fundamental idea driving this area is that by increasing public administration transparency, citizen participation in governmental processes will increase. The current technical premise is that transparency and public participation are positively correlated (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2012). The fundamental research question in public administration transparency is: Is public administration transparency increasing public participation in government? Like trust, this dissertation's author argues that the investigation should not specifically focus upon governmental transparency, but a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency.

1.6 Current Transparency Issues

As background, three primary transparency issues need now to be addressed. First, the central issue in public administration transparency literature today is the debate on whether

increased governmental transparency is effective in terms of promoting public trust. “The ambivalent relation between trust and openness is at the heart of debates about the new transparency” (Meijer, 2009, p. 256). Restating the general literature’s research question on trust: Is public administration transparency increasing public trust in government? Although the theoretical answer to this question has been “yes,” the sparse quantitative research finds conflicting results (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2014a; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).

This first transparency issue leads directly into the second issue. The second issue is the overall lack of scholarly transparency research and literature within public administration. Although a few researchers in Europe and Asia have published public administration transparency research (de Fine Licht, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2014a; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Meijer, 2009), U.S. public administration transparency research is severely lacking (Meijer, 2013). Transparency research is also deficient at the local governmental level (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012) and at the international governmental level (Roberts, 2004). Furthermore, regarding published literature, quantitative analysis is extremely sparse. In 2011, de Fine Licht highlighted the point that much of the current public administration transparency literature was theoretical, based on assumptions, and not quantitatively tested. In the theoretical transparency literature, the biggest criticism is that the literature assumes a positive causal relationship between higher governmental transparency and public trust, and between higher governmental transparency and public participation; however, the direction and causality cannot actually be determined yet since research is lacking to verify this theoretical premise (de Fine Licht, 2011).

Third, by implementing transparency in a governmental agency, costs will increase and capacity will be strained (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Brian, 2014; French, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012; Royo, Yetano, & Acerete, 2013). Additionally, Bannister and Connolly (2001) not only acknowledge that governmental costs will increase due to transparency, but they also acknowledge that risks will increase. For example, someone updating a web site containing transparent data could inadvertently post incorrect data. The data could be personal, could be deemed secret, or could be too old for posting (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). As stated earlier, although governmental transparency data may be cheaper and easier to publish on the web compared to paper publications, the skill sets required to publish Internet transparent data are completely different. This human resource constraint can cause a capacity issue for the governmental agency, meaning the governmental agency must hire additional IT-skilled resources to create and update their web site with governmental transparency data. (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012).

Besides these three critical governmental transparency issues, other issues exist as well.

Other issues include:

- Transparency sustainability: Can governmental transparency initiatives continue over time, especially due to financial costs and limited labor resources over time?
- Governmental secrecy: Governmental secrecy is the opposite of governmental transparency. When is it right for the governmental to be secretive and when is it right to be transparent?
- Personal information: How does personal information not get released through governmental transparency initiatives?

- Radical transparency: Do organizations like WikiLeaks have a place in governmental transparency?
- Transparent data misunderstanding: How can a citizen understand all the technical data that a government publishes?
- Transparent data spin – How can governmental agencies not spin the transparent data positively to heighten a citizen’s perception of the specific governmental agency?

These issues will be addressed within the governmental transparency literature review later in this dissertation.

1.7 Transparency Introduction and Background Summary

This dissertation’s research inquiry focuses upon trust and public participation in relationship to a citizen’s perception and use of transparency. Use of transparency within this dissertation primarily emphasizes utilizing governmental websites, researching governmental statistics, and analyzing recent governmental legislation. Additionally, this dissertation concentrates specifically upon governmental transparency and its effect upon U.S. citizens. The next chapter will demonstrate that governmental transparency research within public administration is lacking, especially within the U.S. The goal of this dissertation is to add to public administration’s transparency literature by determining if relationships exist between a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency and trust in government, and between a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency and public participation in government.

Chapter 2: Transparency – Literature Review

2.1 Transparency History

Although governmental transparency has become a hot public administration topic within the past decade, the concept has expanded over time. In Figure 2.1, a general time line provides certain key events that changed governmental transparency throughout history.




Figure 2.1. Time Continuum for Governmental Transparency

Using Figure 2.1 as a guide, the concept of governmental transparency within public administration dates back to Chinese ideology. Chinese political philosophers like Shen Buhai are cited for their initial transparency concepts (Kamenka, 1989). Shen Buhai believed governmental officials were inherently corrupt. To combat corruption, governmental transparency was required for a Chinese ruler to understand what was occurring within government. Shen Buhai did this through establishing a process where his ministers divided

administrative tasks and submitted information to be audited for verification. With this method, hidden, corrupt data became transparent to Shen Buhai and his auditors.

Centuries after this Chinese ideology, transparency laws were written into classical Greek legal documents from Sparta to Athens. These Greek cultures adopted the first fundamental concept of transparency in which laws were written not articulated (Hood, 2006a). Although written law is a fundamental concept now, for centuries in various cultures, laws were verbal causing inconsistency between rulers over time.

Regarding written law, as the U.S. formed, transparency concepts came into being. Certain initial U.S. Federal and state laws mandated the printing and distribution of laws and treaties (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). For instance, in 1780, the Massachusetts' Constitution stated "a government of laws not of men" (Hood, 2006a, p. 5). Around the same time, James Madison penned that "popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy [sic]; or, perhaps both" (Etzioni, 2014, p. 687). Even Adam Smith promoted that taxes should "be certain and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear to the contributor and to every other person" (Hood, 2006a, p. 6). These early Americans understood the need for an informed public through governmental transparency (Piotrowski, 2009).

However, these early transparency laws were not without foes. Some people in the 1700s still did not believe in written laws. Instead, these individuals believed written laws have no flexibility on how public administrators or even judges could govern. Laws required flexibility according to these people. One person that summarized these anti-transparency ideals well was Boswell who stated, "A country is in a bad state, which is governed only by laws; because a

thousand things occur for which laws cannot provide and where authority out to interpose” (Boswell, 1785, p. 159).

While the U.S. was enacting written rules and laws, Sweden was laying the groundwork for another building block to transparency, open governmental records. In 1766, Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act became law. While many other countries began to adopt freedom of the press legislations at this time in history, Sweden went further and mandated that public administrators must make available certain governmental records to the press (Hood, 2006a). This act was the first law to truly mandate open governmental records to the public.

Another participant in the rise of transparency was the Christian church. For many years in Europe, the Catholic Church was the controlling religious body; however, during this religious monopoly, the Catholic Church became a very secretive organization (Hood, 2006a). Many decisions were made behind closed doors. Church members were not aware of how or why different doctrines were created. For instance, two of the most well-known secret Catholic processes are how a new Pope is elected and what is stated in an individual confessional. These actions are still carried out in secrecy today.

In the 1500s and 1600s, people began to challenge the Catholic Church’s secretive ways. An ideological rebellion began against the Catholic Church and new Protestant ideas emerged. Protestant reformers pushed openness and frankness regarding church governance discussions and practices. The Protestant reformers wanted congregational members to not only understand church practices, but how and why these practices were created (Hood, 2006a). These concepts of openness and public deliberation were the cornerstones to today’s transparency.

In the late 1700s, the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham is credited for being the first to argue transparency’s benefits to include increasing public trust and acceptance of

governmental decision making (de Fine Licht, 2014b). Bentham stated, “I do really take it for an indisputable truth, and a truth that is one of the corner-stones of political science – the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave” (Bentham, 1790, p. 277). He also stated, “Without publicity, no good is permanent; under the auspices of publicity, no evil can continue” (Bentham, 1843). These statements reflect Bentham’s stance that government should be transparent so that public administrators will “behave” properly. Overall, Bentham’s major focus was his promotion of governmental transparency for budgets, finance, and expenditures (Hood, 2006a). Bentham did not trust public managers and their use of public funds. Bentham believed that fiscal transparency was required to suppress governmental fiscal errors and a public administrator’s potential for corruption. Moreover, Bentham was not the only person promoting the idea of governmental fiscal transparency; advocates like Britain’s Earl of Shelburne also promoted the idea of an annual audit requiring public administrators to print a listing of governmental expenditures to validate governmental payments and to suppress possible corruption.

From these building blocks of:

- Written laws for the public to read and review
- Openness for governance discussions mandated open governmental records
- Fiscal expenditure auditing

came the current concept of governmental transparency within public administration.

World War I (WWI) ushered another issue into the transparency debate; the debate on international agreements and treaties (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010). Prior to WWI, many international treaties were created and signed in secrecy. Various nations did not know who their supposed allies had secret treaty obligations with. In fact, treaty secrecy became such an issue that President Woodrow Wilson blamed most of WWI upon these secret treaties (Hood, 2006a).

After WWI, President Wilson believed that the negotiation phase of a treaty's creation should be conducted in private; however, the actual signed treaty should be open for a country's citizens and for other countries to read and understand.

Over time, President Wilson pushed various acts to support his position regarding transparency of international treaties. For instance, in 1922, the U.S. signed the Washington Naval Treaty with Italy, France, Japan and Britain stating that a nation's naval statistics (e.g. number of warships) would be shared between governments (Hood, 2006a). This openness was later carried into other agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency and even the European Union (EU).

The next major transparency building block was the idea of freedom of information. This idea focused on citizens understanding how the executive branch operated. Even though Sweden is credited with the first open government law, it was not until the U.S. began enacting laws like the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act and the 1966 Freedom of Information Act that transparency began to achieve serious momentum.

The 1946 Administrative Procedures Act specifically targeted public administration. The legislatures and citizens in the 1940s believed that public administrators assumed too much power, especially creating public policy. Moreover, the 1940s began to focus more on a citizen's perception of governmental transparency. Prior to the 1940s, governments enacted transparency laws due to suspicions of other governmental agencies or other governments (e.g. treaties). However, by the 1940s, citizen's negative perception of public administration pushed the creation of the 1946 Administrative Procedures Act. "Bureaucrats, it was said, exercised extraordinary influence – but did so secretly and often capriciously. Administrative agencies, said U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, had formed a 'fourth branch' of government

that deranged traditional ideas about the division and control of political power” (Roberts, 2004, p. 410). The 1946 Administrative Procedures Act pushed back on this fourth branch of government and public administration’s expanding power. This act required a governmental agency to inform the public of their agency’s procedures and rules, including a governmental agency’s rulemaking process. This act also defined judicial review for a governmental agency’s rulemaking.

The 1966 Freedom of Information Act came later in U.S. legislative history. This act was a bellwether piece of legislation for the entire world (Ginsberg, 2014). According to Jaeger and Bertot (2010), the “goal of transparency was formalized with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966” (p. 371). Furthermore, “one of the most basic ways to become more transparent is by enacting freedom-of-information legislation” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b, p. 48). Prior to the 1966 Freedom of Information Act, many U.S. governmental agencies were reluctant to release unpublished governmental information (Relyea, 2009). The 1966 Freedom of Information Act changed this reluctance and the law mandated that public administrators release governmental information requested by its citizenry, so long as the information will not harm national security. To this day, the U.S.’s 1966 Freedom of Information Act is the sole template for legislation for other countries to write their freedom of information laws. For instance, most of the European governments structured their freedom of information laws directly from the U.S. 1966 Freedom of Information Act (Hood, 2006a). Besides these two early U.S. transparency acts, other transparency legislation became law, for example, the 1976 Government in Sunshine Act, the Privacy Act, the Inspector General Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and the Government Performance and Results Act (Newbold, 2011).

In the 1980s with the rise of New Public Management (NPM), governmental contracts and laws targeted transparency of governmental vendors and contractors. The NPM transparency need was due to proper outcome auditing. At the same time, Bentham's fiscal transparency philosophy began again. In the 1980s, U.S. public administration transparency became synonymous with governmental accounting transparency. Within other countries, transparency became synonymous with the fight against governmental corruption (Hood, 2006a). Therefore, during the 1980s, fiscal budget transparency regulations were enacted in higher volumes across countries than any previous decade.

By the 21st century, governments and businesses were required to be much more transparent than ever before. The age of secrecy was vanishing. However, during the 2000s, the U.S. no longer was the transparency leader in terms of actual governmental transparency initiatives; Europe assumed the world role as public administration transparency leader (Thomsen, 2013). Even as the leader, Europe struggled with what governmental information to provide to its citizens and how to provide the data. Furthermore, various nations (e.g. Britain) realized that audit processes were required to validate that the transparent information was being published *and* that these governmental transparent data were correct (Curtin & Meijer, 2006).

This European transparency leadership was not constrained to only the legal framework of public administration, but also included the introduction of the Internet's capabilities. In the early 2000s, the Internet played a limited role in European transparency. At the time, the concern was more about providing governmental documents when citizens specifically asked for them. However, by the late 2000s, European countries began analyzing how to provide transparent data to the citizens proactively, before they asked for it (Curtin & Meijer, 2006). To accomplish this, Europe began utilizing the Internet's capabilities. "In this period the Internet plays a very

important role and is the main medium for the EU to guarantee transparency to the widely dispersed population of Europe” (Curtin & Meijer, 2006, p. 114).

Presently, the U.S. is catching up with Europe and is doing much more in regard to governmental transparency. The days of governmental regulations specific to audits and transparency have been curbed. This turn from regulations was evident in the Obama Administration issuing fewer regulations than his four presidential predecessors (Etzioni, 2014). Obama’s focus was primarily on governmental transparency, not regulation, through initiatives like his Open Government Directive (Meijer, 2013). Per President Obama’s Executive Order M-10-06, the Open Government Directive guided Federal governmental agencies to publish data online, to improve the quality of published data, and to create a culture of open government within each governmental agency. Obama emphasized governmental transparency to restore citizen’s trust and to enhance citizen’s participation of government (Meijer, 2012). This same theme is a focus of this dissertation.

2.2 Freedom of Information Act

The backbone of transparency can be found in Freedom of Information Acts (FOIAs) (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011, p. 35).

The right of the public to access information from its government is fundamental. FOIA is a strong mechanism that allows citizens to exercise that right (Nisbet, 2010, p. 35).

The 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was introduced in the last section; however, this section provides more detail regarding its history. This review is to better understand a fundamental building block of governmental transparency in the U.S. and the world. Although Sweden’s information access laws date back to 1766, the U.S. FOIA is credited for being the pioneer law that began the international push for freedom of information (Hazell, Worthy, & Glover, 2010).

2.2.1 Freedom of Information Act - History

The U.S FOIA was enacted in 1966 and replaced various portions of the older Administrative Procedure Act (Ginsberg, Carey, Halchin, & Keegan, 2013). Experts point to the 1955 hearing of the Special Subcommittee on Government Information as the catalyst for creating the U.S. FOIA. During deliberations, Representative John Moss stated:

We are not studying the availability of information from Congress, although many comments have been made by the press in that field, but we are taking a long, hard look at the amount of information available from the executive and independent agencies for both the public and its elected representatives (Ginsberg, 2013a, p. 54)

The U.S. FOIA act became the template for many other countries' FOIA throughout the world (Worthy, 2010).

The U.S. 1966 FOIA began in 1950s, many years before FOIA was signed into law. The first push towards a FOIA law was from academics that believed that public administrators were becoming too secretive in their activities. People like Paul Appleby, Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs in Syracuse, argued for an open government. This open government concept was opposite to what was occurring in the 1950s. At that time, public administrators hid many legal processes from its citizens because they were presumed to be “a threat to administrative morality, since it [transparency] encourages the administrator to approach his problems narrowly, to minimize or neglect or ignore the general interest” (Mosher, 1982, p. 232). People like Paul Appleby pushed back on these ideas and promoted general freedom of information for the public.

The second push for a FOIA law came directly from the news media (Hazell et al., 2010). In the years directly following World War II, the U.S. feared the spread of communism. Because of this fear, President Truman and his administration began a national security apparatus focusing on information secrecy; the Truman administration did not want any information falling

into communist hands (Forestel, 1999). By the 1950s, the U.S. public administration's goals of national security, secrecy, and governmental information control were in effect. Because of this, the news media began fighting back in order to obtain governmental information.

To promote governmental openness of information, Kent Cooper from the Associated Press penned the phrase "right to know" in 1950 and the phrase caught on with the public (Forestel, 1999). People like Cooper (1956) believed that providing unpublished governmental information constitutes freedom of the press. Without a statute or a specific law, any authorized media representative had a legal right to analyze and audit any governmental document to validate its purpose. As the media promoted their stance with the public, people understood what the media were trying to do. U.S. citizen's perceptions that governmental transparency was a good idea began to take root; U.S. citizens began to believe that they truly had the right to know about governmental policies and governmental decision makings.

Because academics and the media pushed for greater open government, a major catalytic event for U.S.'s FOIA legislation occurred when the Special Subcommittee on Government Information was formed by Chairman John E. Moss. The subcommittee officially began on June 9, 1955. The news media applauded the formation and direction of this subcommittee (Forestel, 1999). The first objective of the subcommittee was to mend the government-versus-media riff that occurred due to the government's previous secrecy direction.

By 1956, the Democratic Party was so infuriated with the Eisenhower administration's secrecy that they placed the following declaration directly into their party's platform (Freedom of information, 1956):

During recent years there has developed a practice on the part of Federal agencies to delay and withhold decisions affecting their lives and destinies. We [the Democratic Party] believe that this trend toward secrecy in Government should be reversed and that the Federal Government should return to its basic tradition of exchanging and promoting

the freest flow of information possible in those unclassified areas where secrets involving weapons development and bona fide national security are not involved. We condemn the Eisenhower administration for the excesses practiced in this vital area, and pledge the Democratic Party to reverse this tendency (p. 102,114)

After the rift with the media was mended in 1955-1956 time period, a debate occurred within the Special Subcommittee on Government Information, the debate was whether the U.S. Constitution already guaranteed citizens the right to know or if legislation was required to make it occur (Forestel, 1999). Jacob Scher, a professor of journalism from Northwestern University who was the primary advisor and special counsel to the subcommittee, provided the chief argument that the right to know was inherently imbedded in the 9th and 10th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The 9th Amendment addresses rights retained by the people that are not stated in the U.S. Constitution. The right to know, or freedom of information for U.S. citizens, was argued to be a right not enumerated within the constitution and thus was a right of and to the people. The 10th Amendment states that only the powers listed in the constitution are delegated to the Federal government. All other powers are delegated to the states and to the people. Again, the right to know, since not specifically stated in the constitution, was the right of the people. However, by 1961, the subcommittee was not accomplishing their objectives for more transparent government using the 9th and 10th Amendment arguments. Therefore, the subcommittee made the decision that legislation was their only direction.

On a more human level regarding Jacob Scher, even in his obituary, the Chicago Tribune (Sept 29, 1961) provided the following accolades:

He [Jacob Scher] was lauded in 1959 by Rep. John Moss (D., Cal) chairman of the House subcommittee on government information, for his efforts to obtain full reporting of government news.

In 1960, Prof. Scher urged legislation permitting an appeal to the federal courts by any person denied information by a government agency. He attacked the “growing practice of

withholding information in the executive branch under the claim of ‘executive privilege.’” (Part 2 – p. 12)

It was Scher’s change of direction from using the 9th and 10th amendments to realizing true legislation was required that was the turning point in the FOIA initiative. The U.S. FOIA was born through the workings and writings of Moss and Scher within the Special Subcommittee on Government Information.

To write the FOIA legislation, the subcommittee needed to understand the current public administration’s publication practices occurring during the late 1950s. To understand this, the subcommittee conducted a series of hearings with the executive branch. The specific questions during the hearings were “What categories and types of information possessed by your agency are not available to: (a) The press and other information media serving the public? (b) The Congress? (c) Other federal agencies? (d) Businesses, trade and other groups with an economic interest in the information? (e) Research specialists, scientists, public affairs organizations and similar groups or individuals” (p. 286). After those questions were answered, the subcommittee followed up with another question, “On what do you base authority for denying access to or not making available such information?” (p. 287). These questions harvested how much informational secrecy occurred within the Federal government and if real legislation was required to combat this secrecy. By the early 1960s, the U.S. Congress agreed that it was time for freedom of information legislation (Forestel, 1999).

Moving from initial U.S. FOIA history to world FOIA history, FOIA history is segmented into three phases. As stated above, most FOIA experts point to the U.S.’s 1966 FOIA as the start to freedom of governmental information to its citizens. The first phase began in 1966 and essentially ended during the Watergate era due to President Nixon’s secrecy scandals (McDonald, 2006).

The second phase occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s when many other countries began adopting FOIA legislation. Although initial FOIA adoption occurred throughout the world, Europe was the primary adopter of FOIA laws during the 1980s along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Within the U.S., the requests for freedom of information exploded. Because administrations like Eisenhower's and Nixon's were so secretive, the 1974 and 1976 amendments to the 1966 FOIA opened up more opportunities for citizens and organizations to request documents. For instance, in 1975, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) saw an increase in their FOIA requests five times due to the 1974 FOIA amendment. The primary requesters were businesses trying to obtain information regarding other businesses. A challenge to the 1974 amendment started when corporations began suing the Federal government due to the Federal government releasing too much proprietary information for a given company. These law suits became known as "reverse-FOIA suits" (Forestel, 1999).

Another challenge during the second FOIA phase was President Reagan's 1982 Executive Order 12356. Reagan's order eliminated the need for governmental agencies to consider a citizen's right to know in matters of national security. Reagan pushed various governmental agencies to classify many documents as national security when in fact they were not. The CIA was first to formalize Reagan's initiative into the CIA Information Act which was signed into law in 1984. After the CIA secrecy act became law, the FBI tried to create their secrecy law as well. However, members of Congress started to become leery of Reagan's secrecy direction. By the end of the 1980s, Congress began to truly question secrecy within newly proposed legislation. The pendulum between secrecy and transparency began to swing back in favor of governmental transparency.

The final FOIA phase came in the 1990s when FOIA laws went completely international. Organizations like the World Bank, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development enacted full FOIA policies (McDonald, 2006). However, in the U.S., the national secrecy issue was front and center. By 1996, the tides had turned from national security secrecy back to a more open government. To combat secrecy in 1996, an additional amendment to the 1966 FOIA law was adopted. The 1996 amendment was specific to electronic data and made requesting transparent data much easier than ever before. The 1996 amendment also provided easier FOIA search capabilities for U.S. citizens. Prior to the 1996 amendment, governmental agencies were required to publish certain documents, but most documents were only required to be available in public reading rooms. These public reading rooms were limited geographically for U.S. citizens and governmental documents were extremely difficult to search (Forestel, 1999). Overall, the 1996 amendment opened more transparent documentation to the U.S. citizenry and was a major part of the FOIA third phase.

It is now argued that the U.S. is in the midst of a fourth phase for FOIAs. This fourth phase is the transition from a paper-based, FOIA request system to an electronic-based, FOIA request system through e-government applications. Started by the 1996 FOIA amendment, this transition was inevitable. Why? By 2004, the U.S. produced far too many paper documents. The Department of Energy alone produced 109,000 tons of paper in 2004 (Roberts, 2006a). Paper costs and paper document management pushed public administrators to look at electronic options in order to implement FOIA requirements. Computer-based FOIA was essential for modernizing transparency in the U.S. government (Hong & Im, 2013) and for keeping transparency costs low. In this fourth phase, the U.S. House of Representatives proposed the Government Information Transparency Act in order to incorporate electronic and web abilities more into FOIA (Congress,

House of Representatives 11th, 2009); however, the act never became law. Since 2009, other electronic transparency acts have been proposed, but no substantial law has been passed.

The initial 1966 FOIA legislation was not perfect. To rectify various inefficiencies in the legislation, the actual 1966 U.S. FOIA was amended six different times in 1974, 1976, 1986, 1996, 2007, and 2010 (Ginsberg, et al, 2013). Why all the changes? The challenge has not been making the FOIA better throughout the years; the challenge has been how each administration and even each Congress defines what exactly FOIA's scope is and what exactly constitutes one of the nine exemptions (explained on next page). Each amendment rectified an interpretation gap or loophole of the 1966 FOIA law.

Regarding this interpretation gap, the executive branch's interpretation of FOIA since its inception in 1966 has been broad. The spectrum has ranged from near secrecy to a very transparent executive branch. This range was witnessed during the past two administrations. For instance, President George W. Bush's Administration acted with much less transparency in regard to FOIA requests. The Bush Administration focused more on national safety, security, and secrecy versus full transparency due largely to the actions subsequent to September 11, 2001. George Bush's Administration accomplished this national safety and secrecy direction by using the FOIA exemptions (Ginsberg, 2013a). On the other hand, the Obama Administration, at least initially, pushed freedom for transparency (Ginsberg et al., 2013). An example of this was on December 8, 2009. The Obama Administration released the Open Government Directive. In this directive, President Barack Obama provided a roadmap on how governmental agencies implement a more open and transparent government.

2.2.2 Freedom of Information Act – Definition

After providing a historical view into FOIA, the question “What is FOIA?” must be addressed. In general, the FOIA is an open records law. The FOIA provides an individual the right to unpublished information from nearly all governmental agencies (Boardman, 1983). Not only does FOIA apply to all Federal agencies, the law applies to almost any action that is performed within a Federal governmental organization. The 1966 U.S. FOIA allows any person or organization access to certain unpublished, existing executive-branch documents, regardless of any justification or explanation for viewing these documents (Faulconer & Dashaw, 2013). The word “certain” in this context refers to nine exemption categories that the executive branch and its public administrators can refuse release of requested materials (Birkinshaw, 2006; Ginsberg, 2013a). These exemptions include (Boardman, 1983; Ginsberg et al., 2013; Stevens, 2013):

- Secret national defense or foreign policy documents
- Agency personnel rules and practices
- Information stating what documentation should be withheld
- Trade secrets of commercial or financial entities that were obtained confidentially
- Communication between governmental agencies
- Personal information like Medicare medical files
- Certain law enforcement investigation files
- Documents relating to the regulation of financial institutions
- Geophysical or geological information

If the Federal governmental agency refuses publication of a FOIA request document, a person or organization can appeal the denial even if the documents are classified in one of these nine exemption categories. This appeal process is performed through the U.S. court system.

Besides an individual, other FOIA actors can request records including lawyers, press, lobby groups, corporations, academics, consumer groups, and activists. In fact, four of the submitter categories are so large that they have their own request process. These four categories are commercial requesters, educational institutions, non-commercial scientific institutions, and news media requesters (Wise, 1994).

Special interest groups and the media are the greatest users of the U.S.'s FOIA. In 2002 and 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was the largest special interest group to utilize the U.S. FOIA (Roberts, 2006a). Because of this, governmental employees complain how these special interest groups like the ACLU and the media use the FOIA data. For many requests, the transparent data are never utilized (Roberts, 2006a). This fact is alarming in that these FOIA requests are a waste of a public administration's time, money, and resources if they are never used. Moreover, many media requests are for trivial issues, like public administrator's travel and hospitality expenses (Roberts, 2006a). "Thus FOI[A], in political reality, means that governments are not more open about what they do but more open about their mistakes and failures" (Worthy, 2010, p. 576).

With special interests and the media requesting undisclosed data, public administrators feel that they can no longer be neutral in terms of governmental advice. "The sort of news that is generated by FOIA is unlikely to be flattering to government" (Roberts, 2006b, p. 119). In helping create and implement laws, public administrators traditionally have a "cloak of anonymity" (Hazell et al., 2010, p. 136). However, FOIAs are written to potentially endanger

this neutrality and anonymity. If interest groups and the media push certain positions, public administrators may be pressured to act in a certain way and make decisions that they would not normally make without FOIAs being in place.

Although some of the FOIA requested data are never utilized, some data are requested and only used for personal reasons like academic research or a citizen's hobby. Forty percent of requested FOIAs are for individual needs. Academics, campaign workers, and journalists make up 10 percent each. Finally, commercial businesses make up 7 percent of the FOIA requests (Worthy, 2010). Except for campaign workers, the majority (67 percent) of requested FOIA data are not for political reasons. For yet a second major reason, FOIAs may not actually increase public participation, even though it is one of FOIA's goals.

The amount of requested documentation can vary anywhere from one page to reams of pages. The delivery format is either paper or electronic (Faulconer & Dashaw, 2013). The frequently requested transparent documents from the Federal government are contracts, bidder's mailing lists, invitation for bid (IFB) lists, abstracts from the IFB bids, request for proposal (RFP) offerors lists, abstracts from the RFP offers, technical and cost proposals, progress reports, delivery orders, business clearances, classified records, and personnel records (Wise, 1994). These requested documents make up the bulk of all FOIA requests.

As stated earlier, the transparency pendulum swung from secrecy in the Bush Administration to more openness in the Obama Administration. However, with the new Trump Administration, the pendulum appears to be swinging back to less governmental transparency as witnessed in the Trump Administration's recent refusal to publish White House visitor lists.

Reviewing the volume of requests, in 2008, the U.S. government received over 600,000 FOIA requests. Of those 600,000 requests, only 1.5% requests were appealed and only 0.05%

(323 cases) requests were litigated in court (Nisbet, 2010). By 2015, the total FOIA requests were over 700,000 with 2% of the requests being appealed (Nisbet, 2015). With these low appeal and litigation percentages, one could argue that the current FOIA request process is working. However, the challenge for governmental agencies is that although these percentages are low, the costs for appeals and legal litigation are high.

To combat these high FOIA costs, the Obama Administration initiated five communication and mediation services. These services include (Nisbet, 2010):

- Creating FOIA public liaison positions in the governmental agencies to better resolve disputes
- Developing a pool of highly trained mediators to mediate disputes before going to court
- Informally mediating potential disputes before an appeal even occurs
- Reviewing online dispute capabilities prior to an appeal occurring
- Reengineering current FOIA dispute practices to make them more streamlined and efficient

These services are primarily performed through the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). OGIS was established in 2009 to address these needs (Office, United States Government Accountability, 2013). Although OGIS continues to advance their goals, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that OGIS establish timelines to complete their current directives. The GAO made these recommendations since OGIS timelines continue to slip (Office, United States Government Accountability, 2013).

What are the benefits of FOIAs? How does the FOIA help U.S. citizens? The answer is transparency (Hazell et al., 2010). The U.S. FOIA's goal is to make governmental information more transparent to the U.S. citizenry. Recently, the Obama Administration enhanced

transparency through expansion of current U.S. FOIA policies. The Obama Administration not only did this through a technical solution, but also through a human solution, specifically through direct human interaction with the U.S. executive branch of government. The Obama Administration provided direct human interaction by addressing two major issues. The two issues were, and still are, citizens lacking Internet access to governmental websites and governmental transparency sustainability over the long-term (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010).

One very interesting aspect of FOIA is that no area within the executive branch, at least when FOIA was initially enacted, supported the FOIA legislation. In fact, the initial law was at odds with the branch of government that administers the law. Public administrators under the FOIA must make available previously undisclosed documents to the citizens, but these same public administrators are not inclined to support the law since the FOIA documents being disclosed could uncover an action, issue, or error that the same public administrators did (Ginsberg, 2013a; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b).

Although the primary goal for the FOIA is transparency, other FOIA goals include (Worthy, 2010, p. 564):

- Increase governmental accountability
- Improve governmental decision-making quality
- Improve governmental decision-making understanding to the general public
- Increase public trust
- Increase public participation

This dissertation focuses upon the last two goals regarding how a citizen's perception and use of transparency through FOIA laws increases public trust and public participation. One major reason for this focus is, as Worthy states, "the study of FOI is in its infancy" (p. 562). "Given the

rapid spread of FOI[A], it is surprising that there has not been more systematic study of its effects. There is little academic literature on FIO[A]... The lack of research on FOI[A] is surprising given how rapidly it has spread across the world” (Hazell et al., 2010, p. 3).

Regarding trust, Worthy’s (2010) findings regarding the effects of FOIAs in the United Kingdom demonstrate something rather interesting. FOIA and public trust is perceived differently depending on one’s frame of reference. For instance, over 50 percent of public administrators do not feel that FOIAs increase trust within the general citizenry. However, 80 percent of citizens perceive that FOIAs increase trust in government (Worthy, 2010). Therefore, a large discrepancy exists between the giver of the FOIA information (e.g. public administrators) and the receiver of FOIA information (e.g. citizens). Worthy’s (2010) findings also demonstrate that based on the published transparent information, most of the United Kingdom’s media FOIA stories are negative towards government. This fact is alarming to public administrators since this reinforces the fear that governmental transparent data will be held against them. In 2010, only eight percent of the United Kingdom’s media stories were positive to public administration (Worthy, 2010). No public administrative studies have been conducted to verify Worthy’s results within the U.S.

Besides public trust, public participation potentially increases through FOIAs. The idea is that with an increase in governmental information, the public will better understand why and how tasks are completed in government. With an increased governmental understanding, public participation will increase (Hazell et al., 2010).

Although certain reasons exist in favor of the FOIA like fighting governmental secrecy and corruption (Birkinshaw, 2006), certain arguments against FOIAs are also in the public administration literature. First, some experts argue that secrecy is beneficial, especially during

negotiations. During public policy decision making, secrecy can facilitate deliberations and agreements amongst parties (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). Second, FOIAs provide a method to criticize government, not promote it. This idea causes less trust, not increased trust in government. Third, FOIAs could be an assault on people's privacy (Birkinshaw, 2006). Unnecessary release of a public administrator's personal information may occur. Finally, information overload can arise. FOIAs may provide too much data for citizens to understand or the data could be too detailed for an average citizen's comprehension. Data overload can cause confusion and even misunderstanding, opposite to the FOIA's fundamental goals. WikiLeaks is an example of data overload. WikiLeaks yielded a mammoth amount of raw data. However, the average U.S. citizen did not have the capacity or ability to understand and analyze all the data (Meijer, Hart, & Worthy, 2015). In 2017, WikiLeaks again performed this data dump by publishing a large amount of CIA surveillance data.

Other challenges exist with FOIAs. Governments pass FOIAs for good intentions (e.g. increased transparency, increased public trust, and higher public participation). However, many public administrators who administer the FOIA are in conflict when publishing the requested data. For instance, because public administrators know that they are being watched due to FOIA, public administrators can change their habits and not document the information. If data are not written or recorded, they are not discoverable (Forestel, 1999). Public administrators may document governmental proceedings; however, if the written information is too generic or certain details are left out, nothing specific can be discovered. Also, although this is not ethical, discoverable documents through the FOIA could be deleted, meaning public administrators could delete the documents. For example, Secretary of State Clinton was accused of deleting 30,000 emails from her private email server. Without proper audit capabilities within the FOIA

guidelines, this action is difficult to detect. Furthermore, the publication of FOIA information may not be consistent throughout each public administration's department. Some public administrators are more forthcoming and transparent with FOIA requests compared to other agency's public administrators.

Finally, public administration management could under-resource an FOIA operation; so much so, that generation of a requested FOIA document could be greatly hindered (Roberts, 2006b). Because FOIA is such a conflict of interest for public administrators, many Federal agencies split their FOIA requests into two separate departments or workflow streams. One workflow stream is dedicated to recent publications and the second workflow stream is dedicated to historical publications (Forestel, 1999). For instance, the FDA has a staff of three full-time staff dedicated to FOIA requests for very recent governmental transparent data. The FDA also has a staff of part-time employees committed to only addressing historical FOIA data requests.

Although it was stated earlier that the executive branch and public administrators do not like FOIAs, a small group of public administrators advocate transparency as the primary goal of FOIAs. This group believes in a citizen's right to know about governmental information and governmental decision making. Founded in 1980, the American Society of Access Professionals (ASAP) is an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to the administration of the FOIA law, the Privacy Act, and any other related statutes (Forestel, 1999). The organization is made up of 85% Federal public administrators and 15% U.S. citizens who perform FOIA requests. Although ASAP advocates transparency through FOIA, the ASAP organization's tasks also include clarifying ambiguity of the FOIA and understanding implications of FOIA court rulings, FOIA executive orders, and public administrative FOIA guidelines (Forestel, 1999).

2.2.3 Freedom of Information Act – The U.S. Courts

During this historical look at the FOIA, the focus has been on the executive and congressional branches of government. However, what about the courts? How have the U.S. courts viewed the U.S.'s FOIA? The courts have primarily sided toward secrecy and the executive branch versus pure freedom of information for U.S. citizens (Forestel, 1999). The courts have ruled that the FOIA exemptions carry more weight than freedom of information requests and legislation, especially in the areas of law enforcement and national security.

For instance, in an initial FOIA landmark U.S. Supreme Court Case, *Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink*, the court ruled that the secrecy of U.S. nuclear bomb testing is more important under FOIA law than environmental data for its citizens. The environmental data in this case pertained to health implications for U.S. citizens living near nuclear test sites in the Aleutian Island chain between Alaska and Hawaii (Mink, 1975). “*Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink* presented the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret the Freedom of Information Act of 1966... By its ruling in *Mink*, the court dealt such a severe blow to the purpose of the Act that it might better be titled the ‘Executive Secrecy Act’” (Mink, 1975, p. 8). Also, Federal courts have ruled that many FOIA clauses are too ambiguous. The Federal courts have pushed the U.S. Congress to enhance the FOIA law to resolve these ambiguities. This was one major reason for the various amendments to the original U.S. 1966 FOIA. Overall, the U.S. courts have been a hindrance to the FOIA’s goal of transparency for its citizens (Forestel, 1999).

2.2.4 Freedom of Information Act – Performance

How is the current U.S. FOIA performing? Miriam Nisbet, Director of the Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, testified in

2012 to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and Procurement Reform that the Federal government between 2010 and 2012 created better electronic search capabilities along with a greatly enhanced www.FOIA.gov website. Between 2010 and 2012, the Federal government opened more governmental information to the U.S. citizens (Nisbet, 2012).

Even though Miriam Nisbet provided glowing FOIA performance testimony two years prior, during a 2010 hearing before the Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, opponents to Obama's directive provided contrary testimony. David Sobel, Senior Counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, agreed that Obama was very vocal and positive regarding governmental transparency through FOIA; however, Sobel expressed frustration that Obama's talking points and his actions were not in sync. For instance, although Nisbet's five services for better FOIA are being performed, FOIA requests were taking longer than ever. This delay increased so much so that Senator Leahy and Senator Cornyn introduced bi-partisan legislation titled the "Faster FOIA Act" that "establish[es] an advisory panel to examine agency delays in processing FOIA requests" (Sobel, 2010, pp. 82-83).

Another age-old issue that David Sobel addressed was secrecy within the various Federal agencies, especially law enforcement. For example, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) FOIA requests are either tabled for years or are grouped under one of the 1966 FOIA exemptions. Sobel (2010) provided an example where the FBI tabled a FOIA request for 6 years before addressing it, showing a definite need for a faster FOIA Act to become law. Although the FOIA Federal request backlog decreased significantly from 2008 to 2009, from 2009 to 2012, the backlog remained constant without any further decrease (Ginsberg, 2014).

In 2015, lag time for FOIA requests was again a topic in a congressional hearing. Rick Blum from the Sunshine Government Initiative testified that although FOIA provided open data to journalists, the wait time from the time a FOIA request is submitted until it is fulfilled was extremely long (Blum, 2015). The reason that the request wait time was such an issue in 2015 is that “nothing in the Freedom of Information Act requires expeditious handling of requests for access to public records, nor would fast and efficient response to requests be expected for agencies which uniformly opposed the legislation” (Committee on Government Operations, 1975, p. 22). This timeliness requirement omission in the U.S. FOIA request process is a major public policy gap that needs to be addressed and rectified. The fear is that the longer a FOIA request takes, the longer the undiscovered issue in regard to the requested topic continues.

Besides FOIA request delays being a challenge, the correctness of the FOIA data has been questioned as well. In 2012, the GAO did a study on the robustness of the www.FOIA.gov data finding both positives and negatives with the data. On the positive side, first, GAO’s conclusion was that U.S. governmental agencies were populating the website with the mandated reports from each of the governmental agencies. Second, the GAO also found that over the past couple years, the www.FOIA.gov expanded the list of governmental agencies posting their data on the site. On the negative side, even with these advancements, the GAO determined that the reliability of the www.FOIA.gov report data was questionable at best. For instance, of the 97 governmental agencies that were to report data on www.FOIA.gov, many agencies posted reports that were incomplete, or the reports were simply missing (Office, United States Government Accountability, 2012). In fact, their recommendation for the www.FOIA.gov website was that “the Director of the Office of Information Policy, in conjunction with the department’s Chief Information Office, make certain that the website’s ‘Advanced Reporting’

feature produces complete reports in response to all queries” (Office, United States Government Accountability, 2012, p. 3). This recommendation means that audit capabilities against FOIA should be enacted.

Like the audit recommendation, one final challenge that Miriam Nisbet (2015) addressed was the challenge that public administrators create the unpublished FOIA documents and they are the ones to determine if the documents fall under FOIA guidelines for release or are part of the nine exemptions. This issue was addressed earlier in this section, but it is worth addressing again. Nisbet stated that a definite conflict of interest exists under current FOIA law. Nisbet’s recommendation was to create a third-party ombudsman organization specifically dedicated to processing FOIA requests for the Federal government. In 2015, Nisbet supported changes to the FOIA law in order to make the requests more independent from the current public administrators (Nisbet, 2015).

This section focused specifically on the U.S. FOIA law. FOIA’s primary goal of transparency will be analyzed next. This dissertation’s continuing focus is how a citizen’s perception of transparency relates to public trust and public participation.

2.3 Transparency – Detailed Review

When it comes to government transparency, we are only starting to understand the variety in potential benefits and drawbacks (Meijer et al., 2015, p. 21).

Transparency is more often preached than practiced, more often invoked than defined, and indeed might ironically be said to be mystic in essence, at least to some extent (Hood, 2006a, p. 3).

In relationship to government, transparency is about opening the black box of government, unknown and misunderstood to the general citizenry. Transparency allows the citizens to see the intra-workings of governmental areas like decision making, budgets, planning,

and policy outcomes. Transparency provides artifacts in order to allow the governmental black box to be open or to be “in the sunshine” as quoted within much of the public administration literature. The expectation is that by opening this black box, citizens will have a better understanding of government when they eventually go to the ballot box (Veal et al., 2015). Ultimately, transparency forges a closer relationship between government and its citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a).

So, why focus on transparency within government? One major reason is that many experts and academics believe that transparency is a fundamental human right that is not currently truly provided to the public (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Birkinshaw, 2006; de Fine Licht, 2011; Heald, 2012; Hood, 2006b; Roberts, 2004). “Transparency is, among all the perspectives, still the one where an intrinsic right is most frequently cited” (Meijer, Curtin, & Hillebrandt, 2012, p. 20).

[Transparency and the] Freedom of information is rightly regarded as a basic human right. There is a long and honourable [sic] tradition of struggle for this right that is based on appeals to political statements such as Article 19 of the *Universal Charter of Human Rights*. Article 4 of the *Declaration of Principles* that was adopted by the first World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva in 2003 is part of this tradition. (Lor & Britz, 2007, p. 396)

In 2015, the European Union stated that transparency is a citizen’s human right to access any governmental information in order to express their opinion (Ortiz-Rodriguez, Navarro-Galera, & Alcaraz-Quiles, 2015). Birkinshaw (2006) takes transparency one step further in regard to a human right. Birkinshaw believes that without transparency as a human right, the right to freedom of speech is not fulfilled. Without a properly informed constituency, speaking out in opposition or support of a governmental action cannot occur (Birkinshaw, 2006).

Although many experts and academics believe that governmental transparency is a fundamental human right, a few experts do not believe that it is a broad human right. Instead,

these experts believe that transparency is a tool to keep government in check, much like Light's watchful eye (Scarlett, 2014). "Transparency is... a tool for enhancing the accountability of governments, as a principle to be implemented in order to reduce corruption, and a means for making information on government performance more readily available" (Cucciniello et al., 2015, p. 572). E-government expands this transparency tool concept. For instance, websites provide easier means for governmental agencies to publish transparent data proactively (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011).

Even if not all experts classify transparency as a human right, transparency has recently gained momentum in not only the public administration discipline, but other disciplines as well. Transparency is not just a new buzzword that people in multidisciplinary areas are using; instead, scholars in academic fields like sociology, law, economics, geography, journalism, and business administration are also debating transparency's benefits and researching transparency in their scholarly areas (Piotrowski, 2009).

Besides transparency gaining popularity across academic disciplines, transparency has gained popularity specifically in public administration for five key reasons. First, conventional forms of governmental auditing and intervention are seen as not working. These conventional forms include standard governmental regulations and auditing of outcomes (Fung et al., 2007). A second reason for public administration transparency increasing in popularity is the rise of the Internet, e-government, and social media. E-government allows for quicker and easier publication of transparent documents along with easier access to this data. A third reason is the intense media scrutiny on government to publish more and more transparent data (Oliver, 2004). Fourth, transparency addresses public service issues and emerging risks (e.g. governmental agency sustainability) within public administration. Since the present U.S. government is so

deadlocked due to the current two-party system, citizens look to public administrators to try and forge better public service (Fung et al., 2007). Lastly, public agencies place emphasis on transparency within their mission statements. This emphasis raises the level of transparency awareness within government, especially at the U.S. local level (Fairbanks, Plowman, & Rawlins, 2007).

Transparency is not only about the disclosure of data, but also the use of data. Transparency is a two-way communicative relationship between a provider of data and a receiver of data (Heald, 2012). For complete transparency, the citizenry must process the transparent data for it to be classified as fully transparent (Ginsberg et al., 2013). Therefore, the government must be forthcoming with unpublished data, but the citizens must also be capable of understanding the data in order to use it. Governmental transparency use and how it relates to trust and participation is one of the major focal points in this dissertation.

This two-way relationship is sometimes called “transparency as an institutional relation” (Meijer, 2013, p. 430). The relationship is between the object of transparency and the subject of transparency, who is monitoring the object’s performance. This relationship is based on rules, interactions, and power. A test if transparency is working is not about how much data are published, but about how much citizens understand and use the transparent data once the data are published (Hood, 2006b). As the trite expression states, “perception is everything,” understanding citizen perception of governmental transparency is critical. However, this understanding can be difficult to measure. With more attention being placed on transparency recently, more attention must be placed on citizens being governed so that citizens fully understand the published transparent data (Schuler, 2010).

Transparency has five major components. These components include (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b):

- Availability
- Information
- Governmental organization or agency
- External actor
- Internal workings

Availability is about transparent data existing or not. Information is how robust the transparent data are. Do the data meet the citizen's needs for understanding? Governmental organization or agency is the governmental area that is targeted to publish the transparent data. This organization or agency could be a non-governmental organization if the services are contracted out. External actor is a citizen or external organization that is requesting the data. Finally, internal workings determine where in the public policy process the transparent data are being requested (e.g. decision making, the public policy, or the policy outcome).

The two major reasons for governmental transparency are to increase public trust and public participation. These reasons are the main focus of this dissertation's research study. Public trust through governmental transparency can be viewed through three different academic theory lenses. First, governmental transparency can be viewed through *principal-agency theory* (de Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson, & Gilljam, 2014). Although this will be embellished later in this dissertation, transparency can reduce uncertainty for the agent. Since the principal (e.g. government) has more information than the agent (e.g. citizen), governmental transparency decreases the informational moral hazard by providing the agent more data in order to make better rational decisions. Second, governmental transparency can be viewed through *deliberative*

democracy theory (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). Governmental transparency provides better understanding of reasons for new public policy along with how the public policy is implemented. Third, governmental transparency can be viewed through *procedural fairness theory* (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). Governmental transparency provides how a decision is made, meaning the process to make the governmental decision. This theory is about the process being fair and equitable. Therefore, academic literature promotes that governmental transparency increases trust in government through the lenses of principal-agent theory, deliberative democracy theory, and procedural fairness theory.

In general, two types of public trust exist; these types are process-based trust and institutional-based trust. *Process-based trust* is embedded in repeated exchanges between a citizen and a governmental agency. As the exchanges increase, a citizen forms a positive or negative opinion of the governmental agency. These opinions and perceptions are based on if the government cares for the citizen or not. Therefore, if the governmental transparent data and interactions are positive, a citizen's process-based trust will increase; otherwise, negative data and experiences could cause a citizen's process-based trust to decline (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). *Institutional-based trust* is rooted in the perception of the public agency. If citizens feel good about the public agency, then the trust will be higher. Institutional-based trust does not require any citizen interactions. Institutional-based trust is more based on how the public agency brands itself versus the actual individual interactions that occur (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

In the public administration's scholarly debate on whether increasing governmental transparency does or does not increase public trust, three different camps exist, transparency optimists, transparency pessimists, and transparency skeptics (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). *Transparency optimists* state that a positive correlation exists between transparency and

public trust. When a governmental agency increases transparency, the public is more likely to trust that governmental agency more (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011; Hood, 2006a; Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997). This belief is a widely shared opinion by citizenry throughout the world (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). More openness and more honesty energize the public to feel better about the agency and to trust the agency more (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Transparency optimists are concerned about “lifting the veil of secrecy” in order to create a more open government for its citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). An example of transparency optimist is President Obama’s Open Government Directive that his administration initiated on Obama’s first day in office.

Transparency pessimists believe the opposite. By increasing governmental transparency, public trust will decrease (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Fox, 2007; O’Neill, 2006). Fox echoes this belief stating, “We find that when lawmakers are better informed than the public about the underlying state of the world, parameterizations of the model always exist in which increasing the transparency of the policy process harms the public” (Fox, 2007, p. 26). This camp believes that the public has too much data (e.g., information overload) or the data are too complicated for the public to understand. Furthermore, transparency pessimists believe that transparent data can enable a public administration witch hunt where the citizens and media focus on negative governmental issues, not the positive issues (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). Grimmelikhuijsen labels these witch hunts as the “politics of scandal.” Even Tony Blair stated in his memoir that transparency is like having a mallet to use as a weapon against public administration (Meijer et al., 2015). Another transparency pessimistic idea is that if the public determines what really occurs in government, then the public will be more distrusting. Finally, some transparency pessimists feel that by increasing governmental transparency, the public policy creators and

public administrators will document less so that they will not be scrutinized. The outcome from this view is that increased transparency could be associated with less data being produced for accountability.

Finally, *transparency skeptics* do not believe that any correlation exists between a citizen's perception of transparency and public trust. This camp believes that providing transparent public policy to the citizens is the correct action to take, but this camp does not believe that it will sway public trust in either direction (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). The limited governmental transparency research data are inconclusive on which camp is correct. "Although the effect of government transparency on trust is heavily debated, theoretical and empirical understanding of this relationship is still limited" (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012, p. 137).

Reviewing the relationship between transparency and trust within current scholarly literature, Grimmelikhuijsen constantly utilizes three dimensions of trust throughout his writings. These dimensions are competence, benevolence, and honesty (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). *Competency* is the capability to act. Some experts use the terms of ability, effectiveness, and expertise (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010). Essentially, competency is the capacity for governmental officials to make a decision and implement that decision (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). *Benevolence* is the government's intention. Words like caring and commitment reflect benevolence within this transparency trust dimension. Finally, *honesty* is the integrity of a legislator or public administrator. Honesty demonstrates if the person tells the truth and keeps his or her commitments (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b).

According to Grimmelikhuijsen (2012b, p. 39), eleven scholars (Hetherington, Jarvenpaa, Kim, Levi, Stoker, Mayer, McKnight, Mishra, Peters, Stoker, Tyler, and Welch) from 1995 to 2005 used these three dimensions in their trust research within the public administration literature. The transparency research results using these three dimensions have varied greatly. One study found that comparing a similar governmental website with no transparency, low transparency, and high transparency, the high transparency website provided a much higher degree of benevolence in the general public, a slightly higher amount of honesty, but no increase in competency (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009). Another study utilized local governmental websites in the Netherlands. This study compared local websites with and without governmental transparent data. The results demonstrated a significant negative perception of competency and honesty towards the local government. However, the study's findings showed that no difference between transparent and non-transparent local governmental websites regarding benevolence existed (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010). Finally, another European study found that a specific transparent website regarding Dutch environmental data increased negative perceptions of governmental competency. However, governmental transparency had no effect on perceived benevolence or honesty (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). These three studies demonstrate definite inconsistencies in public administration transparency research. More transparency research in public administration is required.

Although Grimmelikhuijsen has performed numerous quantitative studies, most of his studies only utilize college students as subjects. Using only college students, the robustness and diversity of citizenry sampling is lacking in these studies. Furthermore, U.S. citizens are not included in any of these studies. To rectify the college student universes, a larger study done in 2013 utilized citizens from South Korea and the Netherlands. This study's findings unveil that

transparency does cause negative perceptions of competency within government. Therefore, with the competency dimension, transparency actually reduces governmental trust, not increases it. These findings go directly against conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between transparency and trust. Like the 2011 study, governmental transparency in this study displayed no effect on governmental benevolence or honesty in South Korea or the Netherlands (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).

Moving from governmental transparency's effect on public trust to its effect on public participation, three relationships are hypothesized to exist between governmental transparency and public participation. First, a *synergistic* relationship exists where governmental transparency ensures that citizens will obtain access to the appropriate governmental data and that participation allows access to the citizens to act in a necessary way for or against this transparent data. Governmental transparency data causes citizen participation. Second, a *complementary* relationship exists where participation is performed while public policy is being created. Transparency is provided at the end of the public policy process. Synergistic and complementary relationships are converse situations in regard to when transparency and public participation occurs. Governmental transparency causes citizen participation in a synergistic relationship; citizen participation causes transparency data outcomes in a complementary relationship. Lastly, an *undermining* relationship exists where governmental transparency may cause a negative impact to public participation. For example, during heated public policy debates, participants may be reluctant to truly voice their views. This debate hindrance could cause less public participation since the citizens will not understand the true reasons for the public policy's creation (Meijer et al., 2012).

Besides public trust and public participation as the primary reasons for transparency, other reasons for governmental transparency have been promoted in public administration literature (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). First, governmental transparency is specific to the public's right to know. This reason is embedded in the FOIAs. Second, good governance is another reason for transparency or at least, governmental transparency is an enabler of good governance (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012; Loretan, 2013). Democratic governments utilize transparency to combat the tendency toward secrecy and authoritarian governments (Cucciniello et al., 2015). Although transparency will not deliver public services to citizens, transparency in governance validates that public services are equitable and efficient. Also, governmental transparency is a method to make government accountable within the scope of good governance. In fact, experts argue that governmental transparency can reduce corruption within public administration; experts also argue that transparency can provide greater efficiency and effectiveness within public institutions (Heald, 2012).

With governmental transparency, three separate areas exist: decision-making transparency, public policy transparency, and public policy outcome transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012;). Even though quickly highlighted at the beginning of this dissertation, these three areas are discussed in greater detail here. These three separate areas are called “transparency of workings and performance” in determining what the governmental agency is to achieve and how the governmental agency will achieve its public policy goal (Meijer, 2013, p. 430; Thomsen, 2013). Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) places these three areas under the “internal workings” component of transparency. See Figure 2.2 (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, p. 11):




Figure 2.2. Areas of Governmental Transparency

Decision-making transparency has two components. The first component is the rationale behind the decision. The second component is the openness to the steps that lead to a public policy. For instance, governmental transparency in this case would be the meeting minutes, the deliberations, the research, and the requested expert opinions that shaped the decision regarding the public policy. *Public policy transparency* is the actual law or public policy. To create this transparent information, a public administrator documents the law into layman’s terms so that the general public can understand the legislation. This public policy transparency also includes any information on how the policy is implemented and more importantly, how the legislation will affect the citizenry. Finally, *public policy outcome transparency* is the metrics and mechanisms to measure the success or failure of the enacted public policy (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011).

Although each transparency area is very important, much of the current public administration literature focuses upon the decision-making transparency as a critical area for citizens to understand government (de Fine Licht et al., 2014; Newbold, 2011).

Regarding decision making, in 2014, de Fine Licht et al. analyzed the relationship between governmental decision making and transparency differently than Grimmelikhuijsen (2011). To de Fine Licht et al., transparent decision-making splits into two different forms, transparency in rationale and transparency in process (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). *Transparency*

in rationale refers specifically to what the actual decision is and how the decision was made. Normally this transparent information is published specifically for an external actor or group that is not involved in the decision making but is directly affected by the decision. *Transparency in process* refers to the documented actions, deliberations, negotiations, and votes that occur to progress to a final decision. The difference between transparency in rationale and transparency in process is the difference between a concrete decision and the actions to achieve a concrete decision (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). In the public administration literature, sometimes “transparency in rationale” is termed “event transparency” and “transparency in process” is referred to simply as “process transparency” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009; Heald, 2006b; Heald, 2012).

Regarding public policy outcome transparency, four different dimensions can be analyzed: institutional dimension, political dimension, financial dimension, and service-delivery dimension (Cucciniello et al., 2015). The *institutional dimension* demonstrates how much emphasis a governmental agency places transparency into its mission and vision statements. Does the governmental agency not only talk the talk, but also walk the walk in terms of transparency? The *political dimension* describes the background of the decisions makers along with the degree of intensity that a person, who is involved with the decision, has in the public policy process and decision making. The *financial dimension* is simply how much financial information that a particular governmental agency releases to the general public. Lastly, the *service-delivery dimension* is transparency on how well or badly a governmental service is being provided to the public. Cucciniello et al. (2015) found something interesting in regard to these dimensions. Cucciniello et al.’s study sampled 117 Italian provincial capitals and 500 Italian citizens. Cucciniello et al. found that Italian local governments focused completely on

institutional and political dimensions because the local public officials and administrators believed that these public policy outcome transparency dimensions were the most important. However, the citizens surveyed put much greater emphasis and priority on financial and service-delivery dimensions. In other words, the Italian local government administrators believed what the citizens want was not at all what the citizen's desire in terms of transparent data (Cucciniello et al., 2015).

Another way to analyze governmental transparency is through completeness, color, and usability (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). *Completeness* refers to how much transparent data are disclosed. Was the transparent data fully disclosed or was some transparent data missing? *Color* refers to how positive and upbeat the data are spun when initially published. Color can indicate how much spin a public agency is trying to do regarding the transparent data that is being released. An agency may spin data positively to stay in front of any bad publicity that could arise from the released transparent data. Errors and inefficiencies are much more newsworthy than positive news (Meijer et al., 2015). Finally, *usability* deals with areas like timeliness of transparent data, ease of searching and obtaining transparent data, or more recently, how easy a governmental website is to use in order to obtain transparent data (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013).

Regarding timelines within transparency usability, a distinction must be stated. Transparency data can either be viewed in retrospect or in real time. For retrospect, requested transparent data can be from a historical perspective; for real time, requested transparent data can be from an extremely current perspective (Heald, 2012). Retrospective transparent data usually is published on a set periodic reporting interval. This cycle means that a timeframe is determined, and the reports generate at a later timeframe depending on the governmental agency's resource

availability. On the other hand, the accountability window for real time transparent data is always open and continuous (Heald, 2006b). Regardless of transparent data in retrospect or real time, the usability characteristic is based on how quickly the governmental agency provides the requested transparent data.

Governmental transparency has three different factors affecting it: organizational capacity, political influence, and group influence (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). *Organizational capacity* refers to how well a specific governmental agency can deliver required transparent documentation. Currently, governmental agencies with robust e-governmental websites are much better positioned in organizational capacity versus governmental agencies with little to no Internet capability. *Political influence* expands on the idea that transparent data are *not* politically neutral. Published transparent data are spun in some manner, even if just slightly. Finally, *group influence* recognizes that all outside organizations have some type of influence on the publication of transparent data. This influence is especially true from the media (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch's (2012) premise is that these three factors in combination predict a governmental agency's transparency ability.

Transparent data are released to the citizenry in four different ways. First, a governmental agency can be proactive in releasing the transparent data. The agency can either publish the data to the public or post the data on an e-government website based on a set periodic interval. The second method is when a citizen or external group requests transparent data. The data are not guaranteed to be released due to FOIA's nine exemptions. This request method is slow, and the government may not release all the data or documents that are requested. The third method is for citizens to attend public governmental meetings to hear and witness the actual decision-making process. This method allows citizens firsthand knowledge of the policy process versus reading it

through transparent documentation. Leaks from whistleblowers are the fourth method that transparent data are released to the citizenry (Bertot et al., 2010). When whistleblowing is performed, normal forms of transparent data release have failed.

At this point in the dissertation, transparency has been explained; however, no discussion regarding what governmental transparency solves has been put forth. One issue that governmental transparency helps resolve is governmental power. By providing transparent data to its citizens, government does not hold a monopoly on power and secrecy. This situation is analogous to information asymmetry when applied to market failures. Governmental transparency provides a “civic check-and-balance mechanism that is fundamental to curbing the misbehavior of the powerful” (Fung & Weil, 2010, p. 106). With governmental transparency, an informed public understands the workings of government. If the citizens do not like what they find from the governmental transparent data, citizens can vote legislators and executives out of office. A study in Britain found that citizens voted poor performing legislators out of office based on “bad” transparent data against them; however, citizens did not keep legislators in office based on “good” transparent data. In this study, “bad” transparent data were much more influential on the citizenry in terms of public participation (Meijer et al., 2015). Also, with power comes potential harm and corruption. Transparency allows corruption to be uncovered and stopped. Fung and Weil (2010) advocate that transparency should not solely reside in FOIA laws. Instead, the U.S. government should also create transparency laws targeting non-governmental organizations like major corporations. Transparent data from both government and businesses is required in the U.S. culture (Fung & Weil, 2010).

Do only organizations and people outside government benefit from transparency? The answer is “no.” Although outsiders benefit from governmental transparency, insiders do as well

(O'Neill, 2006). It is almost self-evident that governmental outsiders benefit from transparency. Outsiders gain access to internal governmental data that otherwise is not published for their review. Outsiders can assess government's true performance based on published metrics. In general, transparency weakens insiders' power and increases outsider power due to transfer of data and knowledge (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). Because of this principal-agent conflict, "those who think that they will benefit from more transparency will try to develop more transparency, and those who think that they will suffer from it will resist and increase in transparency" (Meijer, 2013, p. 431). However, governmental insiders benefit as well. Insiders can reduce risk and blame by transferring liability to other governmental organizations (O'Neill, 2006). Although this might not be the most ethical action, governmental agencies need to survive. If that means publishing transparent data to help promote their agency's brand, then data transparency is the agency's rational action.

Even with all the hype, governmental transparency is not living up to the utopian state that some scholars had hoped. "Transparency has few enemies, but it also offers fewer and more limited benefits than is widely assumed" (O'Neill, 2006, p. 89). Five reasons for this have been noted in the public administration literature (Prat, 2006). First, although full transparency is the right thing to do, governmental agents do not completely make their actions transparent. Agents will resist a principal's request for increased information. Second, as stated earlier, transparency has a cost, not just in terms of money but also in terms of human resources. For instance, governmental agencies need human resources to answer all transparency requests. The transparent data that is published must be correct; therefore, audit capabilities must be built into the transparency publication process. Third, certain transparent data, if published, could harm another area of government, a U.S. company, or a citizen's group (Scarlett, 2014). Public

administrators must be conscious of releasing data that could bring harm to others. Fourth, citizens could completely misinterpret published transparent data. Fifth, although very subtle, an agent could undermine a principal in order to embarrass or to make life difficult for the principal (Prat, 2006). More detailed analysis of principal-agent relationship in regard to transparency is provided later in this dissertation.

Besides the five listed above, other governmental transparency issues also exist. First, transparency can cause a “chilling effect” meaning that documented information is sanitized, or meetings are conducted by phone or face-to-face to avoid any recording mechanisms (Worthy, 2010). “The notion that transparency involves every discussion, memorandum, email, and phone call being liable to disclosure is threatening” (Heald, 2006a, p. 69). As stated earlier, if information is not documented or recorded, it is not discoverable. In a study on governmental documentation published directly after a FOIA was enacted in England, citizens’ fears and negative perceptions increased regarding diluted and sanitized transparent data. Although citizens’ fear was found in the study, in general, substantiating that public administrators sanitize documents after a FOIA is enacted is nearly impossible (Hazell, 1989), but a perceived threat exists.

Another aspect to the “chilling effect” of governmental transparency is risk avoidance. For many years, public administrators prided themselves on emulating an entrepreneurial spirit. However, since public agency failures can now be publicized through governmental transparency, public administrators are stymied with trying a new process that has a possibility of failure. Governmental transparency suppresses new, riskier options; governmental transparency suppresses entrepreneurial spirit (Meijer et al., 2015). Public administrators will stick to a tried-

and-tested process versus trying a potentially more efficient process for fear something will go wrong and be published to the public.

Yet another aspect to the “chilling effect” of governmental transparency is the public administrator’s fears. One public administrator fear is that published governmental transparent data can be distorted. This distorted view could reflect very badly on the public agency or worse, a public administrator’s career. These public administrator fears toward transparency could greatly restrict the accessibility of transparent data to the general public (Fairbanks et al., 2007). For instance, public administrators could suppress what data are released, lessening the fear of publicity for the agency and the administrator but, at the same time, lessening the citizen’s right to robust transparent data. Furthermore, public administrators could feel not only fear, but intimidation, which could result in a dysfunctional governmental agency. For public administrators, intimidation can occur from the “24/7 media that combines relentless negativity about political life with a preference for 30-second sound bites” or from their superiors who want certain transparent data suppressed (Heald, 2012, p. 42).

One final “chilling effect” of transparency is in terms of political stability or upheaval. In times of political stability within the executive branch, more open transparency exists. However, during turbulent political times, the executive branch and the public administrators can be very reluctant to publish critical transparent documentation on policy decision making and policy outcomes. Public administrators are more likely to limit transparent data during turbulent times versus full and open transparent data (Welch, 2012).

Another transparency issue is that governmental transparency costs money (de Fine Licht, 2014b; Meijer et al., 2015), labor, and time (Fairbanks et al., 2007). In 2003, the Federal government estimated that the costs of governmental transparency from the FOIA were \$323

million or approximately \$100 per request. However, if Social Security and Veterans Health Administration transparency requests are factored out of this request pool, the cost per transparency request rose to \$405 (Roberts, 2006a). As stated previously, these requests are primarily for contracts, bidder's mailing lists, invitation for bid lists, request for proposal offerors lists, technical and cost proposals, progress reports, delivery orders, business clearances, classified records, and personnel records (Wise, 1994).

Moreover, in 2015, Meijer et al. found that a very small number of requests consume the largest amount of resources and costs. Nearly 20% percent of the requests cost 80% of the total amount. Meijer et al. (2015) call this the "iceberg effect" where such a small amount of transparency requests constitutes such large unseen costs. Besides money costs, dedicated governmental employees are required to respond and answer governmental transparency requests real-time or to create published periodic reports. Governmental transparency departments are extremely small; some departments only have one employee (Fairbanks et al., 2007). Extremely small transparency departments mean that the limited staff must prioritize FOIA requests. This prioritization can limit the data given in the requests. The requested transparent data might not be robust enough due to the limited labor resources. This prioritization leads to a final transparency cost, time. Much like labor resources, without enough time to complete transparency requests, limited data will be published (Fairbanks et al., 2007).

Continuing with cost issues, although e-government can help reduce costs (e.g. paper and publishing costs; Heald, 2006a), computer expertise is costly as well. Furthermore, if e-government is used to lower costs, data on the Internet can raise risks. For example, hackers could obtain privacy information that is locked down on an e-government website (Bannister &

Connolly, 2011). Costs and data breach risks must be weighed against the benefits of governmental transparency.

A third governmental transparency issue is that data overload and data misunderstanding can occur. Recent studies unveil that citizens and non-governmental organizations take shortcuts when understanding complex information. Taking shortcuts means a higher risk of misinterpretation, especially by a political organization using the transparent data due to their particular bias (Meijer et al., 2015). Furthermore, some experts argue that certain data ambiguity is better than complete and total data overload. Data sanitizing, costs (e.g. money, labor, and time), e-government breach risks, and data overload are all issues for governmental transparency.

If governmental transparency has substantial issues and challenges, then what would occur if government were not mandated to release transparent data? The alternative is secrecy in government, especially in public administration. Max Weber argued that secrecy is a primary goal of a bureaucracy (Roberts, 2006a).

Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret sessions'; in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action criticism (Weber, 1946, p. 233).

Without transparency, secrecy would be prevalent throughout the executive branch and public administration. Secrecy may cause more issues than governmental transparency itself. With this battle between public administrators being secret and the public demanding transparency, Oliver (2004, p.12) suggests ten proverbs of governmental transparency:

1. What's done in private is eventually public.
2. What's acceptable today probably won't be tomorrow.
3. If it looks bad today, tomorrow it'll look worse.
4. Today's penalties will be worse tomorrow.

5. Each denial generates more pressure to disclose.
6. With each denial, enemies and detractors multiply.
7. With each denial, more friends desert you.
8. The more denials, the more severe the punishment.
9. Covering up is more damaging than the original act.
10. Nothing is forgotten, seldom forgiven.

Although these Oliver's proverbs lack proof, the main point to harvest from these ten transparency truths is the fact that honesty is best policy, and sooner is better than later. Being transparent will provide less negative citizen perceptions in the long run over secrecy.

Transparency literature is sparse in public administration, especially quantitative research on the topic. "Measuring transparency is a difficult task due to the varied approaches that could potentially be used to view transparency, and transparency means different things to different people (Veal et al., 2015, p. 14). To help push for more transparency research, Meijer (2012) advocates that the field of public administration focus on the following areas of transparency research (p. 5-7):

- The conceptual relationship between governmental transparency and citizen participation
- The empirical relationship between governmental transparency and citizen participation
- The effect of transparency on trust in government
- The nature and effects of fiscal transparency
- The effect of interinstitutional transparency on governmental oversight (interinstitutional transparency is transparency on interactions between governmental agencies)
- The nature of radical transparency (e.g. WikiLeaks)

This dissertation takes Meijer's advice and will focus upon the relationship between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency, trust, and public participation; three of Meijer's six currently suggested research areas for public administration.

2.4 Transparency Drivers

2.4.1 E-government – Transparency Driver

The largest driver of governmental transparency in the past two decades is e-government. E-government has greatly increased transparency throughout the world (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Loretan, 2013; Worthy, 2010); moreover, e-government has created a “transparent government” (Curtin & Meijer, 2006). “The use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the public sector, generally known as e-government, has multiplied the potential for increased transparency in the public sector and for enhancing citizen engagement” (Cucciniello et al., 2015, p. 574). E-government “refers to the delivery of [governmental] information and services online via the Internet or other digital means” (West, 2000, p. 2). The Internet is a critical part of this e-government definition (Cucciniello et al., 2015). In a recent study, Welch (2012) confirmed that a government's increased use of the Internet is positively associated with increased transparency to its citizens.

E-government usage occurs around the world. For instance, the European Union utilizes e-government extensively to publish governmental information on the Internet (Meijer et al., 2012). Although somewhat behind their European counterparts, the U.S. recently made great strides to utilize e-government on the Federal, state, and local levels. To understand e-government, a historical perspective must first be provided.

A joint report from the Government Information Technology Service Board and the National Performance Review in 1997 titled, *Access America: Reengineering Through Information Technology*, is credited by most journals for introducing the term of e-government (Relyea, 2002). In 1997, the initial definition of e-government was extremely general. The basic e-government definition encapsulated anything that dealt with information technology and governmental entities. During the decade after the initial term was coined, various authors tried to define e-government more precisely. West (2000) is credited for adding the Internet attribute to the e-governmental definition, which still applies today (Margetts, 2006).

Changes to governmental communication and technology are not new. For instance, the U.S. government went through a major technology change in the early 1900s. At that time, telephones came into widespread acceptance in the U.S. (Hernon, Cullen, & Relyea, 2006).

Below is a quote from 1910 about telephones and the U.S. government.

Public officials, even in the United States, have been slow to change from the old-fashioned and more dignified use of written documents and uniformed messengers; but in the last ten years there has been a sweeping revolution in this respect. Government by telephone! This is a new idea that has already arrived in the more efficient departments of the Federal service. And as for the present Congress, that body has gone so far as to plan for a special system of its own, in both Houses, so that all official announcements may be heard by the wire (Carson, 1910, p. 380).

Many years after the phone established itself as an integral communication tool in the government, the computer was introduced. As the computer evolved, so did the notion of e-government.

So, how did e-government originate? Many public administration journals site the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA) as a major catalyst for e-government (Relyea, 2002). This act's goal was to lessen the burden of paperwork on businesses and U.S. citizens. To perform this goal, the government began to create websites in order to collect data. The act

encouraged information sharing activities on a government-wide basis without all the bureaucratic paperwork needed to transfer the data. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget became the lead promoter of this new idea.

Amendments were made to the original PRA in 1986. The primary goal of the PRA amendments was to create and define Information Resources Management (IRM) for the federal government. IRM is “the planning, budgeting, organizing, directing, training, promoting, controlling, and management activities associated with the burden, collection, creation, use, and dissemination of information by agencies, and includes the management of information and related resources such as automatic data processing equipment” (Relyea, 2002, p. 10). The PRA was modified again in 1995 to even further define IRM. This time, the changes focused on actual management of information resources.

How the PRA evolved is directly related to how e-government came into being. One of federal government’s current goals is to improve electronic information management. The federal government’s focal area for the PRA is the Office of Management and Budget. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is responsible for utilizing IT resources to implement government-wide standards and common accountability practices in regard to IT equipment and procurement, to improve IT productivity throughout the Federal government, to propose new changes to regulations or legislation, and to improve the government’s IT direction (Relyea, 2002). The PRA presented the government with a paradigm shift, utilizing electronic processes and files instead of paper to run the government. From this, e-government was born. Suddenly, like the telephone, the computer became a key tool for the Federal government.

E-government then added the Internet to its scope, expanding the government onto the World Wide Web. This expansion allowed governments to publish information to citizens. The

citizens in turn could access this transparent data from anywhere and at any time. E-government transformed government-to-citizen transparency interactions through electronic and digital media (Margetts, 2006).

E-government use continues to grow. In the U.S. in 2006, 59% of the population used a federal governmental website for transparent data, 54% used a state website for transparent data, and 43% used a local website for transparent data (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). Although white males initially were the major users of e-governmental transparent data, women and African-Americans were the major users of e-governmental transparent data in 2006 (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

With e-government expanding onto the Internet, e-government requires a solid technical infrastructure along with human capacity to maintain this technical infrastructure. Furthermore, e-government must have usable content. This usability must not only be accessible, but also affordable, timely, relevant, available, and written in common languages for all citizens to understand (Lor & Britz, 2007, p. 390).

E-government differs from pre-e-government in various ways. The cost of delivery is much lower with e-government than pre-e-government (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012; Heald, 2006a). E-government enables governments to store large amounts of data (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Due to the costs of computer storage continuously falling, governments can cost-effectively upgrade to meet growing data capacity needs (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). With e-government, governments can publish transparent documents to websites much easier and faster than printing and mailing transparent data to its citizens. Also, search capabilities using e-government are so much faster and larger in scope than pre-e-government. Since pre-e-

government was paper-based, searching paper documents was done manually (Bannister & Connolly, 2011).

Along with better search capabilities, response time is much faster with e-government. For instance, requesting transparent data can be done online. The transparent data can be extracted faster. The transparent results can be posted to an e-governmental website or emailed. This searching process took much longer under the old paper system (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Finally, e-government allows citizens to perform their own data searches. During pre-e-government, usually only public administrators performed these lengthy paper searches.

The last paragraph emphasizes the benefits of e-government compared to pre-e-government. However, one disadvantage of e-government over pre-e-government must be stated in terms of communication. In pre-e-government, citizens had the right to talk with public employees, especially when trying to retrieve transparent documents. Pre-e-government interactions were normally face-to-face. With e-governmental transactions, no face-to-face interactions are currently possible (Meijer, 2009). For better e-government, public participation should be promoted.

Using these positives and negatives above, supporters of e-government advocate that e-government provides citizens with better transparent data that can be published quickly and for less governmental costs. These abilities increase public trust in government. E-government in public administration literature is promoted to be the “savior” in terms of increasing public trust since public trust has been declining for years (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). However, opponents of e-government state that the one-way communication is not truly transparency. Governmental transparency needs to be a two-way communication methodology. With one-way

communication, e-government will decrease trust in government since the public does not have valid methods to participate and voice their opinions (Meijer, 2009).

Why is e-government such an important driver for transparency? First, e-government can aid in the implementation of FOIA legislation. As of 2006, the UK government had at least 9 million pages of governmental documents. The Australian government had at least 7 million pages; the Canadian government had 9 million pages; and the US government had at least 79 million pages (Margetts, 2006). Before the 1990s, if a citizen wanted to review any of this documentation under a FOIA, the person would need to obtain a hardcopy of this information directly from the governmental agency. With e-government and the Internet, a citizen can access governmental transparent data any time in the comfort of the citizen's home. Governmental transparent data access is just a click away due to e-government's better database search features (Margetts, 2006).

Second, e-government helps promote formalized data rules. E-government forces governmental agencies to correctly code data into databases, software, and published documentation, which ensures that the data are coded uniformly (Margetts, 2006). Third, Internet and website use is increasing across all demographics. As younger generations use the Internet, the assumption is that all diverse citizenry will utilize e-government to a greater extent over time. With the rise of e-government, transparency should rise as well (Margetts, 2006). For these three reasons, e-government is driving government to be more transparent.

Since e-government is a major driver of transparency, certain steps should be followed to emphasize transparency in government. A first step is at the Federal level to continually enhance the www.data.gov website. Initially, www.data.gov only had select public agencies publishing their transparent data onto the site. Over time, more public agencies have been added. The

www.data.gov site must continue to add public agencies until all governmental agencies are represented (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). Legislation is required for additional agencies to post their transparent data onto www.data.gov. Without legislation, public agencies are very reluctant to post their data on this web site. A second step is for government to embrace social media. Although social media present issues for government, more citizens turn to social media to obtain their news and information (e.g. President Trump utilizes Twitter extensively to provide direct feedback to U.S. citizens). Government must keep current and utilize social media to its benefit (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). A third step is creating e-governmental websites that provide access to true transparent data (e.g. government financials and governmental processes).

Holding online governmental meetings so that the public can participate is a fourth step. This step will be a major leap forward for certain governmental agencies, especially local governments. The “old” method of local citizens going to a local municipal government building for official meetings will be a relic of the past. Online governmental meetings are e-government’s next step. A fifth step is to mandate that all governmental agencies create a transparent governmental plan and that all web pages match to this transparent governmental plan (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). The recommendation is to create these transparent governmental plans according to President Obama’s Open Government Directive.

Designing e-governmental websites that a diverse population can utilize is a sixth step. A diverse population means one that varies extensively in education, native language, and physical needs. All citizens must be able to read and understand transparent e-government data without discrimination (Meijer et al., 2012). Finally, a last step is designing e-governmental websites with the idea of public participation in mind. E-government is not just about providing transparent data, but also allowing the public to participate and voice their opinions on

governmental issues. One way that this can occur is during initial governmental decision-making processes (Meijer et al., 2012). Local governments utilize e-government to allow for open debate on the agency's web site prior to making a local policy decision.

As recommended above, each public agency must create a governmental website to promote data transparency. Two approaches to designing e-governmental websites are an entrepreneurial transparency approach and participatory transparency approach. An *entrepreneurial transparency approach* is about reinventing government. The public administrators who utilize the entrepreneurial transparency approach focus on customer service along with flexible methods to access transparent data (e.g. 24/7 transparent governmental websites versus governmental agencies that are only open to the public from 9am to 5pm). Using an entrepreneurial transparency approach, costs decrease by reducing governmental staffing while making transparency data transactions easier for the citizens (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). An entrepreneurial public administrator focuses on eliminating paper documents replacing them with e-government publications to fulfill transparency needs and FOIA requests.

A *participatory transparency approach* increases a citizen's governmental knowledge. E-government websites are a tool for this to occur. Not only can citizens obtain governmental data easily, websites can be enhanced to allow citizens to participate through chatrooms, instant messaging, email, or even bulletin boards (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). Any e-governmental website should accommodate a participatory transparency approach.

E-government is not a panacea for governmental transparency. E-government has its challenges. For one, costs are a benefit and a challenge at the same time. As stated earlier, e-government is a key driver for governmental transparency due to its lower costs compared to traditional transparency publication methods (Cucciniello et al., 2015). However, e-

government's costs can be challenge, especially to small governments (e.g. local governments). Although e-government lowers transparency costs over traditional methods, local governments may still have budget constraints when building transparent websites. Also, local governments may not have the technical expertise to create a transparent website and maintain the website over time (Bertot et al., 2010). Lack of expertise can increase costs even more. Therefore, e-government costs can be a challenge for local governments.

Another major e-governmental issue is the digital divide. The digital divide is an issue where much of a country's population has access to computers and the Internet; while, a portion of a country's population does not have access to computers and the Internet. The portion that does not have access is left behind since government and businesses have migrated so much processing and information onto the Internet during the past two decades. Therefore, not only is money a differential between deprived and affluent citizens in a country, now technology is also a differential. This is the digital divide. E-government's issue with the digital divide is that a portion of a country's population may not have access to e-governmental websites or transparent data. This portion of the population may be the citizens that need e-governmental websites the most.

One facet of the digital divide is a citizen's access to computers and high-speed Internet connections (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). The inability for the citizenry to purchase or rent the necessary technical equipment without a financial burden is a primary issue in accessing e-governmental transparent websites (Hernon et al., 2006). Besides citizen's technology costs, citizens may also have issues obtaining proper Internet connectivity depending on where they live.

If a major issue in e-government is Internet access due to money and technology, how can the government solve this issue? At the national level, the first true address to the nation about the digital divide was during the Clinton administration. In 1996, President Bill Clinton placed the digital divide as a key issue in his State of the Union Address. In 1999, the Clinton Administration tried to address this digital divide by issuing a presidential memorandum to executive departments, public agencies, and public administrators

Directing their assistance with the development of a national strategy for making computers and the Internet accessible to all Americans; expansion of the federal community technology centers network to provide low-income citizens with access to IT; encouragement of the development of IT applications that would help enable low-income citizens to start and manage their own businesses; and use of training to upgrade the IT skills of the American workforce, particularly workers living in disadvantaged urban and rural communities (Relyea, 2002, p. 29).

In the following year, President Bill Clinton's 2000 budget to Congress included \$380 million in new federal programs and \$2 billion in tax incentives to entice corporations to donate computers and to train workers (McCullagh, 2000). Computers for schools were included in this budget.

The basis for the budget request was to target people in very urban and very rural areas in order for them to have the ability to utilize e-governmental websites. According to the President's data, these areas were the most challenged in regard to the digital divide.

Congress did not completely agree to President Clinton's digital divide direction.

Congress objected to providing computers to schools. The U.S. Congress required assurances that proper filters would be placed onto these donated computers so that the students could not enter adult websites (McCullagh, 2000). One primary objective in Clinton's budget proposal was to divide (excuse the pun) the digital divide issue between government and business. Clinton's direction was to split the e-government access solution; the solution was not a government issue only, but a government and business issue.

In an effort to help erase the [digital] divide, the federal government has provided low-cost connections for schools, libraries, hospitals and health clinics, allocated money to expand in-home access to computers and the Internet for low-income families and given tax incentives to companies donating computer and technical training and for sponsoring community learning centers (Marriot, 2006).

These actions have been implemented at the federal level; however, these actions are not factoring down to the state levels or local levels yet.

Today, the digital divide still exists. For instance, according to Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats.com) using Nielsen Net Ratings data from November 2006, Internet World Stats found that 210,080,067 U.S. residents were Internet users; stated another way, 69.6% of the U.S. population had Internet access. Therefore, 30.4% of the U.S. population did not have Internet access in November 2006. Three years later in 2009, the U.S. Census Bureau published that nearly 40% of the U.S. population still did not have Internet access (Bertot et al., 2010).

Although Clinton's directive meant well, it has not done much to help the digital divide in the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. must analyze other options. To help, the U.S. may look to other countries for potential resolutions to this issue. Government must provide electronic services through multiple channels. Some channels could include web-enabled kiosks at local malls or PCs located in public libraries (Holmes, 2003). Spain has taken e-government access a step further and provided "smart cards" to its citizens. These "smart cards" are like digital social security cards. Citizens can insert these cards at machines all over Spain, much like ATM machines here in the U.S., and access information such as welfare programs and job want ads. Spanish citizens now access their e-government accounts much like they access their bank accounts. Spain has reduced the amount of paperwork while giving the masses access to e-government and transparent data (Holmes, 2003). However, these e-government initiatives in

Spain come at a cost. For example, according to de Juana- Espinosa, Valdés-Conca, Manresa-Marhuenda, and García-Felonés, (2008), the annual cost for the city of Benidorm, Spain, with a population of nearly 70,000, is 700,000 Euro to maintain such e-government initiatives.

Embedded within the digital divide, other e-governmental issues are found. For instance, even if a citizen gains access to the Internet, a citizen may not have the technical ability to use the Internet, especially how to use an e-governmental website (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Bertot et al., 2010; Jaeger & Bertot, 2010; Lor & Britz, 2007). Also, the e-governmental websites might not be designed well for the citizens to understand how to use the site (e.g. might not be intuitive) or to access the site (e.g. people with disabilities). Providing all citizens a computer and Internet access is not the complete solution; providing technical e-governmental training is also a requirement. For instance, citizens who find data on non-e-governmental websites could be reading incorrect or biased data against the government's agencies. Citizens must understand what e-government is and what it is not (Meijer, 2009). Governmental agencies must understand this need and provide necessary training for their citizens (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). This need is very evident at the local U.S. government level (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

Another e-governmental issue is called the "Matthew Effect" which refers to the basic concept that the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. The "Matthew Effect" argument applied to governmental transparency is how e-government through governmental transparency is benefiting people in communities who are much more affluent versus citizens in poorer communities. Since affluent citizens have the time and money to utilize the governmental transparent data, these citizens take greater advantage of participating in government versus the underprivileged who do not have time or means to access this governmental transparent data

(Veal et al., 2015). Under the Matthew Effect, transparency is not benefiting groups who truly need e-government access to governmental transparent data.

Although e-governmental websites benefit the citizens through transparent data, not all governmental agencies have websites. In a study of Arkansas county websites, in 2013, less than 50% of Arkansas counties had their own governmental website (Harder & Jordan, 2013). The counties that did not have websites were primarily less populated counties with a much older population. Related to the “Matthew Effect”, these counties also had the highest poverty rates in the state. Counties that had growing populations and had higher education levels were the counties with robust e-governmental websites (Bernick, Birds, Brekken, Gourrier, & Kellogg, 2014; Harder & Jordan, 2013). This e-governmental website issue, or lack of, is not only occurring in the U.S. but Europe as well. Royo et al. (2013) found that only 55.7% of European local and city governments had websites that publish transparent data.

To help solve these local government transparent website issues, some suggestions have been provided in the public administration literature. First and foremost, local governments must maintain an up-to-date website with informative, transparent data. To overcome the digital divide issue, local governments must place dedicated computer terminals in governmental kiosks in places like a county court house, public libraries, and shopping malls in order for all citizens to have access (Veal et al., 2015). Second, on local e-governmental websites, the following transparent data should be posted: facts, figures, records, policy documents, codes and ordinances, budgets, zoning maps, land use, flood plains, council meeting minutes and job vacancies with job descriptions, and hiring policies (Veal et al., 2015, p. 15).

Returning to e-government’s definition, e-government “refers to the delivery of [governmental] information and services online via the Internet or other digital means” (West,

2000, p. 2). This definition encapsulates why e-government is a primary driver for governmental transparency. In a recent study, e-government was determined to be the *only* factor to influence the dissemination and sustainability of governmental transparent data (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015). In another study surveying U.S. citizens, transparency e-governmental websites revitalized public debate, improved governmental decision-making, and lead to better governmental policies (Welch, 2012). This is a significant finding. U.S. citizens believe that e-government enhances governmental transparency. This in turn can boost citizen's trust and participation.

Why focus on e-government so much? The basic belief in the public administration literature is that e-government increases trust in government (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Grimmelikhuisen, 2009; Kim & Lee, 2012; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). However, empirical data in the public administration literature is lacking or questionable. For instance, using the exact same set of data, West (2004) did not find a positive correlation between e-government and increased trust in government; however, Welch, Hinnant, and Moon (2005) found a positive correlation between e-government and increased trust. Again, both studies used the same data, but the authors came to two different conclusions between e-government and trust. A study conducted specifically on U.S. local governments and their e-government websites did find substantial evidence that e-government does increase trust in local government (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

Another belief in the public administration literature is that e-government increases public participation in government (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2012; Noveck, 2010). Ahn and Bretschneider's case study (2011) demonstrated how South Korea has created various e-government channels for citizen participation in government. South Korea's e-

government is setup in such a way to provide transparent data on websites and to allow citizens direct influence on governmental decision-making through e-government (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011). However, even though a recent body of public administration literature promotes that e-government increases public participation, little empirical research has been conducted demonstrating any direct correlation (Kim & Lee, 2012).

Finally, a small amount of public administration literature hypothesizes that e-government increases public trust, which in turn increases public participation, a two-step process (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006; Welch et al., 2005). However, no empirical studies have been published within public administration literature to substantiate this two-step process from e-government to public participation.

Like many things in government, politics sometimes gets in the way of e-government, governmental transparency, and public participation. With President Obama's Open Government Directive, the administration welcomed all ideas relating to transparency and open government. Anyone could submit ideas to the open government website. One submitter, The Speaker of the House, John Boehner, proposed a 72-hour mandatory minimum public review on all Federal spending legislation. This public participation would occur on a Federal government's website. This initiative would link e-government, governmental transparency, and public participation together. Boehner's suggestion received thousands of votes on the open government website (Schaper, 2010). However, politics stopped this initiative. President Obama did not even review this suggestion for merit since this was a Republican-initiated idea. In fact, asked why the Obama Administration was opposed to this initiative, White House Deputy Chief Technical Officer Beth Noveck admitted that although there was widespread support for the initiative, the 72-hour minimum public review simply did not make sense to actually enact this legislation

(Schaper, 2010, p. 189). The Obama Administration provided no other explanation besides this information. Although other governmental transparency and public participation initiatives were performed through President Obama's Open Government Directive, not all initiatives were completed due to U.S. political, partisan issues.

Certain non-governmental policy groups utilize e-governmental transparent data in order to help citizens better understand the data. One such group is MAPLight.org. A recent initiative from this group is to marry campaign money, policy votes, and special interest positions on bills. MAPLight.org collects transparent data from various e-governmental websites to piece the entire picture together (Newman, 2010). This initiative is very helpful for citizens to better understand if public administrators or U.S. Congress members are heavily influenced by campaign or special interest money.

In summary, e-government is a major driver for increased governmental transparency. Based on current public administration literature, published transparent data on e-governmental websites will increase citizen's trust in government (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). Also, if the digital divide and "Matthew Effect" can be resolved, citizen participation at all levels of government (e.g. Federal, state, and local) will increase due to the increase in e-government (Kim, Halligan, Cho, Oh, & Eikenberry, 2005). Although these e-governmental concepts seem valid, extensive empirical research is still required to support these statements.

2.4.2 Principal-Agent Theory – Transparency Driver

There is a principal-agent relationship between the people and the government (Brito, 2011, p. 49).

Principal-agent theory thus focuses on *information* and the *incentives* for using that information as the critical problems of public administration (Kettl & Fesler, 2005, p. 76).

Kettl and Fesler (2005) specifically use the italicized term *information* when explaining principal-agent theory. This is not by chance. Hidden information is a critical concern in principal-agent theory (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006).

Principal-agent theory is the interactions between a principal who requires an object or service and an agent who can provide it. Negotiation occurs between the principal and the agent in order to complete the necessary tasks that the principal needs performed. The principal pays or rewards the agent to perform these tasks. The agent is obligated to perform the tasks correctly and in a timely manner (Weimer & Vining, 2005). To obtain an agreement between the two parties, a contract is usually negotiated, created, and agreed upon.

In principal-agent theory, principals and agents operate using contracts (Welch, 2012). The relationship between principal and agent is only as good as the contract between them. To write a good contract, both parties need information (Kettl & Fesler, 2005). Asymmetric information will cause incomplete or biased contracts (Utero-Gonzalez, 2006). Both parties may be unwilling to divulge all the information that they have to the other party in order to write a contract to their advantage (Prat, 2006). In fact, principals strive for secrecy in order to enhance their asymmetric information advantage (McDonald, 2006).

The principal has two approaches to help create informational asymmetry to their benefit. First, secrecy can be used, especially within governmental situations. Moreover, secrecy can easily be applied more often in times of crisis (e.g. national security situations) to slow or even curtail the release of transparent information to an agent. Second, a principal can make transparent information less understandable in order to hide the data (Jenkins-Smith & St.Clair, 1993). Therefore, a conflicting relationship exists between the need for information transparency and the need to keep the information secret or non-understandable to the other party.

In regard to principal-agent theory, a debate exists within public administration's scholarly literature regarding who the principal and agent are. Certain public administration literature asserts that the government is the agent and the citizen is the principal. In this relationship, the citizens are the stakeholders (Brito, 2011; Fox, 2007; Veal et al., 2015). Citizens control the agents by voting them in or out of office. Conversely, the elected officials along with the public administrators work for the citizens.

However, looking at the relationship through a governmental transparency lens, the rolls reverse within public administration literature. Under this lens, the focus is in terms of who holds the information. As stated above, information is a critical element within principal-agent theory. In a governmental transparent relationship, the government controls the information that the citizen needs in order to make a rational decision. Therefore, through a governmental transparency lens, the principal is the government, and the agent is a citizen (Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015; Jenkins-Smith & St.Clair, 1993; Welch, 2012). In this dissertation, the view that government is principal and citizens are agents is used.

It is no surprise that governmental transparency is about providing the agent (citizens) information that the principal (government) has. In this asymmetric relationship, the government may not understand a citizen's needs and preferences. Instead, a governmental agency may act unilaterally in the best interest of the incumbent who may not maximize the voter's interests (Benito & Bastida, 2009). The incumbent's objective is to push his or her policy from creation to implementation while making the citizens believe that the he or she is committed, unbiased, and faithful to them (Stasavage, 2006, p. 167). Since the voter may not understand a principal's (e.g. incumbent's) preferences or the link between a principal's actions and outcomes, the voter will worry that the principal will act only in his or her best interests (Fox, 2007; Stasavage, 2006).

One method to rectify this asymmetric issue between principal and agent is to monitor and audit the relationship on a periodic interval (Savage, 2006).

If the principal does not have adequate information about the agent, the term “adverse selection” is used. However, in terms of data transparency, this situation is rare in that a principal has less information than an agent. In governmental transparency situations, normally a “moral hazard” exists where an agent has less information than a principal (Kettl & Fesler, 2005). Because of an agent’s lack of information, agents demand more information from the principal in order to hold government accountable (Welch, 2012). FOIAs balance government’s information monopoly with the agent’s needs. However, creating FOIAs are challenging due to the principal needing to give up informational control. Ultimately, FOIAs weaken a governmental principals’ information monopoly, which weakens the principal’s power over the agents (Roberts, 2006b), producing a more equitable principal-agent relationship.

For transparency to work, disclosure must be mandatory (Brito, 2011, p. 48).

Transparency reduces information uncertainty between a principal and an agent (de Fine Licht et al., 2014) and overcomes principal-agent problems (Veal et al., 2015). Otherwise, information asymmetries will persist. The public elects officials, who hire public administrators. Getting re-elected is the incentive for officials. To get re-elected, an official must appease the citizens. To validate that an elected official along with public administrators should be re-elected and stay in their positions, the citizenry requires governmental transparent information to understand their actions while in office (e.g. policy creation and policy implementations; Brito, 2011). Publishing governmental transparency data promotes a positive perception within the citizenry.

A different method to analyze transparency and principal-agent theory is through review of four different transparency types: upwards transparency, downwards transparency, inwards

transparency, and outwards transparency (Heald, 2006b; Heald, 2012). *Upwards transparency* is evaluated through principal-agent theory and underlies basic economic modeling. Upwards transparency means that a principal can completely monitor the behavior and results of an agent (Heald, 2006b). This transparency occurs within a governmental agency due to the reporting hierarchy (e.g. bureaucracy). A manager monitors what an employee does through transparent data and metrics. *Downwards transparency* arises when agents can observe the results and behaviors of a principal. Examples of this can be citizens observing the results of the public administrators and public agencies. Another example would be public administrators observing the behavior of their elected executive placed in charge of their public agency (Heald, 2012).

Inwards transparency occurs when an outside person or organization can observe what is occurring within a public agency. Inwards transparency is true governmental transparency to the citizens (Heald, 2006b) and is another example of principal-agent theory. An example of inwards transparency transpires when a public agency publishes transparent data onto a governmental website (Heald, 2012). The citizens can then see inwardly into the public agency through the website's published transparent data. Finally, *outwards transparency* happens when the inside principal (e.g. public administrator) can observe what is occurring outside the public agency. The principal monitors the actions and habits of the agent (Heald, 2006b). Although these four transparencies exist within the framework of principal-agent theory, this dissertation mainly focuses upon downwards and inwards transparency due to the focus on citizen's perception of governmental transparency on public trust and participation.

As stated in this section, principal-agent theory helps drive transparency within government. Transparency aligns an agent's informational needs and interests to a principal's

needs and interests (Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015). To make this occur, FOIAs are enacted to balance the governmental transparency information needs of all parties.

2.4.3 Economic – Transparency Driver

In general, findings show that increases in transparency, interactivity, and openness are positively associated with externally oriented agencies and integration with the world economy. Therefore, at one level we can conclude that accountability is induced by necessity. It is pushed by the need for governments to integrate with the global economy (Welch & Wong, 2011, p. 530).

As stated in the last section, transparency can be analyzed through principal-agent theory. Principal-agent theory is based on economics and game theory (Welch, 2012). One party wants to compete and win over the other party. Therefore, this section generalizes transparency into an economic view. Within economics, efficiencies must be achieved. For transparency, scholarly public administration literature implies that governmental transparency creates more efficient governmental processes. Transparency “is seen as a *precondition for optimal markets*. Rational behavior can only be exerted if actors have access to information” (Meijer et al., 2012, p. 20). Meijer et al. (2012) call this the “*economic argument*” for governmental transparency. This “precondition” can be achieved through open and retraceable records during public policy decision making processes.

Economists believe that better information will result in increased rational behavior (Meijer et al., 2015). For rational decision making to occur during policy creation or implementation, governmental transparency is required to continually achieve rational policy decisions, especially for the long term (Meijer et al., 2012). For example, a popular argument in scholarly literature centers on transparent public-school data. In order for citizens to make rational decisions on where to send their children to school, the parents need valid transparent

school district data regarding schools within driving distance of their home. With transparent school data, citizens “vote” by selecting the best school. To survive, the schools that have the smallest enrollment must improve their systems; otherwise, they will fail. This process is purely economic and begins with valid transparent data.

Another economic argument is that with transparent data being released, citizens will read, understand, and use the transparent data. By doing so, citizens become an external auditor (Meijer et al., 2015). Citizens push public administrators to create a more efficient governmental process or the citizens push to reduce governmental costs if citizens find costs to be too high. Under this argument, governmental transparency is a necessary element to economically efficient governmental agencies through public participation (Meijer et al., 2015).

Taking the auditing economic argument a step further, with more governmental transparent data available to the citizenry, public administration corruption can be suppressed (Kim et al., 2005). Governmental transparent data can demonstrate if a public administrator or even a public agency is not utilizing governmental funding properly. For instance, a public agency could be spending tax payer funds on lavish conferences and holiday parties. Citizens and media can decipher if improper use of governmental funds is occurring and publicize a fraud, waste, or corruption issue. Therefore, from an economic perspective, published governmental transparent data are a deterrent to any public administrator that wants to steal or cheat (Kim et al., 2005). The challenge with this argument, however, is a citizen’s ability to find this data. Knowing how to request this data and searching for this data are challenges for a common citizen. Media are more suited for public administration corruption investigations.

Finally, another economic argument is that without transparency more governmental regulations are required. Regulations are placed on governmental agencies and on businesses. As

the economic argument goes, these additional regulations hinder free markets and efficient government. For instance, more governmental bureaucracy must be created in order to administer regulations. If citizens and government concentrate on enhanced transparent information versus creating more regulations, a more efficient process could improve the entire policy process (Etzioni, 2014). Some experts call using governmental transparency instead of regulation, *targeted transparency* (Meijer et al., 2014). Targeted transparency imposes a disclosure requirement on a market sector or public agency to enable consumers or citizens to be informed. Targeted transparency verifies compliance of business's or public agency's goals and objectives.

Various counterarguments to an economic view of transparency exist. First, governmental transparency costs do not make sense economically. Governmental transparency costs are simply overhead to current governmental processes. Costs like labor, time, and money are used to publish transparent data and then respond to the transparent data if questions arise. However, these costs do not create a positive return on investment provided the governmental policy creation and implementation are efficient (Meijer et al., 2015). Second, even if governmental transparent data are published, citizens do not have the time or knowledge to understand the data (Prat, 2006). Therefore, instead of rational behavior, the actions from citizens could be inaccurate or biased. Citizens might twist the transparent information based on their own beliefs or on what their friends or neighbors believe versus analyzing the actual published transparent data. Finally, governmental transparency in regard to economics can increase risk avoidance. If public administrators do not attempt newer efficient processes, the public agency will not advance to become a better agency for future citizens (Meijer et al., 2015). As stated earlier, public administrators will hesitate on using entrepreneurial ideas to

make governmental processes better. Economically, this conservative direction is not good for a public agency or the citizens that public agency serves.

Although counterarguments against transparency as an economic driver exist, economics help drive governmental transparency. Transparency can make government more efficient through a citizen's understanding and use, and a citizen's potential public participation to correct any inefficiency that may exist.

2.4.4 Watchful Eye – Transparency Driver

Watchful eye claims fairness... It is in the effort to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power that the tide has gained its greatest statutory momentum, particularly in statutes designed to provide freedom of information for ordinary citizens (Light, 1997, p. 31).

Paul Light (1997), in his book *The Tides of Reform: Making Government Work, 1945-1995*, provided four major reform themes within U.S. public administration history:

1. Scientific management
2. War on waste
3. Watchful eye
4. Liberation management

Each of these reforms achieves a separate goal. However, only two of these reform movements, war on waste and watchful eye have ties to governmental transparency. This section will briefly address war on waste, but primarily focus on watchful eye and how watchful eye applies to governmental transparency.

For war on waste, most citizens believe that creating the most efficient government will always be government's utopian goal. On the surface, this statement sounds correct; however, it is not necessarily the case. At times, reform must focus upon the equity of a public good or

service and not the efficiency, meaning the economic costs of providing a public good or service may be higher than what is efficient. The war on waste reform targets saving citizens time and money. The government (e.g. Congress) oversees the budgets and financing of the various Federal public agencies. Two initial reforms that came out of the war on waste are (1) the concept of a governmental budget and financial management of that budget and (2) the expansion of the position of inspector general (Light, 1997). In the 1900s, various U.S. budget reforms were enacted like the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act and the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 in order to battle war on waste.

Although the Congress is an advocate for the war on waste, citizens and the media are also credited as major players in helping uncover waste throughout the government (Light, 1997). Citizens and media who fight war on waste accomplish this objective through governmental transparency.

Watchful eye reform is similar to war on waste. First, Congress, not the president, supports both types of reforms. Second, a large distrust of government creates the need for both watchful eye and war on waste. Third, like war on waste, citizens and the media are staunch allies when it comes to watchful eye. However, watchful eye and war on waste similarities stop there. “Where war on waste puts its faith in strong enforcement by counterbureaucracies [sic], watchful eye puts its faith in simply sunshine” (Light, 1997, p. 31). The “sunshine” term that Light is referring to here is governmental transparency. The term comes from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Brandeis is credited for being one of the first judicial proponents for governmental transparency with the now famous statement, “A little sunlight is the best disinfectant” (Oliver, 2004, p. 50).

The primary method of reformers to overcome waste in government is the creation of anti-bureaucracies, more specifically inspectors and auditors, essentially people watching people. These anti-bureaucracies can be inside or outside government. This situation can be equated to Heald's inwards and outwards transparency types (Heald, 2012). Moreover, watchful eye is about opening up government to the masses (Oliver, 2004) and full disclosure of its proceedings (a.k.a. transparency). Anything behind closed doors in the government is anti-watchful eye. As indicated earlier, a defining piece of watchful eye legislation reform was passed in 1946 as the Administration Procedure Act (APA). The act required (Light, 1997):

1. That public agencies must keep the public updated on its rules, regulations, and procedures
2. That the public be able to participate in the rule making process
3. That standards be in place to create rules and regulations for the public agency (like hearings)
4. That judicial review be allowed

Major reform legislation for watchful eye came in 1966 with the Freedom of Information Act. The FOIA is explained in detail earlier in this paper. In general, the APA and the FOIA opened up government and its records to the watchful eye of Congress, the media, and its citizens. While these acts opened the door to transparent information, the executive branch continued its reluctance in providing data to the public and Congress. Both Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon refused to provide information on the highly visible Vietnam War (Light, 1997). Later in President Nixon's term came Watergate. Watergate was a moment in public policy and public administration that changed everything. Suddenly, instead of a strong executive branch with a high volume of scientific management legislation, the legislation

became geared towards watchful eye. Not surprisingly, in 1974 reformers updated the FOIA and created the Privacy Act of 1974 (Light, 1997). The Privacy Act of 1974 allowed citizens the right to see information that the government and its agencies has about specific citizens. If the citizens found the information inaccurate, this act allows citizens to correct the faulty information.

The irony of the Privacy Act of 1974 is that President Gerald Ford reluctantly vetoed the measure. Historians state that he vetoed it, not because of his ideas, but due to the strong influence of Ford's Chief of Staff, Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy, Richard Cheney. The battle between the executive branch and the Congress regarding watchful eye continues today. The irony, however, is that the battle continues sometimes with the same players. For instance, during the recent Bush Administration, Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-president Richard Cheney continued to oppose watchful eye legislation over a quarter of a century later. Vice-president Cheney performed many actions under the cover of "executive privilege" without any regard to watchful eye reform.

Although watchful eye is not a reform that causes major leaps forward in our society, it is a method for reformers to keep tabs on public bureaucracy that may, at times, head in the wrong direction. Through governmental transparent information, watchful eye can uncover fraud, waste, and abuse situations (Brito, 2011). The primary argument against relating watchful eye and governmental transparency is that watchful eye can be carried too far if the transparent data are misconstrued. For instance, if special interest groups or the media incorrectly interpret certain published governmental data, they could oversimplify a very complex issue resulting in public confusion and mistrust (Heald, 2006a).

Even with this argument against watchful eye and governmental transparency, overall, watchful eye creates fairness in democracy (Oliver, 2004). The statement below summarizes the idea that watchful eye is a driver for governmental transparency.

Paul Light's work on the four tides of U.S. governmental reform has found that the effort to maintain a watchful eye on government supports the need for a public sector that is more open and transparent as a means to ensure that fairness and due process are protected throughout various stages of the public policy and decision-making processes. Supporters of this school of thought argue that the most effective way to ensure citizen's confidence in their government is by providing individuals and groups with as much information as possible (Newbold, 2011, p. S47).

As Newbold implies, due to watchful eye, governmental transparency is required; in other words, governmental transparency increases citizen's trust in government. This is a fundamental focus of this dissertation.

2.4.5 New Public Management (NPM) – Transparency Driver

The increased attention for government transparency in recent years is to a large extent inspired by the emphasis of the New Public Management (NPM) movement on making government more accountable. Transparency optimists argue that showing citizens the results of government policies through clear performance targets and indicators is supposed to result in increased trust in government. The rise of the NPM doctrine triggered governments to focus on active forms of transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012).

As stated in the introduction section and is echoed in the above quote, one reason for governmental transparency is the rise of NPM. NPM helped push additional governmental transparency not only in the U.S. but in other countries as well. NPM is about running government like a business. To do this, public agencies no longer perform all tasks; instead, outside entities perform certain delegated tasks. Many times, these tasks are not related to a public agency's core competencies (e.g. custodial tasks or construction tasks).

NPM drives transparency in terms of performance data for three main reasons. First, for public works that are infrastructure or public services related, citizens want to know how they are performing. Therefore, the need for transparent performance measures arise (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a). Second, transparent data are a tool to enable disclosure of regulatory performance data (Meijer et al., 2014); moreover, transparency is an essential tool for high performing governmental agencies (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). Third, the argument for transparency is that if public agencies publish NPM transparent data, the agencies will increase trust with the citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012).

What are the general issues regarding NPM performance measurements and governmental transparency? The foremost issue regarding NPM performance measurement which appears in various public administration articles is in terms of the “black box” of government (Behn, 2003; Boyne, Meier, O'Toole, & Walker, 2005; Moynihan & Pandey, 2004). Governmental transparency is required for citizens to understand the intra-workings of government.

The black box theory of government, associated with the Maxwell School's Government Performance Project, argues for examining managerial factors. A basic premise of the theory is that we know little about the process by which the public sector transforms inputs into outputs. The black box approach argues that better specification of management capacity is necessary before plausible theoretical or empirical links could be established with performance (Moynihan & Pandey, 2004, p. 423).

The “black box” is what occurs between inputs and outputs within a public agency. Essentially, the “black box” is the process that creates an outcome or output from input. For NPM, the public agency does not create the outcome or output directly; instead, an outside entity creates the outcome or output. Experts believe that, before performance measurement can occur, understanding the “black box” processes must be accomplished. To achieve this, governmental transparency performance data are required.

Another major issue is that studies find that NPM fails in terms of governmental transparency due to questionable data collection methods. No quantitative models exist to effectively analyze transparent performance data and no true methods exist to compare transparent performance data against proper benchmarks to validate outputs (Heald, 2006b; Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015). As discussed in the principal-agent section, contracts are a critical element in NPM relationships. If a contract does not properly specify how transparent performance data are to be provided between parties, questionable data collection methods will arise (Reynaers & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2015). In fact, NPM has fallen somewhat out of fashion since transparency and accountability are not in many current NPM contracts causing too much of a “hollow state” for public administration (Newbold, 2011).

FOIAs are another major NPM transparency issue. Currently, FOIAs only pertain to government-specific transparency. Anything dealing with contracted-out government (a.k.a. hollow state) is not addressed; in other words, FOIAs do not specifically speak to NPM arrangements (Roberts, 2006b). Therefore, governmental transparency under NPM is completely dependent upon the contract between the government and the outside entity along with the hope that the public agency will publish the performance data to its citizenry. No guarantees are written into current FOIAs to make this occur. Moreover, without a solid contract and with no FOIA backing, outside contracted entities can hide their information causing asymmetric information to creep into the relationship. This again can be classified as a principal-agent issue (Hood, 2006b). Finally, other transparent performance measurement issues include too many metrics, metrics not measuring what they are intended, lack of public administrator authority, and measuring performance over long periods of time (e.g. sustainability).

In this section, the focus is upon NPM as a driver for transparency. Although NPM has only been in existence within the public administration literature since the 1980s, NPM has quickly become a driving force for governmental transparency (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015).

2.5 Transparency Challenges

2.5.1 Limited Empirical Transparency Studies – Transparency Challenge

There has been much political and media attention for government transparency but academic attention seems to be lagging behind (Meijer, 2012, p. 3).

A major reason for this dissertation is that quantitative governmental transparency studies are extremely rare and limited within the public administration literature. Although various normative articles exist (Curtin & Meijer, 2006; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Meijer, 2012), actual research on the subject is sparse. One reason for the lack of research is that in the recent past, a general debate has arisen examining if governmental transparency experts are even asking the right questions regarding transparency research. For instance, should current public administration transparency research address corruption, trust, public participation, new technology, governmental efficiency, transparency publication limitations, or whistleblowing (Heald, 2012)? Without the right research questions, valid governmental transparency studies cannot be conducted.

The number of normative governmental transparency articles within public administration continues to increase; however, only recently has quantitative transparency research been published in scholarly public administration literature (Meijer, 2012; Meijer et al., 2012). With the recent transparency empirical work, the results regarding transparency, trust, and public participation are extremely fragmented and contradicting (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b, p. 75; Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012) showing that transparency does *and* does not promote

trust and that transparency does promote citizen participation, while some researchers have found that transparency has *no* effect on trust or public participation (de Fine Licht, 2014a; de Fine Licht, 2014b).

One general theme from the normative transparency literature is that legislators and public administrators assume that transparency, open government, and trust are simple concepts and interactions (Curtin & Meijer, 2006). This assumption is far from the truth. Governmental transparency interactions are complicated. These interactions are between political and social actors using constantly improving technologies (e.g. e-government) under a set of formal and informal rules (Meijer, 2013). Public administration transparency normative literature requires more investigation into these complicated interactions.

An example of normative transparency literature is Curtin and Meijer's (2006) article "Does transparency strengthen legitimacy? A critical analysis of European Union policy documents." In Curtin and Meijer's article (2006), which is typical for public administration literature, no quantitative or qualitative data are found. Instead, the article's topic centers on basic transparency assumptions in public administration, with no data to back up the assumptions. When Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer tried to address transparency in their 2012 study, the first statement that they made is, "The empirical basis for both lines of argument [transparency optimists and transparency pessimists explained later] is limited: both camps refer to anecdotal material rather than thorough empirical studies" (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012, p. 138). Again, this lack of data and research is witnessed in many public administration, scholarly transparency articles.

For the few empirical transparency studies that exist, very small and non-diversified citizenry samples are used. With this type of sampling, the studies cannot be generalized into

fundamental public administration transparency theory (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). For example, certain studies only utilize college students. Grimmelikhuijsen has written many public administration transparency articles. He has become a leading expert in European governmental transparency; however, he primarily only uses college students in his transparency research samples. In his article (2009), “Do transparent government agencies strengthen trust?” Grimmelikhuijsen used 44 Utrecht University students in his study on local governmental transparent websites. Then in 2011, in his article, “Being transparent or spinning the message? An experiment into the effects of varying message content on trust in government,” Grimmelikhuijsen used 60 first-year and graduate students. This 2011 study focused on how a government spins transparent data in a positive way. Utilizing only college students from Utrecht University places a heavy socio-demographic bias on his transparency research results. These are just two examples of not only the limited empirical public administration transparency research, but also the limited sample sets that are being used.

One large U.S. study of e-government and transparency reviewed 3,099 U.S. county governmental websites. However, this e-government transparency study did not provide any relationship correlations or regression analysis (e.g. transparent websites to trust or public participation). The study’s data were specific to how many counties had websites and of those websites, how many counties had transparent data published, and what type of transparent data were published on the county’s websites (Bernick et al., 2014). This type of governmental transparency study demonstrates that U.S. public administration is in its infancy regarding transparency research. Expanded correlation and regression governmental transparency research is required, especially in the U.S.

Based on these research limitations, governmental transparency generalizations cannot be performed. Even Grimmelikhuijsen self-assesses his research and agrees (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). Many existing transparency studies are simply test labs, not real-life studies of citizenry or even public administrators. With these discrepancies, one can posit that current transparency research in public administration has not yet created a common body of knowledge (Meijer, 2012).

When reviewing empirical transparency governmental studies, the few that exist are primarily non-U.S.-based articles. Few empirical studies center upon the U.S. More specifically, extremely limited research has been performed at the U.S. state or local levels. (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012). Some transparency experts promote that local governments must be researched more fully. A large issue with local governments and governmental transparency is sustainability. In terms of transparency sustainability, if a local government begins publishing transparent documentation to the public, the question is: Can the local government sustain updating transparent data overtime due to limited resources (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015)? This is a major issue that future research must address in order for transparency to stay viable, especially at the local level.

Table 2.1 summarizes recent scholarly transparency public administration articles (n=55). This table encapsulates a bulk of academic scholarly articles in existence within the past decade. (These 55 articles are used within this dissertation.) These data suggest that twice as many public administration transparency articles have been written about citizens and governments outside the U.S. (34) versus inside the U.S. (17). Also, only six U.S. public administration articles have empirical research analysis performed. Therefore, not only is empirical transparency research limited in public administration throughout the world, but comparatively,

Table 2.1

United States (U.S.) vs. Non-United States Scholarly Transparency Public Administration Article Comparison

Research Target	Type of Article	Total	
Non-U.S.	Normative	14	
	Empirical	10	
	Student-only Empirical	7	
	Case Study	3	
	Non-United States Total	34	
U.S.	Normative	10	
	Empirical	6	
	Student-only Empirical	0	
	Case Study	1	
	United States Total	17	
Non-U.S. and U.S.	Normative	3	
	Empirical	1	
	Student-only Empirical	0	
	Case Study	0	
	United States and Non-United States Total	4	
Research Target Totals	Type of Article	Total	Percentage
	Normative	27	49.10%
	Empirical	17	30.90%
	Student-only Empirical	7	12.70%
	Case Study	4	7.30%
	TOTAL	55	100.00%

Note: Normative - Articles with no empirical research

Empirical - Articles with empirical research

Student-only Empirical - Articles using only college students in empirical research

Case Study - Articles using only one or two case situations for research

the volume of U.S. research is extremely limited. This highlights a major need for additional U.S. research studies to expand transparency knowledge in public administration.

To demonstrate that transparency has only recently began to draw attention of academics, the First Global Transparency conference did not occur until May 2011 at Rutgers University (Heald, 2012). Moreover, due to the limited nature of transparency literature, only two books and one article are credited as seminal works within governmental transparency (Meijer, 2012). The first book is *Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?* by Christopher Hood and David Heald (2006). Both authors are quoted experts in the field of governmental transparency. The book is an edited edition of eleven transparency experts who provide a historical view of governmental transparency along with key details in certain governmental areas (e.g. e-government). The second seminal book in governmental transparency is *Blacked Out, Government Secrecy in the Information Age* by Alasdair Roberts (2006). This book emphasizes secrecy instead of governmental transparency. The book outlines the advantages and disadvantages of secrecy within public administration and when secrecy should be applied during public policy creation and implementation. Finally, the last seminal transparency publication is 'Global Information Technology Pressure and Government Accountability' by Eric Welch and Wilson Wong (2011). This article concerns the operationalization of governmental transparency from concept to practice within public administration. The operationalization is primarily focused on electronic, web, and e-government components in order to implement a useful transparency methodology.

This dissertation focuses upon a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency, trust, and public participation. Therefore, a quick review and critique of scholarly empirical research articles within these areas is warranted. For research regarding the

relationship between governmental transparency and trust, recent research concentrates on e-government. For example, in Tolbert and Mossberger's study, their findings show that by increasing transparency on governmental websites, increased trust in government occurs. However, the study only utilized citizens who use governmental websites. This highlights an issue regarding transparency and e-governmental research. The problem with the current e-government studies is that a major segment of the population does not utilize e-governmental websites especially on an ongoing and consistent basis. Non-e-government users are completely left out of the analysis. Furthermore, many citizens are not educated on how to understand the transparent data presented on the e-governmental websites. Some of the data are simply a dump of data without legitimate explanation of the data (Kim & Lee, 2012). Therefore, showing a relationship between transparent e-governmental data and trust is a challenge if the users do not use or understand the data. This dissertation's research study addresses this research deficiency within public administration literature.

For institutional-based trust, de Fine Licht (2014b) found that the public greatly supports transparency over secrecy; so much so, that citizens desire transparency even if they do not utilize the governmental transparent data. Transparent data enhances the public's perceptions of government and builds trust. This increased trust then increases a citizen's willingness to accept governmental decisions (de Fine Licht, 2014b). The challenge with this study is that the "spin" of the governmental data is in play but not addressed within the study. Is perceived governmental transparency deemed beneficial due to the data being published or how the data are spun by the governmental agency? The study does not address this possible variable in the analysis. However, this dissertation's research study does address governmental transparency and a citizen's perception of it.

Crossing between trust and public participation, very limited public administration research has been conducted analyzing governmental transparency and public participation. de Fine Licht (2011) posits that governmental policy regarding health, health care, and health insurance must be understood better in terms of transparency. Due to the recent PPACA (a.k.a. Obamacare) legislation, citizens must understand what the new governmental health care policies are. However, no studies specific to public participation, trust, and governmental transparency have been performed focused specifically on health care (de Fine Licht, 2011). Furthermore, in a recent review of 103 transparency public administration articles, 38% of the articles did not make a single reference on what effect governmental transparency has in terms of trust, public participation, or anything else (Meijer et al., 2012).

Specific to governmental transparency and public participation research, “sometimes, in research into government transparency the question is raised whether information is actually used to strengthen participation, but generally this does not feature prominently in the debate” (Meijer et al., 2012, p. 11). Although various experts believe that a positive relationship exists between governmental transparency and public participation, very little research has been conducted to prove or disprove this assertion (Welch, 2012). Some experts call the link between governmental transparency and public participation a “superficial understanding” since so little attention has been placed upon it (Cucciniello et al., 2015). With this lack of research, governmental transparency and public participation empirical studies are needed to advance public administration’s understanding of transparency. This dissertation’s research study will help to fill this public administration research gap.

This section highlights the very limited transparency research in public administration. Additionally, empirical U.S. transparency research is extremely lacking. The purpose of this

dissertation is to expand the understanding of transparency within U.S. public administration by focusing on the relationship between transparency, trust, and public participation. The relationships will be expanded upon in the next section.

2.5.2 Sustainability – Transparency Challenge

Sustainability is crucial for governmental transparency (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015). As highlighted in the last section, transparency sustainability is a challenge for all governments. Launching a governmental transparency process within a governmental agency is challenging enough; however, continuing transparency publications and even expanding and enhancing existing transparency processes over time is an even larger challenge (Piotrowski, 2009).

Various transparency sustainability issues exist within the public administration literature. First, if a governmental transparency process is not implemented properly, sustainability and maintenance are nearly impossible. With a badly implemented transparency publication process, enhanced governmental trust and public participation cannot occur (Ospina, Kersh, & Su, 2014). Second, when a new FOIA or amendment to a FOIA is created and implemented, the act is normally an immediate reaction to a major political issue. The FOIA or an amendment is to rectify a gap that was suddenly discovered in current legislation. The legislators and public administrators normally only address a current governmental transparency issue and do not address the long term transparent implications of a law's changes (Fung et al., 2007). Third, with FOIAs having various exemptions (e.g. the nine exemptions stated earlier), governmental transparency maintenance and sustainability is a challenge for public administrators. Public administrators continually must determine what data falls inside and

outside the various FOIA exemptions. Normally, public administrators decide conservatively (e.g. not to publish transparent data) in regard to exemptions (Ospina et al., 2014).

Fourth, as highlighted earlier, even though transparency is assumed to be good for government and its citizens, transparency over a period of time can promote risk avoidance during public policy discussions and debates; governmental transparency can suppress public administrative entrepreneurship; and, governmental transparency can increase compliance and control costs (Meijer et al., 2015). Fifth, in the long term, auditing is an issue. Who will audit a public agency's published transparent data? With FOIAs, no major mandate is written into FOIAs on how to ensure that published governmental transparent data are accurate over time (Meijer et al., 2015).

Sixth, sustained data collection is also a major issue. Data formats change over time (e.g. in just the past 20-30 years, government has gone from tape backups to real-time cloud backups). Data values and meanings also change over time. Consistent transparent data over the long term can be challenging in order to represent "old" data and "new" data in the same context and meaning (McDonald, 2006). Seventh, governments want to utilize more social media (e.g. YouTube, SnapChat, Facebook, and Twitter) in order to attract additional citizen demographics (e.g. younger citizens) to use transparent data. However, publication on these social media sites has a negative aspect. How can a typical citizen decipher what the government publishes versus what other non-governmental groups publish? An example of this misunderstanding occurred during the H1N1 flu pandemic. The National Institute of Health and the Department of Health and Human Services posted governmental transparent information on Twitter regarding H1N1 flu data. However, due to other non-governmental organizations posting unfounded data also on

Twitter at the same time, the common citizen did not know what to believe (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010).

In summary, Jaeger and Bertot (2010) encapsulate what government must focus upon in order to provide transparency sustainability during the long term.

To truly provide [sustainable] access to the information and data, transparency must encompass all aspects of information access. Users must have physical access (be able to reach the content), intellectual access (be able to understand the content), and social access (be able to share the content) for government information to become completely transparent (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, p. 374).

Expanding upon the data format sustainability issue, changes in technology can be a problem in terms of archiving and storing older data for many years. For FOIAs, no mandates exist on maximum date ranges when FOIA requests can no longer be provided. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) must maintain a large and diverse array of storage and computer devices in order to access and retrieve older electronic, audio, and video files created since the inception of the U.S. (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). The governmental transparency sustainability challenge is not only the data format issue, but due to e-government's expansion, older data formats must be converted into current formats in order to publish the data onto websites or to answer FIOA requests for the citizens and outside organizations.

Besides the issue of government using social media sites to publish transparent data, another web-related issue occurs with governmental transparency sustainability. The issue is the ability to search older data along with governmental websites keeping older links to transparent data up to date. Governments and businesses enhance their websites on a routine basis. During these website enhancements, organizations periodically also upgrade their computer platforms to stay abreast of new technologies. With computer upgrades, links to older server locations can be lost. Therefore, a solid testing process must be in place to validate that all links to older

governmental transparent data publications still exist and are functioning (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010).

Although limited empirical governmental transparency research exists, very little academic literature addresses transparency sustainability processes within government and public administration (Meijer et al., 2015). Additional research in sustaining governmental transparency is required in public administration, especially at the local governmental level. One major sustainability challenge is that local U.S. governments which are not transparent or do a poor job sustaining transparency attract 70% to 80% more FOIA requests than U.S. local governments that perform transparency publications well (Meijer et al., 2015, p. 17). This finding suggests that governments that do not focus attention on governmental transparency sustainability can cause themselves extra work and costs in the long term. Although limited research exists, this data advocates that solid governmental transparency sustainability policies will save governmental costs in the long term.

Regarding FOIAs, in England, an unintended downward governmental transparency spiral began to emerge. England launched their governmental transparency website, www.data.gov.uk in January of 2010 (Worthy, 2010). Initially, this website contained a repository of various statistics thought to be useful to the public and its citizens. After a few months, the public agency in charge of maintaining the website found that very few citizens were using the website. Because of this lack of use, the public agency focused less attention on governmental transparency publications and more attention on other tasks within their governmental agency. The website transparency updates became less frequent. Due to fewer periodic updates, even fewer citizens used the website (Worthy, 2010). A negative spiral began; less citizen views caused less agency updates, which caused even less citizen views, which

caused even less agency updates. This is an example of an ill-fated governmental transparency sustainability policy that can occur within a public agency.

Governmental transparency sustainability is expensive. As stated earlier in the dissertation, the primary transparency costs for governmental agencies are time, money, and labor. “The honeymoon between new administrations and transparency can be short as political costs are felt. More importantly, the looming public spending cuts could have a severe impact upon the size of FOI[A] budgets” (Worthy, 2010, p. 579). To combat rising transparency publication costs, Ireland introduced fees to support increased FOIA requests. These fees were charged to the citizens or organizations when a FOIA request was initiated to the Irish government. This change in FOIA policy is another example of a negative spiral issue. As Ireland raised the fees on transparency requests, fewer citizens and organizations requested and utilized the transparent data. Due to fewer requests, the Irish public agencies put less priority on governmental transparency, which in turn the Irish public agencies provided decreased governmental transparent data and quality (Worthy, 2010). As governments add or increase fees for transparency data requests, public agencies need to be wary of this downward transparency direction and understand its implications to governmental transparency. More fees mean fewer governmental transparency requests; this direction defeats the purpose and goal of governmental transparency and FOIA legislation.

Thus far, various challenges and negatives have been stated regarding governmental transparency sustainability, but sustainability can be a positive for a governmental agency if proper focus is applied. If a public agency engages in constant improvements to their governmental transparency process, better outcomes can be obtained. Suggested focal points are (Fung et al., 2007, p. 109):

- Expanding *scope* of [transparent] information relative to the scope of the problem addressed
- Increasing *accuracy and quality* of information; and
- Increasing *use* of information by consumers, investors, employees, political activists, voters, residents, and/or governmental officials.

Fung, Graham and Weil (2007) define a sustainable transparent system if the system has these three dimensions and can continue performing these dimensions over time. Although a governmental transparent system with these three dimensions is not a guarantee of perpetual sustainability, a system without these dimensions has a higher probability of failure in the long term (Fung et al., 2007).

Another method for continued governmental transparency improvement occurs when citizens or advocacy organizations push a public agency for improvements to an agency's transparent data. The improvements can be in their FOIA request system or in their transparency publications (Fung et al., 2007). Not only is a governmental agency responsible for transparency sustainability, the citizenry also must be accountable to voice concerns when a governmental agency begins to fail in their transparent publication responsibilities. This accountability leads back to the need for governmental transparency and public participation research within public administration literature.

Two positive transparency sustainability examples are provided to demonstrate that transparent sustainability can be achieved. The first sustainable transparent example is from the U.S. automotive industry. Although this legislation is not specific to a governmental agency, a governmental agency must validate that the U.S. car industry is performing within governmental legal guidelines. In 2005, the U.S. Federal government created a policy that by 2007 all car

companies selling vehicles in the U.S. must provide more transparent vehicle rollover data in the showroom, where consumers need to see it quickly. The policy had a unique enhancing sustainability clause. The law requires that the data be more accurate over time as technologies advance. The initial metrics were based on current mathematical models using current gravity and track ratios to determine vehicle rollover probability. However, the legislation requires improved metrics as technologies are enhanced to determine better rollover probabilities. The National Academy of Science directs improvements to these mathematical and data models (Fung et al., 2007). Therefore, this legislation is a rather unique example in that a law has a built-in mechanism for improved transparency sustainability. This legislation is a good model for future consumer and governmental legislation in terms of transparency sustainability.

Another example of transparency sustainability comes from the European Union (EU). Eurostat, which is the Statistical Office of the European Union, validates European Union states conform to budgetary transparency that is required to stay in the EU. Eurostat setup various steps that an EU state must follow in order to comply with the EU's transparency sustainability laws (Savage, 2006). First, each EU state must submit their budgetary data on a biannual basis. Second, Eurostat continually sends out questionnaires to all EU states asking more specific questions regarding budgetary matters. Third, Eurostat administrators visit each EU state on a periodic basis to audit and verify that the transparent financial and budgetary data that is submitted is accurate. Fourth, Eurostat promotes that the media and political advocacy groups also push and validate each EU state's transparent data. Instead of the EU being skeptical of the media regarding transparency, Eurostat promotes their oversight. Finally, Eurostat offers training initiatives for EU states in order for their public administration personnel to understand what

Eurostat's ongoing needs are and how these needs can be fulfilled through efficient administrative processes.

Although governmental transparency has major issues with sustainability, these last paragraphs demonstrate that governmental transparency sustainability issues can be overcome. However, sustainability issues can only be overcome if the legislators and public administrators have not only a short-term view of governmental transparency, but a long-term view as well. To overcome long-term needs, special clauses may be required within governmental legislation in order to mandate governmental transparency sustainability. Furthermore, government and its citizens have an equal responsibility for governmental transparency sustainability to occur.

2.5.3 Governmental Secrecy – Transparency Challenge

Three things cannot long be hidden: the sun, the moon, and the truth (Confucius).

It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery (Publius, 1788).

Conflict between governmental secrecy and governmental transparency has existed throughout U.S.'s history (Ginsberg, 2013b). The two sides have opposing arguments. For governmental secrecy, secrecy protects national security, national law enforcement, and an individual's privacy. Secrecy advocates emphasize that transparency is not perfect. The release of certain transparent data can do more harm than good for the government and the general public. On the opposite side, governmental transparency's goal is to increase trust and public participation in government. This concept is rooted in procedural fairness theory which was discussed earlier in the dissertation; however, to review, procedural fairness theory supporters believe that if decision making is carried out in a transparent manner, the public will be more

willing to accept the policy decision versus if the decision making was performed in secrecy. Under this theory, transparency promotes fairness, which in turn promotes trust and possibly public participation (de Fine Licht, 2014b). Transparency advocates posit that governmental transparency provides a check-and-balance mechanism to keep the executive and public administrators honest within their roles (Ginsberg, 2013b).

This initial conflict between secrecy and transparency in the U.S. can be found directly in the U.S. Constitution. For example, in Article I, Section 5, of the U.S. Constitution, it states that:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgement require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

The U.S. Constitution creates a basis for transparency in government by requiring the U.S. Congress to document its proceedings and publish these proceedings. However, the U.S. Constitution also allows the same congressional members to vote to keep certain topics secret. The U.S. Constitution does not provide guidelines on what qualifies as secret. Therefore, the U.S. Constitution unintentionally encourages this conflict between secrecy and transparency (Ginsberg, 2013b).

Another section of the U.S. Constitution requires that the president provide transparent information on a periodic basis. In Article II, Section 3, of the U.S. Constitution, it states that the President from “time to time” must “give to the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” This statement has been interpreted as the U.S. President giving the State of the Union Address to the U.S. Congress at the beginning of each calendar year (Ginsberg, 2013b).

Examples of secrecy versus governmental transparency can be found in recent U.S. history. The first example of secrecy is President George W. Bush’s Administration. Due to

September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration established secrecy in governmental agencies under the umbrella of national security. The Bush Administration greatly restricted governmental openness and transparency. Attorney General John Ashcroft even took this view to extreme by announcing that any governmental agency has the “green light” to restrict the release of governmental transparent information or data if any plausible reason exists (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). President Bush’s secrecy agenda came into question when the U.S. voted to go to war with Iraq due to Iraq supposedly having weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This WMD argument was not only used on the U.S. Congress, but the United Nations as well. Because citizens, media, and non-governmental agencies could not obtain additional transparent data on WMDs, the U.S. Congress voted to allow military action using faulty transparent data (Fox, 2007). These faulty data and corresponding decision to use military force against Iraq continues to complicate U.S. foreign policy even today.

President Obama’s Administration was initially very transparent; however, President Obama became increasingly obsessed with secrecy (Brian, 2014). The second example of recent administration secrecy is the Department of Justice (DOJ) during President Obama’s Administration. President Obama’s DOJ prosecuted whistleblowers who spoke to the media by utilizing the Espionage Act. President Obama’s Administration prosecuted seven individuals, more than every previous presidential administration combined (Brian, 2014). Therefore, the past two U.S. administrations promoted secrecy over governmental transparency at various points during their tenure.

Although this dissertation concentrates specifically on governmental transparency, do any governmental situations exist where secrecy is better than transparency? One argument for secrecy versus governmental transparency pertains to intergovernmental affairs and international

governmental affairs. The ethos for secrecy when negotiating treaties or policies with multiple governments and governmental agencies posits that secret negotiations are more conducive to compromise. If negotiations are public, compromise would be lessened (Meijer et al., 2012; Stasavage, 2006). This “ethos of confidentiality” has been in existence in Europe since the Renaissance period. As stated previously, pushed heavily by President Woodrow Wilson in the early 1900s (i.e. negotiate in private, publish outcome in public), this “ethos of confidentiality” continues to be a hallmark of international negotiations within modern diplomacy. This de facto standard in international negotiations provides the ability for a diplomat’s leeway to compromise on many different issues without the public protesting each and every point, which could occur if governmental transparency is required during the negotiation process.

Even in the U.S., this split between transparent domestic policies and secret international policies is witnessed. Within the scholarly public administration literature, this split is called a bifurcated government. Many countries have this split between secrecy and transparency in regard to public policy (Roberts, 2006a). Furthermore, if negotiations and decision making are kept secret, then when the policy or treaty is made public, all parties can agree on what information to present to the public in order to have a single, consistent story versus multiple stories that the media or citizens could misinterpret (Stasavage, 2006). One major problem with this “ethos of confidentiality” is that studies have shown that various diplomats negotiate in secrecy from a very different position than what their domestic constituents want and have elected them to advocate (Stasavage, 2006).

Even with the U.S. FOIA act and its multiple amendments, the U.S. Congress and the Federal courts agree that the executive branch has the authority to withhold information regarding foreign policy (Roberts, 2004). Also, as stated earlier, the Federal courts strongly

support secrecy over governmental transparency, especially in foreign policy situations. “In United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that a president’s decision to refuse access to ‘diplomatic secrets’ should be treated with ‘utmost deference’” (Roberts, 2004, p. 412).

Although the U.S. promotes governmental transparency, other cultures promote secrecy instead of governmental transparency. In these cultures, secrecy is rooted in historical tradition and state-society relations. Governmental transparency within these countries is a challenge. “It is hard to get past the unchecked growth of a national security state that has engaged in far too much secrecy and spent far too much time punishing rather than protecting” (Brian, 2014, p. 9). In a 2007 study, it was found that cultures that promoted secrecy in the past might now want to be more transparent; however, these cultures are not equipped to do so due to their deep-rooted secrecy (e.g. South Africa during apartheid; Lor & Britz, 2007). It is simply too hard to understand a transparent culture when all that has been known and understood is a culture of secrecy (Meijer, 2013). However, with the Internet, e-government, and digital data, these transparency tools can fight secrecy in these countries (Meijer, 2013; Roberts, 2006a).

One unfortunate issue in countries with a culture of secrecy is censorship. Censorship is as evil to governmental transparency as secrecy. Censorship restricts public choice and public debate. Censorship is a major barrier to governmental transparent data. Many times, the government only provides what they want the public to hear and understand, not the actual transparent truth (Lor & Britz, 2007). Although censorship is not found in the U.S., censorship is found in counties within East Asia, North and Central Africa, and the Middle East (Bertot et al., 2010).

Although governmental secrecy might have benefits, secrecy can be a definite detriment to the government and the public. For instance, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)

appalling handling of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s was due to the secrecy policies that the IMF had in place at the time. IMF's policies at the time hid accounting errors regarding the Fund's handling of various very large Asian financial transactions. To combat these 1990s IMF's secrecy policies, the U.S. government provided \$18 billion to support the IMF *but* the money was contingent on the IMF cleaning up their secrecy policies (Roberts, 2004). Since the late 1990s, the U.S. government and the IMF sponsor the idea that if world governmental organizations like the IMF become more transparent, then countries involved with the IMF will also be pushed to become more transparent (Roberts, 2004). The basic idea is if a parent organization is doing it, then the child organization will also eventually learn to do it.

Secrecy is the arch nemesis of governmental transparency. FOIAs have been enacted to combat secrecy. However, as explained earlier in Section 2.2, even the U.S. FOIA has nine exemptions for publishing governmental transparent data due to U.S. security and individual privacy concerns. Therefore, a major transparency challenge is the conflict between the need for governmental secrecy and a citizen's right to governmental transparent data. This conflict will continue since no true guidelines have been generated to end this conflict.

2.5.4. Personal Information – Transparency Challenge

Whenever a conflict arises between privacy and accountability, people demand the former for themselves and the latter for everyone else (Brin, 1998, p. 12).

Much like the conflict between secrecy and transparency, a growing conflict has arisen between privacy and governmental transparency. To prevent access and disclosure of personal data, privacy laws have been enacted. These privacy laws curb any abuses that could arise when unintentional disclosure of citizen's information occurs (Brin, 1998). This privacy versus

governmental transparency conflict is about striking a balance between a single citizen's needs (e.g. privacy) and the needs of society (e.g. governmental transparency).

Privacy relates to the activities of an individual. Experts agree that certain transparent data should not be released to the general public due to privacy concerns (Heald, 2006a). For instance, even if the general public requests tax returns of the top ten richest citizens using FOIA, the government should not release this data due to privacy constraints. However, if the person is an elected official, then tax returns are expected to be released (e.g. President Trump).

As stated earlier, principal-agent theory is a driver to governmental transparency. However, privacy stymies principal-agent theory since certain data will be held by one party and not known to the other party (Prat, 2006). Information asymmetry exists when this occurs. Therefore, privacy is contrary to governmental transparency when viewed through a principal-agent theory lens.

Until the late 1980s, governmental transparency reform was in vogue. At the time, privacy was not a major topic, especially in governmental policy discussions. However, by the late 1980s, things changed. Taking a cue from other countries, U.S. privacy advocacy groups became politically active. Initial areas that privacy groups concentrated on were in banking, education, and health care. These advocacy groups pushed the U.S. Congress to support and pass privacy legislation within these areas (Roberts, 2006a). An example of this initiative is the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). HIPAA transformed the health care industry imposing major constraints on releasing health-related information to anyone but the patient. Due to enacted privacy laws, governmental transparency has declined in most Western countries during the past 30 years. This decline in governmental transparency can be directly attributed to the rise of privacy and data protection laws (Hood, 2006b).

Examples of ethically questionable governmental transparency requests have occurred throughout the U.S. First, a local radio station in Seattle (KIRO) requested the full name, the employment start date, and the employee's date of birth for every city employee. KIRO's goal was to determine how many city employees would be retiring from the city in the near future. With this data, KIRO was determining if the city would have an upcoming labor shortage issue due to impending employee retirements. However, having a person's name and date of birth provides two of the three fundamental data elements necessary to steal someone's identity (Schrier, 2010). Arguably, privacy should trump governmental transparency in this example.

Second, many elected officials and governmental agencies keep their constituent's email addresses. Submitting a FOIA request for this information is ethically questionable (Schrier, 2010). A business could request this email information from a governmental agency through a FOIA request. The business could in turn use the email list in upcoming business promotions. The publication of this transparent data would be in ethical violation of a citizen's privacy rights. A citizen would not be expecting a governmental agency to publish their private email account.

Third, all governmental employees have the right to file a harassment or discrimination grievance or complaint. However, since these data are deemed public information due to the employee working for a governmental agency, this data could be discoverable under governmental transparency law. However, like the email address situation above, employee harassment or discrimination data should be kept private and not disclosed to the general public under the umbrella of FOIA (Schrier, 2010).

Fourth, much like the third example, public administrators have certain rights. One right is a basic right to personal privacy in the workplace (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Public administrator's salary information is open to outside FOIA requests. However, private business

is not under such scrutiny. The issue is that public sector employees have less privacy rights due to governmental transparency laws than their counterparts that work in the private sector. Data like salary information should not be under FOIA transparency guidelines (Heald, 2006a). These four examples demonstrate that privacy advocates have legitimate arguments. In other words, privacy should trump transparency in certain situations.

One method to potentially balance privacy and governmental transparency is to use data minimization. Data minimization requires government and citizens to reveal only the data needed for a transaction or request to occur (Jonas & Harper, 2010). For instance, if a citizen or non-governmental group requests data through the U.S. FOIA, the government must *only* provide the data that is requested and nothing more in order to protect an individual's or group's privacy. Conversely, the government must *only* collect data that is required during policy creation and policy implementation. These data collection and data disbursement limits are data minimization.

A topic that needs mentioned when discussing privacy and governmental transparency is surveillance (Heald, 2006b; Heald, 2012). Governmental agencies need to be cautious of the growing amount of data that is kept due to FOIA and other transparency laws. With so much data, the data can be mined for specific personal data. Hackers or unethical public administrators can illicitly mine this data and illegally release these data for either monetary gain or to embarrass a person or public agency. As governmental agencies store more data and provide easier mechanisms to search the data, these governmental agencies must be mindful of potential consequences. For instance, outside groups can analyze the data in so much detail that these outside groups could become a surveillance group (Roberts, 2006a). Although this has not

occurred in the U.S. presently, surveillance could become a new challenge to governmental transparency in the future.

In summary, privacy laws have slowed the advancement of governmental transparency. Privacy, therefore, is a challenge to transparency especially since privacy can be viewed as the counter to governmental transparency. Increasing privacy efforts decrease governmental transparency efforts and vice versa. A balance must be struck between these two conflicting directions.

2.5.5 Radical Transparency – Transparency Challenge

In the last section, transparency, privacy, and surveillance are discussed; a caution is also provided regarding unethical public administrators releasing unapproved data to the public. This action is not hypothetical; it occurs. This type of governmental transparency is called, radical transparency (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Radical transparency is outside the realm of FOIAs and traditional governmental transparency data requests.

Radical transparency ensues when a public administrator determines that certain data should be released, but his or her superiors suppress the governmental employee from publishing this data (Meijer, 2013). A traditional transparency process occurs when an individual or group requests a public agency to release certain governmental data. These transparent data are published if these data are not deemed secret or are not deemed a detriment to national security. Radical transparency completely changes this traditional transparency process. Radical transparency's process is "leak, publish and wait for public outrage" (Meijer, 2012, p. 3; Roberts, 2012).

In modern history, WikiLeaks is a prime example of radical transparency. Although Meijer (2012) believes that WikiLeaks turned governmental transparency from a very dull topic to a very sexy topic, WikiLeaks caused, and continues to cause, major issues and challenges for world powers and for traditional governmental transparency processes.

WikiLeaks's now-famous data leaks began in 2010 under the leadership of Julian Assange. WikiLeaks's goal is to steal governmental and corporate secrets and to publish this data for regular citizens to see and read. Per Assange, WikiLeaks's aim is to "wage war on secrecy" (Roberts, 2012, pp. 116-117). WikiLeaks achieved worldwide attention when the organization published various U.S. documents that were obtained illegally from a governmental whistleblower, U.S. Army Private Bradley Manning. These data were published on the Internet and in certain newspapers (Meijer, 2012). The five major newspapers that WikiLeaks teamed with were *The New York Times*, the *Guardian*, *Der Spiegel*, *Le Monde*, and *El Pais* (Roberts, 2012, p. 123). The total amount of governmental data that WikiLeaks released was extremely large consisting of a quarter of a million diplomatic cables and thousands of Iraq War and Afghan War logs. Overall, the illegal data release was substantial for the U.S. and its allies (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a).

The volume must be placed in proper perspective. The first leak of documents was Iraq War logs. This leak occurred early in 2010. Approximately 200,000 pages of material were released to the general public. Assange boasted that this was one of the largest leaks in U.S. military history (Roberts, 2012). Later in 2010, WikiLeaks published war logs from the Afghan War. These data were much larger than the original Iraq War log release. The Afghan release amounted to approximately 1,400,000 pages of information. A third release of U.S. documents in

2010 was the U.S. State Department cables between key U.S. diplomats and their foreign counterparts (Ginsberg et al., 2013).

Assange held the belief that the U.S. public would rally around him for what he did and would spur outrage against the U.S. government and its ongoing war in Afghanistan. Instead, WikiLeaks' actions had an opposite effect. Once the U.S. State Department data were released, various U.S. organizations began turning against Assange and WikiLeaks. For example, on December 1, 2010, Amazon stopped hosting WikiLeaks information on their cloud servers. On December 3, 2010, PayPal announced that it would no longer take donations for WikiLeaks through its payment systems. On December 6, 2010, MasterCard announced that it would no longer take payments for WikiLeaks donations through its financial systems either (Roberts, 2012).

More examples exist, but the key aspect is that companies turned against the WikiLeaks's actions of leaking critical government information to the public. One major reason for corporations turning against WikiLeaks is that Assange stated that governments would not be the only organizations targeted. Corporate data would eventually be stolen and leaked too; hence, the severe reaction from U.S. companies in support of the U.S. government. Assange and WikiLeaks were outraged by these corporate responses from Amazon, PayPal, and MasterCard. These business actions hurt WikiLeaks so much so that Assange called the actions "economic censorship." WikiLeaks lost three-quarters of a million dollars just in the first week of December 2010 alone (Roberts, 2012).

The problem with WikiLeaks' strategy of "leak, publish and wait for outrage" is the "wait for outrage" part. Assange and WikiLeaks thought that after the war logs were published, major outrage from citizens and media would ensue. The main information in these war logs was

detailed techniques on how to prevent overthrow of governments friendly to the U.S. To the surprise of Assange, nobody really cared. The subject matter was so complex that no one understood it (Roberts, 2012). Media did not take the time to decipher the detailed data. The media decided not to summarize the data in common terms so that an average citizen could understand it. The media deemed the data complicated and un-newsworthy. Also, instead of WikiLeaks controlling what was released to the general public, the five major newspapers that WikiLeaks selected to publish its data became the gatekeepers of the data. The newspapers began to edit and decide what data were newsworthy. The newspapers did not release all the data that WikiLeaks wanted released. WikiLeaks's original radical transparency initiative began to falter since data censorship began to occur.

Besides U.S. corporations rejecting WikiLeaks' "wait for outrage" strategy, the outrage that Assange and WikiLeaks expected from the U.S. population also did not occur. Instead of U.S. citizens being motivated to public action against the Iraq and Afghan Wars, the U.S. citizens turned against the messenger, WikiLeaks. In August 2010, an ABC News poll found that 42% of the U.S. population believed that WikiLeaks publication of data was in the public's interest. By December 2010, only 29% of the U.S. population still believed that it was in the public's interest. Also, in December 2010, a CNN News poll found that 80% of Americans strongly disapproved of the release of the WikiLeaks documents (Roberts, 2012). Instead of public outrage against the U.S. government, the outrage was directed against WikiLeaks.

As witnessed by the public's response to WikiLeaks, when radical transparency occurs, no public outrage ensues; no public condemnation of the government happens. Instead, citizens turn against the publishers of the radical transparent data. Governmental transparency is good for society provided it is performed through a valid transparency publication process under the

direction of government and its citizens. Radical transparency will continue to be a challenge to traditional transparency as witnessed in the recent 2016 presidential election when WikiLeaks released stolen Democratic emails regarding Hilary Clinton. According to Clinton as recently as May 2017 (USA Today), WikiLeaks is a major reason for her presidential election loss. However, creators of radical transparency must understand that the basic “leak, publish and wait for outrage” does not work.

2.5.6 Transparent Data Misunderstanding – Transparency Challenge

Transparency is not only about publishing governmental transparent data but publishing the *right* and *understandable* data (Cucciniello et al., 2015). With governmental transparency, three fundamental actions must occur with the data for transparency to work efficiently and effectively. Public agencies must provide the right transparent data; published transparent data must be correct; and, citizens must understand the published transparent data (Swartz, 2010). All three actions must work in tandem to achieve true governmental transparency. If one of these three actions does not work correctly, governmental transparency fails.

Various issues arise with governmental transparent data. The first issue is that too much transparent data exist for a common citizen to understand (Oliver, 2004). With too much data, confusion occurs (Margetts, 2006). The EU is struggling with this issue on their e-governmental websites. EU publishes transparent data regarding their policymaking processes on their websites. However, “it is impossible for a normal citizen to understand all information on policymaking processes both because of the quantity of the information available or received as well as the specific terms and explanations used” (Curtin & Meijer, 2006, p. 116).

With large data caches, another transparent data issue exists. The issue is searching the massive quantities of transparent data trying to find what is being requested (Ginsberg, 2013b). Searching has two parts. Searching requires proper record keeping and the ability to find the records. Data have to be stored correctly to be found efficiently (Bertot et al., 2010); “the right to information is meaningless if files do not exist or cannot be found” (Roberts, 2006a, p. 111). This governmental transparent searching issue is more prevalent in developing countries and local governments. Smaller and poorer governments struggle to achieve an efficient record keeping system along with proper search techniques for the data (Roberts, 2006a).

Recently both Google and the *Washington Post* agreed that U.S. governmental data are nearly impossible to search. Regarding the transparent data that is posted on U.S. governmental websites, these data are too complicated to setup in formal search engines (e.g. Google). Also, search engines cannot keep up with the sheer amount of governmental transparent data being published each day (Reich, 2010). A study analyzed searching issues regarding recent transparent influenza pandemic data. French (2011) determined that the public had a very difficult time finding valid governmental data on influenza.

Another transparent data issue that arises due to so much published governmental data is that these data are in raw form. A raw dump of governmental data is difficult to comprehend versus having data properly summarized for the citizens to understand. Raw data are too detailed and too technical; citizens simply do not understand complicated data (Ferry & Eckersley, 2014; Ginsberg, 2013b; Heald, 2006b; Heald, 2012; Jaeger & Bertot, 2010; Margetts, 2006; Meijer et al., 2014; O'Neill, 2006). A transparent data dump does not help the citizens if these data are not explained. Many times, the transparent data does not include any contextual information explaining what the transparent data fields mean.

In public administration literature, the “sunlight” analogy for FOIA is used to demonstrate this data dump issue. Although transparent data can provide “sunlight,” meaning showing problems within the government, transparent data can also provide “over exposure” causing issues for the citizens to not understand the raw data (Heald, 2012). Transparency is about communicating data. Communication means that a receiver must understand the data. However, “huge quantities of information are now made public in order to meet transparency requirements, but a great deal of it is not actually communicated to anyone” (O’Neill, 2006, p. 81). This is a major governmental transparency challenge.

One possible solution for too detailed raw data is for public administrators to simplify the governmental transparent data before publishing it to the general public. Public administrators should be tasked to “dumb it down” for the citizens (Scarlett, 2014). Otherwise, governmental transparent data confusion and misunderstanding will continue. For public administrators that try to “dumb it down,” these administrators may fail. Failure is valid so long as the public agency constantly improves the transparent data (Scarlett, 2014).

For governmental transparent data, a typical citizen may not understand the published transparent data for a couple reasons:

- Citizen is not familiar with the legal framework around a government’s transparent policy or outcome being published (Bannister & Connolly, 2011, p. 15).
- Citizen does not have sufficient knowledge on the subject matter being published. Citizen does not have the expertise (Bannister & Connolly, 2011, p. 15).
- Citizen does not have the pre-knowledge or background around the transparent policy or outcome (Bannister & Connolly, 2011, p. 15).
- Citizen does not understand how to request the transparent data (Roberts, 2006a, p. 117).

FOIAs require that the government provide certain governmental transparent data in a timely manner. However, FOIAs do not require the governmental agencies to explain the data to a common citizen. Therefore, a question has been raised if governmental agencies should provide training in order for the citizens to understand the published transparent data (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Etzioni, 2014)? However, Margetts (2006) counters by advocating that accountability reside on citizens to understand the transparent data, not the governmental agency.

One possible solution around these two issues, the raw transparent data issue and a citizen's understanding issue, is to have a third party analyze, decipher, and summarize the transparent data (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012a; Margetts, 2006). With a third party performing these tasks, a third party could provide a check-and-balance between the governmental agency and the transparent data that the governmental agency is releasing (Meijer et al., 2015). Another option is for a third-party agency to conduct focus groups. A focus group would review a public agency's transparent data (e.g. hardcopy or website data). A focus group could provide feedback if a public agency is publishing transparent data that is not understandable. If it is not transparent enough for the focus group, then the public agency can discuss how the transparent data and possibly the public agency's website can be modified to create greater transparency (Fairbanks et al., 2007).

Media can play this third-party role. For one reason, citizens are more accepting of media information than straight governmental data (de Fine Licht, 2011).

As it is difficult, time-consuming and potentially tedious and unpleasant to actually engage with information provided by transparency reforms (i.e. to make use of actual transparency) people will, however, happily defer the evaluation of the actual information to others who are thought to be in a good position to evaluate decision-making processes. Consequently, if people receive a statement from an external source, such as a journalist, that a decision-making procedure is transparent or non-transparent, they will use that information as a cue when assessing the transparency of a decision-making procedure

without making a full evaluation of the actual transparency of the procedure (de Fine Licht, 2014b, p. 315)

In the U.S., the media make a thousand FOIA requests to each citizen's request. The media are much better positioned to obtain governmental transparent data and analyze the data than any other organization or citizen (Worthy, 2010). Two recent studies advocate that the media should play the role of a third party in order to provide citizens summary, governmental transparent data. In the first study, experimental results exhibit that although governmental transparency positively raises citizen's perceptions regarding governmental transparency, when the media decipher the information and report the transparent data in layman's terms for the citizens, the citizens understand the transparent data better than without the media's analysis. Because citizens understand the data better, this positively raises citizen's perceptions of governmental transparency even higher than if the media were not involved (de Fine Licht, 2014b). In a second study, the findings show that the media provided a much better summary of environmental data for citizens than a governmental agency. Because of the media's input, the citizen's understanding of environmental public policy was increased (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012).

Two counterarguments for using the media to decipher governmental transparent data are that the media tend to focus on bad news and that public administrators should develop better transparency tools to keep the public informed. First, the media do not usually report good news that the government may be performing; instead, the media focuses on negative transparent data (Bertot et al., 2010; Oliver, 2004; Worthy, 2010). The Justice Committee of the House of Commons in England (2012) finds that "irregularities, errors, and inefficiencies" prove "more newsworthy" than positive transparency information from the media (p. 17). In the public administration literature, very limited empirical studies have been performed to validate this assumption (de Fine Licht et al., 2014). In a rare study regarding governmental transparency

publications that the media reported upon, the study found that media focused on bad governmental information much more than good governmental data. Based on this direction, most media reports regarding government are negative in the United Kingdom. For instance, only 3% of media stories increased citizen trust in government; while, 58% of media stories reduced citizen trust in government (Worthy, 2010). Second, instead of relying on the media so heavily, public administrators should be more accountable for keeping the public informed. To do this, public administrators must develop enhanced transparency strategies and tools to comply with government's FOIAs (Fairbanks et al., 2007).

Instead of a third-party solution, Heald (2012) suggests that governmental transparent websites should have both a published summary of the transparent data along with the raw data in case a citizen or a media group wants to take a deeper dive into the transparent data. Understanding raw transparent data is not just focused on the government, but also the governmental transparent policies that public agencies implement.

If the governmental transparent data do not have a summary or are not deciphered by a third party, citizens could misinterpret the data. Instead of misunderstanding the transparent data, citizens could believe that they understand the data and act on misinterpretation of the governmental transparent data (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Fung et al., 2007). Herbert Simon's bounded rationality is one explanation for this misinterpretation. If a citizen or outside organization is presented with some governmental transparent data, but not all governmental transparent data, the decision will be made on limited governmental transparent data. Since the decision or action is not based on complete information, the decision or action may not be correct (Fung et al., 2007).

Two examples of governmental transparent data misinterpretations can be found in the public administration literature. First, at the turn of the 21st Century, media and citizens misinterpreted factory pollutant data. Although the pollutants were measured in various metrics, media and citizens only focused on one metric, pounds of pollutants per factory. What the media and citizens did not understand is that some pollutants may weigh more but are not as toxic as certain pollutants that weigh less. Therefore, by only focusing on one metric exclusively, the media and citizens selected the wrong factories that were the worst polluters (Fung et al., 2007). Second, school comparison data are ripe for misinterpretation. Parents focus on certain school metrics; however, individual school metrics do not show the entire picture of a school. Citizens must review all metrics to understand the pros and cons of each school district (Bannister & Connolly, 2011).

Another transparent data issue is determining what data detail to publish. If citizens want summary data, is that what should be published? Or does the public agency need to know the users of the data so that the raw data and the summary data target actual users versus the general public (O'Neill, 2006)? If these published transparent data are for the general public, the specific users will not utilize the data as effectively. If these published transparent data are targeted for certain primary users, the primary users will use it, but the general public will not be able to understand it (Meijer et al., 2012). Public agencies have a quandary regarding knowing what data to publish, too general or too specific. One suggested option to solve this quandary is for governments to create user-friendly, e-governmental websites in order to increase the perceived perception of governmental transparency within the citizenry (Kim & Lee, 2012).

Regarding governmental transparent data, the validity of the data has come into question. How do citizens know that the transparent data are correct? FOIAs provide for transparent data

to be published. However, stipulations on how to audit the data are not put forth (Savage, 2006). “Transparency initiatives... should also be managed in a rational manner by doing an audit” (Meijer, 2009, p. 261). “The role of [a] public audit is vital to effective transparency” (Heald, 2012, p. 46). Ultimately, a third party should perform these audits (Heald, 2006b; O’Neill, 2006). However, employing a third-party vendor to audit governmental transparent data is a further cost to a governmental agency. As stated previously, even with e-government, transparency costs money. These costs can be a significant impact to small governments (e.g. local governments). Spending additional money to audit the governmental transparent data for validity could cause governmental transparent initiatives to stall.

For example, a third-party, non-profit organization, Sunlight Foundation, that audits various Federal governmental websites, found that “over 1.2 trillion dollars’ worth of misreported spending occurred in 2009 alone. Some of the most serious problems appear to be caused by agencies’ failure to meet their reporting obligations” (Miller, 2011, p. 21). Ellen Miller’s testimony to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and Procurement Reform for the U.S. House of Representatives on March 11, 2011 unveiled that a third party can help audit the Federal government’s websites for validity. One additional audit option is for citizen truth squads to help audit governmental transparent data. These volunteers are experts in their fields and can audit certain websites for validity of transparent data (Fung et al., 2007). For a true transparent society, audits must be performed.

Even if these governmental transparent data are published and are understandable to the citizenry, an additional issue appears in the public administration literature. The issue is citizen’s time. The argument against governmental transparent data is that citizens do not have the time to

read, understand, and react to governmental transparent data. Due to a busy work, family, and social life, most citizens simply do not have time to peruse governmental websites reading and analyzing governmental transparent data (Etzioni, 2014). Although this argument has been put forth, no empirical data supports this idea. Another way to state this issue is through a field-of-dreams concept. If a public agency publishes transparent data (e.g. on e-governmental websites), will the citizens come to use it? Published governmental transparent data are not true transparent data unless citizens use or react to the data (Meijer et al., 2012; Stasavage, 2006).

FOIAs alone do not create true governmental transparency. Transparent data issues exist. These general transparent data issues are primarily in regard to too much data, too detailed data, or potentially not correct data. Various resolutions have been put forth in the public administration literature. Many solutions include a third party to decipher the detailed data into summary information or to audit the transparent data for validity. Although various data issues are discussed in the public administration literature, empirical transparent data studies are very limited.

2.5.7 Transparent Data Communication and Spin – Transparency Challenge

“Neutral information is an oxymoron” (Meijer et al., 2015, p. 6).

This section concentrates on how governmental transparent data are presented to citizens and external groups. This section’s governmental transparency challenge is that governmental agencies spin transparent data positively or negatively depending on a governmental agency’s need (de Fine Licht, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b; Meijer, 2013; Meijer et al., 2015; Thomsen, 2013;). In an earlier section, spin is referred to as transparency’s “color.” Stating again, color refers to how positive and upbeat these data are spun when initially

published. Color can indicate how much spin a public agency is trying to do regarding the transparent data that is being released (Meijer et al., 2015). Public agencies tend to be biased when publishing their governmental transparent data. Public administrators focus on certain data in order to promote their agency's position.

Fox (2007) is more forceful when critiquing governmental agencies that spin their transparent data. Inefficient governmental transparency induces "pandering to ill-conceived and systematically biased public opinion" (Fox, 2007, p. 36). This quote is in reference to how governmental agencies spin welfare data since citizens already have a negative perception of certain welfare programs.

Public administrators can use two types of spin within a public agency. *Untargeted* spin makes a public agency look better. To do this, a public administrator can emphasize the positive governmental transparent data and severely downplay any negative transparent data. *Targeted* spin makes an outside group or another person look bad (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). Comparing the two spin types, public administrators usually use untargeted spin within a public agency when trying to spin governmental transparent data. However, with the recent election of President Trump, targeted spin is increasing (e.g. President Trump's Tweets).

Public administrators use several spin tactics: pre-empting, diversion, manipulation of journalists, and crafting of stories. *Pre-empting* is posting positive governmental transparent data before any citizen or media outlet posts negative data against the public agency. *Diversion* occurs when a public agency posts negative transparent data when other major news stories are occurring at the same time. These other news stories overshadow the public agency's negative transparent data, and no one really notices. *Manipulation of journalists* is a sly way to use the media. A public agency only selects media organizations that favor their specific public agency.

Therefore, when governmental transparent data are published, the spin will be provided through these sympathetic media organizations. Finally, *crafting of stories* entails releasing positive transparent data along with a positive narrative in order to shape citizen's positive thoughts of government (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011). Public administrators use all four spin tactics to mold a citizen's perception of the government and its actions.

To understand spin more, examples need to be given. For example, certain local governmental websites only post positive press releases regarding their governmental policies and outcomes. Negative press releases are not posted (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b). de Fine Licht et al. (2014) call these actions "window-dressing." Such heavy spin on transparent data can influence and frame debates on current public policy by pushing citizens to action (Meijer et al., 2015). This positive or negative spin goes against the neutrality that governmental transparent data should achieve within public agencies.

Another example of spinning governmental transparent data is found in Danish school metrics (Meijer, 2013; Thomsen, 2013). However, instead of spinning the transparent data positively, these transparent data are spun negatively. Therefore, the key issue in certain areas of Denmark is whether published school transparent data are actually neutral data or if school transparent data are posted as "an instrument for naming and shaming" (Meijer, 2013, p. 433). In Meijer's (2013) case study, local public agencies post negative transparent school data for parents to read. Much of the school data were negative in the study, very little was positive. Some experts believe that people like to read bad news (Thomsen, 2013) and posting bad transparent news is a very effective publishing strategy. Posting bad school data promotes more interest within the citizenry than posting good data.

A final example of spinning transparent data comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In a hearing before the Subcommittee of Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and Procurement Reform of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives, accusations were given that “they [USDA] keep a set of books for operational purposes, but then when they report to the taxpayer, to the public, it is in a different format, and it is difficult to reconcile” (Brito, 2011, p. 56). Brito’s complaint was that U.S. governmental agencies spin the published transparent data, and no one can reconcile what is true and what is spun information.

Grimmelikhuijsen (2011) conducted an experiment analyzing the effect that a public agency, when spinning transparent data, has on a citizen’s view of the public agency’s competency, honesty, and benevolence (these dimensions are discussed earlier in the dissertation). The study’s finding was that spinning transparent data has no effect on a citizen’s perception of honesty or benevolence. However, positively spinning transparent data increases a citizen’s perception of a public agency’s competency; negatively spinning transparent data decreases a citizen’s perception of a public agency’s competency (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011).

Another study analyzed positive and negative transparent data spin against acceptance of a public policy decision. The study’s finding demonstrates that spin directly influences a citizen’s acceptance of a public policy. When transparent data are positively spun, a public policy decision has a higher probability of being accepted by its citizenry; conversely, when transparent data are negatively spun, a public policy decision has a higher probability of not being accepted by its citizenry (de Fine Licht, 2011).

Based on these studies, transparent data spin does affect a citizen’s perception of the public agency and its policies. However, spinning too much can lead to propaganda (Fairbanks et

al., 2007). A fine line exists between positive governmental transparent data spin and propaganda. In 1913, the U.S. Congress passed a law prohibiting funds to pay for “publicity experts,” meaning people designated in a public agency to completely spin the agency’s information into propaganda. Although public administrators have a little leeway on public relations in terms of transparent data, caution must be used in case the governmental agency oversteps their bounds into propaganda.

According to public administration literature, public administrators spin transparent data in order to increase a citizen’s perception of their public agency. Spin is common within public agencies. Public administrators utilize various tactics and methods to spin the data either positively or negatively depending on their need. However, spinning transparent data are not FOIA’s goal. Governmental transparent data should not be biased; governmental transparent data should be neutral so that the citizens can have basic facts to decide if action needs to be taken (i.e. public participation). Although very limited public administration studies have been performed in terms of spinning governmental transparent data, citizens must be aware of this governmental transparency practice.

2.5.8 Social Media – Transparency Challenge

“Thanks to social media and an increasing flood of data, the capacity to generate causes and controversies almost instantly has become the new norm in today’s ‘super-transparent society’ (Austin & Upton, 2016, p. 25).

This transparency challenge expands upon this dissertation’s earlier e-government driver section. This section concentrates on a recent e-governmental transparency trend: social media. In past public administration literature, e-government primarily focused upon data transfers and online web sites. However, in today’s technical climate, social media have become the norm

versus simple, static web sites; so much so, that e-government now includes social media (Hao, Zheng, & Zeng, 2016).

What are social media? Landon-Murray (2015) provides a simple yet encompassing definition of social media. “Social media include a number of services and platforms that we have all become very familiar with: social networking (Facebook), micro-blogging, wikis, and media sharing (YouTube)” (p. 69). The premise of social media is that users can create online interactions with each other. This interaction is performed using content-sharing software like Facebook or Twitter (Hao et al., 2016). One person can post information while others can react nearly instantaneously to the information either by “liking” what they read and see or by adding to the information like re-Tweeting information to other people (e.g. family or friends). This interaction can also be achieved through crowd sourcing or generating online petitions (Greve, 2015).

Even though individuals were initially the primary driver of social media, corporations and governments have now begun to utilize social media more extensively. In fact, social media have just recently become a major trend in e-government. Social media hold promises for public agencies through promotion of communication and coordination between internal governmental departments and external citizen groups (Hao et al., 2016). From a governmental transparency perspective, social media have the potential to increase public participation and collaboration. To achieve this, social media present new and innovative democratic participation and citizen engagement opportunities.

To demonstrate the power of social media and how a governmental agency might need to become involved in a situation due to social media, an example (Austin & Upton, 2016) must be given. In April 2012, a 9-year old girl in Scotland started a blog highlighting issues with her

school's lunch program. The blog's name was "NeverSeconds." Initially, the girl's focus was on the small portions that the school cafeteria offered. She stated on her blog that she is a growing young girl who needs enough food to concentrate on studies in the afternoon. Later, she began to question the nutritional value of the school's cafeteria food and posted comments as such on her blog. The girl blogged these issues on a regular basis including pictures of food and portion sizes. People responded positively to her blog by adding comments of their own like "My toddler eats more than that" (p. 26). Even popular chef Jamie Oliver tweeted support for the girl and her blog. Within the first six weeks of being created, NeverSeconds had over two million hits.

Into the seventh week of existence, the blog came to a halt. The school told the girl that she must stop blogging and taking pictures of the school lunches. This direction not only came from the school, but also the local city council who oversees this public school in Scotland. Based on this ultimatum by the school and the local city council, the girl posted one last goodbye blog explaining what occurred and that she would not be blogging any further.

The story did not end there. Within 24 hours, not only did 2,416 people place comments on the NeverSeconds blog infuriated with the local city council's decision (Austin & Upton, 2016), but thousands of people bombarded the local city council's website with extremely negative comments. In addition, citizens launched an electronic petition to save the NeverSeconds blog. Within a week, NeverSeconds had an additional one million hits, and a twitter hash tag supporting the girl started to trend around the world. Moreover, *Wired* magazine wrote an article with the headline "9-Year Old Who Changed School Lunches Silenced by Politicians."

With all this negative publicity through social media, the local city council quickly reversed its decision. The council stated that their original decision was based on being sensitive

to the school's cafeteria workers, but the council realized that the public had voiced their solid displeasure through social media, and the initial decision was rescinded. The girl began blogging again (Austin & Upton, 2016).

Although this social media story is a simple yet true story, this story demonstrates the power of social media and how social media can affect governmental decisions. As this story reveals, "In a social media environment, a government agency not only plays the role of an information/service provider, but also needs to develop strategies to deal with the public online behavior, rapidly respond to the public information query, as well as uncover valuable information from the user-generated contents" (Hao et al., 2016, p. 81). Social media alter the relationship between public administrators and its citizenry (Greve, 2015).

For governmental agencies, the benefits of social media are many. Social media allow citizens more robust interactive methods to participate in government. Social media push governmental agencies to be more innovative technically to keep pace with younger, tech-savvy generations like the Millennials (Hao et al., 2016). More democratic dialogue can occur twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week regarding new and important governmental issues. Physical townhall meetings are no longer needed; crowd sourcing can replace public townhall meetings as a way to solicit input to potential governmental decisions (Greve, 2015). Men and Hung-Baesecke (2015) provide additional governmental agency benefits of social media like making connections with citizens, building a community, enhancing citizen empowerment, yet at the same time being entertaining to the citizens (p. 458). These benefits greatly enhance transparency in government. By utilizing social media, a public agency can disseminate governmental transparency information faster and can quickly receive responses from its citizens regarding this information.

However, with all these benefits, very limited research exists regarding social media within public administration (Landon-Murray, 2015). For instance, a very basic study revealed that in Turkey's six, largest-populated cities, public agencies utilize Facebook and Twitter. Four of the six cities also utilize Google Play and Apple Store applications (Yazici, 2016). However besides basic social media studies like this in public administration, no robust empirical research has been conducted showing the value of social media in public administration as it relates to governmental transparency (Hao et al., 2016; Holtzhausen, 2016). As Hao et al. (2016) state "many [public] agencies, however, are reluctant to measure their online [social media] interactions due to the lack of tangible goals, culture, philosophy of control, and resource management for e-government, or are even prevented due to the existing laws and regulations" (p. 80).

Social media are becoming an option for public agencies to disseminate governmental transparency information. However, the challenge for public administrators is understanding what the true benefits of social media are, what the negatives are for the public agency, and how to use social media in an ever-changing technical environment. As Yazici (2016) warns, "public institutions and especially local governments have to be careful in terms for transparency [and social media]" (p. 49). Social media use is increasing; public administrators need to understand and utilize social media more to aid in governmental transparency and citizen participation.

2.6 Transparency Major Research Topics

2.6.1 Transparency and Trust – Transparency Major Research Topics

The primary focus of this dissertation is a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and how it relates to citizen's trust in government and public participation. In this section, the relationship between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and a citizen's trust will be reviewed followed by a section analyzing the relationship between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and public participation.

To recognize the relationship between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and a citizen's trust in government, both governmental transparency and trust must be understood. As a reminder, Appendix A contains public administration expert's transparency definitions. Although a traditional definition of governmental transparency is the idea of *providing citizenry data in a timely and accurate manner in order that the provider of data can be held accountable*, governmental transparency is not simply about what data or how much data that a governmental agency releases; but instead, *governmental transparency is how a citizen feels (positively or negatively) about the release of governmental transparent data*.

With governmental transparency having been previously explained in terms of a citizen's perception, trust will now be defined and then expounded upon through dimensions, types, and characteristics. "Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Many public administration experts utilize this definition of trust within their writing on governmental transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). A critical part of Rousseau et al.'s trust definition is that trust is based on "positive expectations." In a relationship between a citizen's perception of

governmental transparency and governmental trust, an average citizen's expectation is that government is enhanced due to transparency. Transparency allows a citizen to understand governmental processes, policies, and policy outcomes better, causing trust in government to increase.

Although the volume of public administration literature is limited on governmental transparency and trust, a few experts have written about this transparency-trust relationship. In public administration literature, trust is explained in terms of dimensions, types, and characteristics. As detailed earlier in this dissertation, the primary trust dimensions in public administration literature are competence, benevolence, and honesty (Hong & Im, 2013). Also stated in a prior section, trust splits into three types: process-based trust, institutional-based trust and e-governmental-based trust (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). This dissertation's focus is primarily on process-based trust and e-governmental-based trust. This dissertation's goal does not focus on the amount of governmental transparent data, nor does it focus on the ethics of the governmental transparent data. Therefore, institutional-based trust is not an emphasis of this dissertation.

Trust can also be encapsulated in certain characteristics. Two fundamental characteristics of trust are openness and honesty. Although these two characteristics are found in various scholarly articles, these two characteristics occasionally combine into one characteristic, integrity (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Integrity promotes credibility, which promotes trust. Trust experts, Butler and Cantrell (1984) posit a trust model with five specific characteristics. The five characteristics are integrity, openness, loyalty, competency, and consistency. Several years later, Butler (1991) added directness, fairness, and promise fulfillment to these original five trust characteristics. Reviewing Butler's additional characteristics, these additional characteristics are

encompassed within integrity. Analyzing Rousseau et al.'s trust definition, a public agency's mixture of integrity, openness, loyalty, competency, and consistency through transparency is a major driving force to increase a citizen's positive perceptions of government causing an increase of trust.

Why concentrate on a citizen's trust of government? Over the past decades, trust in government has fallen and continues to fall (de Fine Licht, 2014a). Some authors point back to the 1960s as the beginning of declining trust in Western democracies (Worthy, 2010). To combat this steady decline, emphasis and research must focus on increasing trust within government (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011); otherwise, citizen's frustration will continue to intensify. Governmental transparency, especially through e-government, is seen as a solution to strengthening trust and to halting this continued decline of trust in government (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009).

Regarding the transparency-trust relationship, many experts believe that a positive relationship exists between transparency and citizen's trust (Meijer et al., 2012; Scarlett, 2014). "Transparency is widely supposed to make institutions and their officeholders both more trustworthy and more trusted" (O'Neill, 2006, p. 75). A transparency-trust relationship is built on credibility (Heald, 2006a) and communication between a governmental agency and its citizens (O'Neill, 2006). A positive transparency-trust relationship means that the more a public agency is transparent to the general public, the more a citizen will trust the public agency. For instance, if a public agency is transparent in terms of a policy process, then citizens will be more trusting that the public agency's policy is fair and right (Scarlett, 2014). For a transparency-trust relationship to be positive, governmental transparency must be adaptive to change and the citizens must understand the transparent data (Ferry & Eckersley, 2014).

In the scholarly debate on whether increased governmental transparency does or does not increase public trust, three different camps exist. As a quick review from earlier in the dissertation, these camps are transparency optimists, transparency pessimists, and transparency skeptics (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). Transparency optimists state that a positive correlation exists between transparency and public trust. Transparency pessimists believe that by increasing public administration transparency, public trust will decrease. Transparency skeptics do not believe that any correlation exists between transparency and public trust.

In reviewing the limited public administration literature regarding transparency, a majority of the experts believe that transparency increases citizen's trust.

There is a widely shared opinion that transparency will lead to an open culture in government that benefits us all. It is ultimately seen as 'something good' which will eventually increase citizen trust in government... Transparency is often proposed as a panacea for better governance in general and for combating declining trust levels in particular (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, pp. 7-8).

However, very limited public administration, empirical research supports *or* disproves this premise. In fact, the results are mixed. One major reason is that the transparency-trust relationship is extremely difficult to test (Hood, 2006b; O'Neill, 2006; Roberts, 2006b). A few public administration transparency experts have tried to test this transparency-trust relationship hypothesizing a positive relationship. In one transparency-trust study, Nakamura and Kim (2010) initially believed that governmental transparency is positively associated with public trust in central and local governments. Nakamura and Kim led a research study using surveys conducted in 2003, 2004, and 2006 in Japan and South Korea. In both countries, Nakamura and Kim (2010) found that neither country's citizen's trust increased due to their governmental agencies being more transparent. Nakamura and Kim's view went from initially being a transparency optimist view to a transparency skeptic view.

In 2012, Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer performed a study asking Utrecht University students a series of survey questions regarding transparency and governmental trust. Similar to Nakamura and Kim's (2010) hypothesis, Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer's hypothesis was: "High levels of predisposition to trust government in general strengthen the effect of transparency on the perceived trustworthiness of a specific government organization" (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012, p. 143). Although Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer initially believed that transparency increases trust, Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer found that, in their study, no relationship existed between transparency and citizen trust. Their view also went from an initial transparency optimist view to a transparency skeptic view.

Nakamura and Kim's (2010) and Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer's (2012) findings are in complete contrast to de Fine Licht et al. (2014) findings. In de Fine Licht et al.'s study, high school students (17-19 years old) were surveyed regarding transparency and trust in government. de Fine Licht et al. found that transparency *did* have a very positive effect on citizen's trust in government through open decision-making processes along with public agencies publishing additional transparent data. de Fine Licht et al.'s views are pro-transparency optimist.

Other public administration transparency-trust studies have been performed. In two studies, a comparison between public administrative cultures to a citizen's trust was analyzed. Administrative culture was defined by the decisions that a government makes in regard to direct economic, social, and environmental issues (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015). In 2013, Grimmelikhuijsen, Proumbescu, Hong, and Im performed a study demonstrating that culture affects a citizen's perception of the transparency-trust relationship. For instance, Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013, p. 583) found that South Korean citizens had a more distrusting perception of government when governmental transparent data are published compared to

citizens of the Netherlands. Loretan (2013) agrees with Grimmelikhuijsen et al.'s findings in that "the link between transparency and trust is grounded in a country's cultural features" (p. 587). In another study regarding transparency-trust relationship and culture, a difference was exhibited between Northern (Anglo-Saxon) and Southern European countries. Transparency in Northern European countries was much higher than Southern European countries (Ortiz-Rodriguez et al., 2015). Ortiz-Rodriguez et al. found that this difference in transparency led to higher citizen trust in Northern Europe than in Southern Europe. By analyzing these two studies, culture makes a difference in both how much a government focuses on governmental transparency and how a citizen perceives trust in government given published transparent data.

One surprising result in public administration research literature is that race is a factor in the transparency-trust relationship, especially witnessed in the U.S. Non-whites trust government more through governmental transparency than whites. This study was conducted using U.S. Social Security transparent data. This study's finding could be due to non-whites utilizing governmental services (e.g. Social Security) more than whites (Cook, Jacobs, & Kim, 2010).

Although many narratives exist in public administration literature that the transparency-trust relationship is a positive relationship, various transparency pessimists exist as well (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2011; de Fine Licht, 2014a; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010; O'Neil, 2002; Worthy, 2010). O'Neil (2002) gives a very strong narrative argument that governmental transparency continually erodes trust in government, which ultimately undermines governance. This trust erosion is primarily because too detailed transparent data are published, and citizens cannot understand the data (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2009). Although certain experts are transparency pessimists, very little empirical studies have been conducted to verify this aspect.

In Grimmelikhuijsen's (2010) study of e-governmental transparency and trust in local governments, he found that publishing documents (e.g. local council minutes) turned citizens against local governmental agencies. With local transparent data, citizen's perception was that governmental administrative meetings do not run smoothly; instead, major bickering occurs between multiple parties during the meetings. The perception was that a final decision is made in a hostile environment. This negative perception was found in both perceived honesty and perceived competency. Benevolence was not affected. Grimmelikhuijsen's final sentence encapsulated his findings regarding decrease of trust. "Yet transparency as an instrument to increase citizen trust in government, in this very specific organization of local government, seems to have failed to fulfil its promise" (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, p. 31).

In a different study concerning healthcare transparency data and citizen trust, citizens have much less trust in the government once they learn how healthcare funding is appropriated. The transparent data in the study was policy decision making information on priority setting of health issues. The agency decided on what health issues are important and what are not. The transparent data provided who was involved in the priority setting decisions as well as why financial limits were required. After reading how citizen health priority decisions were made, citizens did not trust the process or the public agency that was involved with the decision (de Fine Licht, 2011). In this case, transparency decreased citizen trust.

In summary, "based on these results it remains questionable whether transparency will indeed lead to more trust in government" (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011, p. 46). The transparency-trust relationship within public administration literature has been debated over the past decade. Very limited public administration research has been conducted regarding the relationship, especially within the U.S. Results that have been published are not consistent, in fact the results

are conflicting. Furthermore, some studies have very limited, non-diverse samples (e.g. a university's college students or only e-government users). Due to all these inconsistencies, no data or research has created a transparency-trust general theory or even a consistent understanding. Therefore, this dissertation expands the literature and research that is desperately needed within public administration to address this transparency-trust relationship.

Although a priori research exists in the transparency-trust relationship, no overall public administration direction has been determined. Therefore, this dissertation creates its research questions and hypotheses with no consistent a priori information. The two general research questions in this dissertation regarding the transparency-trust relationship are:

Research Question: *Does a relationship exist between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public trust in government?*

The hypothesis for this research question is:

H₁: A relationship exists between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public trust in government.

Note: This research question focuses on a citizen's perception of governmental transparency.

This research is not performing an analysis of how much actual data governmental agencies make transparent to the public.

Research Question: *Does a relationship exist between a citizen's use of governmental transparency and public trust in government?*

The hypothesis for this research question is:

H₂: A relationship exists between a citizen's use of governmental transparency and public trust in government.

Note: This research question focuses on a citizen's perception of how much the survey respondent uses governmental transparency data.

2.6.2 Transparency and Public Participation – Transparency Major Research Topics

The relationship between transparency and participation of government is not well articulated in the literature (Welch, 2012, p. 93).

Besides the transparency-trust relationship in public administration literature, a smaller set of literature focuses on the transparency-participation relationship (Benito & Bastida, 2009; Meijer, 2012; Curtin & Meijer, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2012; Roberts, 2004; Veal et al., 2015; Welch, 2012). “The origins of the emphasis on transparency center around the idea of an informed citizenry that is able to engage in political discourse and shape the future directions of the government” (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010, pp. 374-375).

To understand public participation, a definition must first be presented.

[Public participation is] defined as any voluntary action by citizens that is more or less directly aimed at influencing the management of collective affairs and public decision making... A growing body of literature focuses on government efforts to utilize new technologies to enable greater citizen participation in policy formation and evaluation and to create greater information exchange between citizens and government (Kim & Lee, 2012, p. 819).

According to Curtin and Meijer (2006), public participation is a responsibility of being a citizen. Public participation is a method to increase governmental legitimacy within the citizenry (de Fine Licht, 2011) through providing data to demonstrate legitimate use of public funds along with valid methods to decision making. Citizens should not be considered solely as customers of government, but also as collaborative, participative partners with government (Kim & Lee, 2012).

Within this transparency-participation relationship, a marked difference exists between governmental transparency and public participation. As stated earlier, transparency is a one-way communication method. A governmental agency either answers a FOIA request from a citizen or group, or the public agency publishes transparent data on a periodic basis. Governmental

transparency is a one-way communication method in that a governmental agency pushes data to its citizens in a specific manner. No communication from the citizen comes back to the public agency. Public participation on the other hand is a two-way communication method. Based on governmental transparent data from public policy decision making meetings or public policy publications, citizens can react and influence public policy and policy decision making (Welch, 2012).

Citizens need information to *see* [sic] what is going on inside government and participation to *voice* [sic] their opinions about this... Transparency is defined as being able to observe government decision-making processes, whereas participation refers to the opportunity to participate in those decision-making process (Meijer et al., 2012, p. 11,13).

Governmental transparency provides citizens knowledge of governmental processes and products; whereas, public participation is a citizen's input into governmental processes and products (Welch, 2012). Public participation in this context is citizens taking action towards a public agency due to transparent data. In sum, *public participation is citizens attempting to influence government.*

Three public participation views in terms of governmental transparency are: input legitimacy, output legitimacy, and social legitimacy. *Input legitimacy* is a citizen feeling that they had the ability to influence a public decision. A citizen does not necessarily need to actually participate; however, a citizen needs to feel that they had the opportunity to influence a public policy or a public agency's decision making and to scrutinize the results (Curtin & Meijer, 2006). *Output legitimacy* is a citizen accepting the results of a public policy decision making process. Output legitimacy is a citizen's belief that the process is performed fairly, and a citizen has ample opportunity to influence the outcome. Finally, *social legitimacy* is viewed in terms of the long-term collaboration between a public agency's administrators and the citizens. "Social

legitimacy will usually have to be created over time simply by the practice, and habit, of doing things together, and there is only so much that can be done to accelerate this process by symbol-building campaigns and communications strategies” (Curtin & Meijer, 2006, p. 112).

A limited number of public administration scholarly articles support the transparency-participation relationship. “Government transparency and participation are the two building blocks of open government” (Meijer, 2012, p. 5). The belief is that these two constructs are positively correlated. Governments and public agencies with high governmental transparency elicit higher citizen participation. In fact, the belief is that transparency is a critical element for citizen participation (Welch, 2012, p. 94). Certain experts believe that without governmental transparency, voting turnout would be lower (Roberts, 2004); other experts believe that without governmental transparency, the right to free speech, the right to assemble, and the right to participate in government would be suppressed (Benito & Bastida, 2009).

Most public administration literature regarding the transparency-participation relationship is in a narrative form; an extremely limited number of public administration empirical studies exist focusing on this transparency-participation relationship (Benito & Bastida, 2009; Welch, 2012). For one reason, public administration experts are challenged with measuring public participation. In certain public administration literature regarding the transparency-participation relationship, citizen voting rates represent citizen participation. However, voting rates are questionable in terms of a valid research variable. Some experts believe that voting is a critical element in the success or failure of a democracy. To these experts, voting demonstrates citizen participation in government (Fairbanks et al., 2007). Other experts believe that voting is not a good independent variable to utilize for public participation (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

A 2009 transparency-participation relationship study using voting rates as a public participation variable compared transparent data provided by countries to the World Bank against each country's citizen voting rates. The findings show that the more a country increased transparency with their governmental World Bank budget and finance data, the higher that the voter turnout was. For the World Bank data, this transparency-participation relationship is significant (Benito & Bastida, 2009). However, Benito and Bastida (2009) admit that their study might be biased. Variables like the type of government (e.g. centralized versus decentralized) should be analyzed versus solely focusing upon transparent governmental finance data released to the World Bank.

In terms of relating transparency to voting (i.e. citizen participation), a citizen would not only use World Bank data; a citizen would utilize many other governmental agency's transparent data. Moreover, a citizen only has one vote. A many-to-one relationship exists in the governmental transparency-participation relationship when using voting as a variable. Multiple governmental agencies provide transparent data; a citizen can only vote once. Hence, other variables should be utilized in empirical transparency-participation relationship studies (Etzioni, 2014). Contrary to the World Bank study, in an e-governmental transparency study analyzing voting rates, the research results show that no correlation exists between transparency and citizen voting rates, neither positive nor negative (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). Therefore to combat this issue, this dissertation's research method utilizes specific survey questions directed specifically at citizen's participation in government versus utilizing citizen voting rates as a critical independent variable.

E-government is a major channel to boost public participation (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011). E-government has greatly enhanced the transparency-participation relationship; e-

government is now a tool for citizen engagement (Jaeger & Bertot, 2010). However, in a rare empirical study of e-governmental transparency and public participation, Welch (2012) found no positive correlation between e-government transparency and citizen participation.

As stated earlier, one issue regarding e-government is the digital divide. If e-government increases public participation, only a select portion of the public may have access to computers and to the Internet (Kim et al., 2005; Loretan, 2013). This digital divide between the haves and the have nots could cause public participation only for those that have computer capability for e-government; citizens without computer access would have much more limited opportunity for citizen participation.

Analyzing participation from a different perspective, certain public administration literature advocates that citizen participation increases trust in government (Kim & Lee, 2012; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006). “Citizen engagement is considered to have positive influences on citizen trust in government” (Royo et al., 2013, p. 2). This premise is different than the idea that transparency increases trust in government.

Why bring this idea into this dissertation’s literature review of governmental transparency? One basic model that has been suggested in public administration literature is that a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency will increase a citizen’s participation, which in turn increases a citizen’s trust in government (Nakamura & Kim, 2010). As stated earlier, a limited amount of public administration literature promotes a positive relationship between a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency and citizen participation. A mixed positive or negative relationship exists between a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency and trust. Public participation is occasionally a mediating factor between a citizen’s perception of governmental transparency and trust. This idea goes against political science research data

showing a transparency-trust-participation model. Although this transparency-participation-trust model is stated a few places in public administration literature (Kim & Lee, 2012), this relationship has yet to be tested.

Overall, the concept of a transparency-participation relationship is enticing. Based on the public administration literature, the transparency-participation relationship appears to be positively correlated. However, very limited research has been conducted to validate or refute this relationship. A few research studies utilize voter turnout rates as an indication of citizen participation. As pointed out, voting rates are not a good variable to use since a voter can obtain governmental transparent data from many different public agencies. Much more research is required in public administration to substantiate this transparency-participation relationship. Research is also required to understand if a transparency-participation-trust relationship has merit.

Since a priori research does exist, albeit very limited, in regard to the transparency-participation relationship, a basic public administration positive direction has been determined. Therefore, this dissertation creates its research question and hypothesis understanding that a priori information exists. The general research question in this dissertation regarding the transparency-participation relationship is:

Research Question: *Does a citizen's perception of governmental transparency increase public participation in government?*

The hypothesis for this research question is:

H₃: A positive relationship exists between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public participation in government.

Research Question: *Does a citizen's use of governmental transparency increase public participation in government?*

The hypothesis for this research question is:

H4: A positive relationship exists between a citizen's use of governmental transparency and public participation in government.

Chapter 3 Research Method

3.1 Design

The strength of the dissertation is fourfold. First, the research does redress a major gap in U.S. public administration transparency research. As shown in Table 2.1, U.S. public administration transparency research is lagging behind other countries by a 2:1 ratio. Furthermore, of the 17 current U.S. public administration transparency articles, only 6 out of the 17 articles are empirically based. Second, as stated in the previous chapter, these dissertation research questions fit into current categories of public administration transparency research focusing upon trust in government and public participation. Third, the research data have greater strength than previous governmental transparency research that was conducted on small, homogeneous populations (e.g. college students). The dissertation's research data are from a nationally conducted Pew Research study. Fourth, governmental transparency research in the past only included participants that utilized e-government transparency, providing for a potential digital-divide bias. However, the Pew Research study incorporated both Internet and non-Internet users in order to provide a more universal view regarding governmental transparency.

The dissertation's empirical study focuses upon the relationships between:

- A citizen's perception of governmental transparency and trust in government
- A citizen's use of governmental transparency and trust in government
- A citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public participation
- A citizen's use of governmental transparency and public participation

The research questions along with the dissertation's hypotheses are analyzed within the empirical study. Regarding major variables, throughout the empirical study, a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and a citizen's use of governmental transparency are the independent

variables. Trust in government and public participation are the dependent variables. The goal of the study is to determine if a relationship exists between a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency and these dependent variables. Understanding if a positive (or negative) relationship exists between these dependent and independent variables will help public administrators understand why governmental transparency is important versus the costs and resources required to publish the data. For instance, if governmental transparency increases trust in government, a public administrator would be wise to devote resources to governmental transparency publications in order to build trust for the particular public agency.

In order to demonstrate a potential relationship, a robust dataset must be used. A study conducted by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International for the Pew Internet and American Life Project is used for the empirical study. The Princeton survey was conducted between November 30th and December 29th of 2009. The study's population was U.S. adults aged 18 or older. Pew Internet and American Life Project posted the raw data onto their website in Microsoft Excel file format as well as SPSS file format (<http://www.pewinternet.org/datasets/december-2009-government-online>). The study utilizes the SPSS file format.

The Princeton survey was selected for two primary reasons. First, as shown in Table 2.1 of the dissertation, U.S. data are lacking in current public administration transparency studies. These survey data are specific to U.S. citizens, and the Princeton survey encompasses a large, U.S. national survey population. Second, the Princeton survey's questions encompass all variables within the dissertation's research scope (i.e. a citizen's perception of governmental transparency, a citizen's use of governmental transparency, public trust, and public participation). The actual study's questions that directly relate to the research proposal are

located in Appendix B. Only certain questions from the Princeton survey are selected to represent the research's required variables; not every question is utilized. Why? Certain questions in the survey do not relate to governmental transparency, trust, or public participation. For example, certain questions asked the survey participant if they used Myspace, Facebook, or Twitter yesterday or if the survey participant posted anything about themselves to social media. Other questions include the type of computer hardware and Internet provider that the survey participant utilizes. These survey questions did not apply to the emphasis of the dissertation's research. For the survey questions utilized, the mapping of the variables to questions is found in Appendix C.

The Princeton survey is not without statistical risk. The fundamental statistical risk with using the survey is self-reporting, mono-method bias. Self-reporting bias occurs when survey participants either consciously or unconsciously respond to questions in a way to make themselves look better *during a single survey questioning event*. The legitimacy of self-reporting research methodology has recently been questioned (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002; Sjober, 2015). Much self-reporting bias comes from survey participants who are part of an organization (e.g. company or governmental agency). These survey participants are afraid that negative responses will affect their employment or organizational status (Donaldson & Grant-Vallone, 2002). In the Princeton survey, the participants are not under such pressure, except potentially survey participants that work or have a direct family member working for the government. The direct family member data issue will be highlighted during data analysis. Still, the Princeton survey is a single question event for the participant; participants were not called back after a time has passed to analyze differences in their answers. Based on this, a self-reporting bias is a risk for the research methodology; however, the Princeton study is a very robust, non-biased survey

utilizing a large sample size. Furthermore, Princeton and Pew Research studies have built a reputation for their attention to solid, unbiased methodologies.

From the Princeton survey's questions and research data answers shown in Appendix C, SPSS analysis is used to explore the relationships between the independent variables (e.g. a citizen's perception and use of governmental transparency) and the dependent variables (e.g. public trust and public participation). To perform these comparisons, a split of the independent variable must occur between a citizen's general perceptions about governmental transparency and a citizen's use of what published governmental transparency data exist. To split transparency into these two views, different transparency questions within the Princeton survey are utilized. One governmental transparency question category (Q16) focuses upon a citizen's general perceptions regarding transparency. A second governmental transparency question category (Q17, Q21, and Q31) concentrates upon a citizen uses transparency data (e.g. on e-governmental websites).

Primarily all survey variables within the governmental transparency empirical study are nominal and ordinal. For more details, answer values are found in the rightmost column in Appendix C. However, in order to perform statistical analyses (e.g. binary logistic regression) against these survey question variables, certain recoded and calculated variables are created. These calculated and recoded variables are found in Appendix C indicated by an underline within the variable's description.

At this point, further clarification and definition are required regarding the recoded and calculated variables in Appendix C. These variables are utilized in the binary logistic regression analysis; this analysis is the primary reason for the recoded and dummy variables. First, all independent and dependent variables are recoded to eliminate "don't know" and "refused"

survey responses in order to concentrate on participant's true answers. Second, for variables that have more than yes or no answers (e.g. Q2), dummy variables are created combining data ranges into only two values (see Q2-a2 in Appendix C for specific examples). Recoded variables have the word "Recoded" at the beginning of the variable's description in Appendix C. Third, index variables are calculated by counting the number of "yes" answers in a certain independent or dependent variable. These summed indexes include governmental transparency use (Q17T, Q21T, and Q31T), trust in government (Q2T), and public participation (Q13T, Q25T, and Q28T). Summed index variables have "Calculated" at the beginning of the variable's description in Appendix C. Fourth, a dummy variable is created to show if *any* "yes" answers are in a certain independent variable or dependent variable category. Appendix C unveils all the variables along with their corresponding recoded and calculated values.

For variable trust in Federal government (Q2-a), two other variables are recoded. The first recoded variable eliminates any survey participant that did not know the answer or did not answer. The second recoded variable is a dummy variable demonstrating high and low trust values. The same method is used then for trust in state government (Q2-b) and trust in local government (Q2-c). An index variable Q2T is created counting the Q2-a2, Q2-b2, and Q2-c2 values for high trust across all levels of government. Finally, a dummy variable Q2T1 is created with values to indicate at least one high trust dummy variable value within the Princeton survey's governmental trust questions.

The analysis is conducted in two fundamental steps. First, general data analysis is performed using the primary dependent and independent variables. The step's purpose is to harvest an aggregate understanding of the Princeton survey data in order to cognize the subsequent regression outcomes. Second, statistical regression testing is performed. Binary

logistic regression is conducted against dummy variables to demonstrate any relationships between transparency, trust, and public participation.

For each of the four hypotheses, two models are utilized to demonstrate the binary logistic regression in a hierarchical approach. As a foundation, Model 1 contains demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable without the hypothesized independent variable included. Model 1's purpose is to baseline any statistically significant independent demographic control variables in order to reveal if the study's independent variable is a driver in the hypothesized relationship.

Model 2 adds the hypothesized independent variable being tested to Model 1's demographic control variables and dependent variable. Model 1's results are compared against Model 2's results to understand if the hypothesize independent variable affects the dependent variable or not. This two-model hierarchical regression method is employed for each hypothesis being tested. For comparison, regression results will include coefficient and p-values along with Nagelkerke R² values to determine strength or weakness of the hypothesized relationship.

Results from these statistical tests are the basis for determining if the dissertation's hypotheses can be accepted or not.

3.2 Sample

As stated above, the Princeton survey was conducted between November 30th and December 29th of 2009. The survey was conducted completely by telephone, calling both landline phone numbers and cell phone numbers. Twenty-one thousand, nine hundred and ninety landline phone numbers were called; eight thousand and one hundred cell phone numbers were called. From these 30,090 phone numbers, 2,258 U.S. citizens aged 18 or older participated in

the survey. On the surface, this appears to be a very low response rate for a national survey.

However, various reasons for this low response rate include (not an inclusive list):

- Phone number not working or not in service (12,628);
- Phone call went to voice mail without a call back (2,302);
- Phone number was a corporate phone number (1,446);
- Phone number was a fax number (1,072).

Of the calls that were answered, 6,808 potential participants refused to answer the survey.

Of the 2,258 participants, 2,197 phone surveys were conducted in English; while, 61 phone surveys were conducted in Spanish. Also, of the 2,258 participants, 1,676 participants were Internet users; 582 participants were not Internet users, helping to alleviate digital divide bias. Princeton Research estimates that the margin of error for the survey is plus or minus two percentage points; the margin of error for the Internet user results is plus or minus three percentage points. These margins of error are within an acceptable error range for the empirical study due to the large N value. The large N value will aid in decreasing any Type-2 statistical errors that could arise. (Note: The study will primarily utilize $p < .001$ to aid in decreasing Type-1 statistical errors).

To select a sample of landline participants, Princeton Research randomized the phone numbers based on area code and exchanges. For cell phone user selection, Princeton Research randomized the cell phone number sample based upon 100-block number combinations. Each phone number, including landline and cell phone numbers, was tried seven times before eliminating it from the sample. Each phone number had at least one daytime attempt along with multiple evening attempts. During half of the phone calls, when a participant answered, the interviewer would ask to speak to the oldest male in the home at the time of the call. If an oldest

male was not present, the interviewer would ask for the oldest female. At the beginning of the other half of phone calls, the interviewer would ask to speak to the youngest male in the home at the time of the call. If the youngest male was not present, the interview would ask for the youngest female. Princeton survey used this technique (e.g. ask for a male before asking for a female) in order to boost male participation. Even with this technique, a higher number of female participants engaged in the survey than male (female 51.3% and male 48.7%).

The one question regarding using the study's data is: Did Pew Research or any other organization conduct an empirical study to determine a relationship between variables like governmental transparency, trust in government, and public participation? The answer is no. Princeton Survey Research Associates International provided statistics regarding percentages and distributions for each question. However, no analysis upon the relationships of these questions and variables was conducted. Reviewing the empirical U.S. studies for public administration transparency, no scholarly published research utilizing the Princeton Survey Research Associates International data exists. Based on the sample size, the major focus upon randomization, and the low margin of error rates, the Princeton survey is used as the data for the empirical transparency research study.

3.3 Measures

Using Appendix C's information, the survey questions are categorized into the following basic independent variable, dependent variable, and demographic variable groupings:

- Independent Variable - A Citizen's Perception of Governmental Transparency Variable
 - General Perception (Q16) – U.S. citizen's perception (belief) that governmental transparency is important or not important

- Independent Variable - A Citizen's Use of Governmental Transparency Variables
 - Use (ACT27, Q17, Q21, Q31) – U.S. citizens actually using governmental transparency data
- Dependent Variable - Trust Variables (Q2)
 - Variables specific to Federal, state, and local governmental trust
- Dependent Variable - Public Participation Variables
 - Variables demonstrating U.S. citizen engagement with Federal, state, or local governments within the past twelve months (Q13, Q25).
 - Variables demonstrating U.S. citizens have been moved to action and participation with their neighbors regarding governmental issues (Q28).
- Demographic Variable - Other variables (e.g. AGE, SEX, MAR, EMPL, PARTY, EDUC, HISP, RACE, INC)
 - Basic demographic variables that are used for statistical regression and comparison. For instance, if any family member is a governmental employee, the data point could have a higher determination on how the family member views trust and public participation due to governmental transparency.
 - Note: Princeton survey splits Hispanic out into a separate question versus a single question on race with Hispanic as a value. This explains the separate HISP and RACE variables. Why was this done? According to www.pewresearch.org (March 2014), the U.S. Census changed its methodology of asking race questions. Starting with the 2010 U.S. Census, a Hispanic question was split out into a separate question. Prior to 2010, too many (6.2%) of the race answers were answered as “other.” The percentage might seem small, but it is significant when

counting the entire U.S. population. U.S. Census found that prior to 2010, a majority in the “other” category was Hispanic. Hence, the change to two questions versus one question in terms of race was needed to obtain better statistics specific to the U.S.’s Hispanic population.

For the main focal point to the research analysis, through the use of regression methods, the following relationships will be specifically tested:

- Transparency general perception variables (Q16) vs. trust variables (Q2)
- Transparency general perception variables (Q16) vs. public participation variables (Q13, Q25, Q28)
- Transparency use variables (Q17, Q21, Q31) vs. trust variables (Q2)
- Transparency use variables (Q17, Q21, Q31) vs. public participation variables (Q13, Q25, Q28)

These statistical tests will be subdivided into binary logistic regression comparisons at various demographic variable levels (e.g. marital status, race, and sex) to determine if demographics have any effect on these relationships.

3.4 Research Method Summary

As emphasized in the dissertation, public administration research in transparency is lacking, especially within the U.S. With the dissertation’s transparency research questions and hypotheses, the dissertation’s research outcome will enhance public administration’s research and literature.

Chapter 4

Research Results and Analysis

4.1 Research Results: Data Analysis

The statistical analysis for this research study is conducted in a series of steps. This data analysis is the first step. Within this 4.1 section, data analysis is performed using the study's four primary dependent and independent variables. These four data variables are governmental transparency perception (independent variable), governmental transparency use (independent variable), trust in government (dependent variable), and public participation (dependent variable). Within each of these four data variables, demographic data (e.g. sex, political party, race, marital status, employment status, and educational level) are compared against each variable. The goal of Chapter 4's first section is to understand any unusual demographic trends within the Princeton survey data. This initial data analysis is a precursor to the examination of regression that is found later in this dissertation.

Before reviewing the statistical research information, a frequency of the different demographic variables and values is required to better understand the overall participant population. The main reason for this frequency analysis is to determine if any population within the demographic data is so small that it should be discarded from detailed analysis. Table 4.0 displays the totals by demographic value. Values highlighted in yellow are too small for valid analysis. "Small" in this context is defined by any demographic population that has 25 participants or less. Therefore, these values (e.g. student and other within employment survey variable, other party within the political party survey variable, and other within the race survey variable) will be screened out of any data analysis and any regression analysis.

Table 4.0
Totals for Each Value by Demographic Category

Demographic Variable	Values	Totals
SEX		
	Male	993
	Female	1265
	Total	2258
MAR		
	Married	1206
	Living with Partner	111
	Divorced	236
	Separated	52
	Widowed	214
	Never Married	359
	Single	67
	Total	2245
EMPL		
	Employed Full Time	862
	Employed Part Time	251
	Retired	628
	Not Employed	362
	Self-Employed	47
	Disabled	72
	Student	17
	Other	8
	Total	2247
EMP2		
	Works in Government	255
	Does Not Work in Government	853
	Total	1108
PARTY		
	Republican	528
	Democrat	862
	Independent	667
	No Party	109

	Other Party	8
	Total	2174
EDUC		
	None (< 9th Grade)	52
	High School Incomplete	160
	High School Complete	664
	Tech/Vocation School	69
	Some College	532
	College Graduate	452
	Post Graduate	312
	Total	2241
HISP		
	Hispanic	205
RACE		
	White	1806
	Black/African-American	267
	Asian or Pacific Islander	38
	Mixed Race	42
	Native/American Indian	32
	Other	21
	Total	2206
INCOME		
	Less than \$10K	146
	\$10K-\$20K	201
	\$20K-\$30K	269
	\$30K-\$40K	229
	\$40K-\$50K	194
	\$50K-\$75K	291
	\$75K-\$100K	223
	\$100K-\$150K	212
	\$150K or more	103
	Total	1868

4.1.1 Research Results: Data Analysis – Transparency Perception

A summary of the Princeton survey's governmental transparency *perception* data is found in Appendix D. The critical data of Appendix D data are provided within this 4.1.1 subsection. The first part of subsection 4.1.1 unveils demographics within the Princeton survey data that have little to no affect upon a survey participant's governmental transparency perceptions. The second part of this subsection's 4.1.1 analysis reveals unusual results or trends within the demographic data.

In general, for governmental transparency perceptions of the 2,258 survey respondents, as shown in Table 4.1, 86.01% of the respondents answer that governmental transparency is either very important or somewhat important; while only 10.18% state that governmental transparency is not too important or not important at all. These results demonstrate that a very high percentage of Princeton survey participants believe that governmental transparency is an important aspect for U.S. governmental agencies to achieve. This is a critical initial observation for the research study. Also, the survey data matches de Fine Licht's 2011 findings where European citizens agree that governmental transparency is very important.

To better understand this summary information, governmental transparency perception data are split into separate demographic analysis. This analysis focuses upon the percent of survey participants within each demographic category. In order to continue, one term must be defined. In this governmental transparency perception data analysis subsection, "category" is defined as very important, somewhat important, not too important, and not important at all.

To begin, initial data analysis is performed against demographics that have little effect on governmental transparency perception. Reviewing Table 4.2, no major percentage differences are observed within each of the categories in terms of sex. Male and female percentages

Table 4.1
*Governmental Transparency Perception
 Summary*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Total	Percent
Very Important	1478	65.46%
Somewhat Important	464	20.55%
Not Too Important	106	4.69%
Not Important At All	124	5.49%
Don't Know	71	3.14%
Refused To Answer	15	0.66%
Total	2258	100.00%

are fundamentally the same percentage within each of the categories. In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, like sex, no noteworthy differences are observed within political parties or race. In sum, according to the survey's sample in terms of percentages within each category, demographic data across sex, political parties, and race show no major observable effect upon a participant's governmental transparency perceptions.

Table 4.2
*Governmental Transparency Perception
 by Sex (Percent in Category)*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Male	Female
Very Important	43.44%	56.56%
Somewhat Important	46.98%	53.02%
Not Too Important	46.23%	53.77%
Not Important At All	45.16%	54.84%

Table 4.3

Governmental Transparency Perception by Political Party (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Perception	Republican	Democrat	Independent	No Party
Very Important	25.05%	39.90%	29.91%	4.58%
Somewhat Important	21.80%	40.00%	33.93%	4.27%
Not Too Important	25.25%	38.38%	26.26%	10.10%
Not Important At All	27.19%	36.84%	32.46%	3.51%

Table 4.4

Governmental Transparency Perception by Race (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Perception	White	Black / African-American	Asian or Pacific Islander	Mixed Race	Native / American Indian
Very Important	80.95%	12.63%	2.00%	1.86%	1.45%
Somewhat Important	82.89%	11.62%	1.10%	1.97%	1.75%
Not Too Important	85.44%	9.71%	0.97%	2.91%	0.97%
Not Important At All	85.83%	10.00%	0.83%	0.83%	1.67%

Demographic results that do affect governmental transparency perceptions within the Princeton survey's participants are now examined. Key observable percentage differences will be highlighted in yellow in the upcoming tables. In Table 4.5, two trends within marital status are witnessed. For married participants, the percentage of survey participants that believe governmental transparency is not important falls considerably compared to the very important and somewhat important categories. For widowed sample participants, the opposite trend occurs. For widowed individuals, a spike up in the not important at all category is found.

Table 4.5
Governmental Transparency Perception by Marital Status
(Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Perception	Married	Living with Partner	Divorced	Separated	Widowed	Never Married	Single
Very Important	54.45%	4.96%	10.54%	2.24%	7.21%	17.61%	2.99%
Somewhat Important	55.53%	4.56%	9.11%	2.82%	9.98%	14.97%	3.04%
Not Too Important	60.38%	3.77%	10.38%	2.83%	8.49%	11.32%	2.83%
Not Important At All	41.80%	7.38%	13.11%	0.00%	22.95%	12.30%	2.46%

Reviewing employment status data against governmental transparency perception data, two trends arise in Table 4.6. First, for full-time employees, a high percentage of survey participants believe that governmental transparency is very important. This perception falls considerably as each category progresses. Second, for retirees, the complete opposite trend occurs. Retiree survey participants have the highest percentage in the not important at all category and the lowest percentage in the very important category. Full-time employees' and retirees' perceptions regarding governmental transparency slope in opposite directions; while other employment statuses remain fundamentally constant within the different categories.

Reviewing educational levels of the Princeton survey participants, two trends are found. However, these trends are more holistic than the trends within employment status (e.g. specific to full-time employees and retirees). As presented in Table 4.7, higher educated survey participants (e.g. some college, college graduate, and post graduate) have higher percentage perceptions that governmental transparency is very important. This observable trend slopes downward to not important at all. However, survey participants that have a high school degree or less have a higher percentage belief that governmental transparency is not important compared to

very important. Public administrators should recognize this trend in order to promote governmental transparency within under-educated U.S. populations.

Table 4.6

Governmental Transparency Perception by Employment Status (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Perception	Full Time	Part Time	Retired	Not Employed	Self-employed	Disabled
Very Important	42.57%	12.22%	22.00%	16.77%	2.44%	2.85%
Somewhat Important	36.44%	9.76%	34.27%	14.75%	0.65%	3.04%
Not Too Important	26.42%	8.49%	44.34%	13.21%	3.77%	3.77%
Not Important At All	21.14%	8.94%	45.53%	16.26%	2.44%	5.69%

Table 4.7

Governmental Transparency Perception by Education Level (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Perception	None (< 9th Grade)	High School Incomplete	High School Complete	Tech / Vocation School	Some College	College Graduate	Post Graduate
Very Important	1.97%	6.13%	25.53%	2.65%	24.17%	22.94%	16.61%
Somewhat Important	1.51%	7.78%	34.99%	3.24%	23.76%	18.57%	10.15%
Not Too Important	3.81%	7.62%	33.33%	8.57%	25.71%	12.38%	8.57%
Not Important At All	7.38%	13.93%	42.62%	2.46%	18.03%	9.84%	5.74%

In sum, based on percentages in subsection 4.1.1, sex, political party, and race have little observable effect on a Princeton survey participant's perception regarding governmental transparency. However, marital status, employment status, and education levels show a difference within survey participant categories. Married (+) versus widowed participants (-) trend in opposite directions. Full-time (+) and retired (-) governmental transparency perceptions also trend in opposite directions. For educational levels, a larger trend exists. Higher educated survey participants (+) slope downward from very important to not important at all. High school or less educated participants (-) trend the opposite direction.

4.1.2 Research Results: Data Analysis – Transparency Use

A summary of the Princeton survey's governmental transparency *use* data is found in Appendix E. Following the same outline as subsection 4.1.1, the critical Princeton survey data of Appendix E data is provided within this 4.1.2 subsection. Like subsection 4.1.1, the first part of subsection 4.1.2 demonstrates demographics within the data that have little to no affect upon survey participant's governmental transparency use. The second part of this subsection 4.1.2 analysis provides any unusual results or trends within the demographical data.

In general, for governmental transparency use of the 2,258 survey respondents, as revealed in Table 4.8, 43.09% of the survey participations did not use governmental transparency data within the past year; while the other participants did utilize governmental transparency data. Although one could argue that it is good that half of the Princeton survey's participants used governmental transparent data within the last year, the demographic data affecting these volumes requires a further review. Note: the bottom portion of Table 4.8 summarizes statistics regarding survey participants who did not use governmental transparency data (0) and survey participants who did use governmental transparency data (>0). This "0" and ">0" breakout is utilized throughout the rest of this 4.1.2 subsection.

Similar to subsection 4.1.1, to better understand the above general data summary, governmental transparency use data are split into separate demographic analysis. As shown in Table 4.9 below, no major observable percentage differences exist within each of the categories in terms of sex. Male and female percentages are essentially the same percentage representation between no use and use of governmental transparency data.

In Table 4.10, like sex, no major observable differences occur within race. Although Black/African Americans do show a drop in percentage between not using governmental

transparency data and using governmental transparency data, no other major observable percentage changes are found in the data. In sum, according to the Princeton survey's sample in terms of percentages within each category, demographic data across sex and race have no observable effect upon a participant's governmental transparency use. Comparing subsections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1, this is true for governmental transparency perception and use for sex and race.

Table 4.8
Governmental Transparency Use Summary

Governmental Transparency Use	Total	Percent
0	982	43.49%
1	247	10.94%
2	232	10.27%
3	212	9.39%
4	184	8.15%
5	147	6.51%
6	106	4.69%
7	81	3.59%
8	47	2.08%
9	15	0.66%
10	5	0.22%
Total	2258	100%
0	982	43.49%
>0	1276	56.51%
Total	2258	100%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table 4.9
*Governmental Transparency Use by Sex
 (Percent in Category)*

Governmental Transparency Use	Male	Female
0	41.75%	58.25%
>0	45.69%	54.31%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
 >0 = Governmental transparency use

Table 4.10
Governmental Transparency Use by Race (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Use	White	Black / African- American	Asian or Pacific Islander	Mixed Race	Native / American Indian
0	81.02%	14.49%	0.83%	1.25%	1.56%
>0	82.52%	10.26%	2.41%	2.41%	1.36%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
 >0 = Governmental transparency use

Demographic results that do affect governmental transparency use within the Princeton survey's participants are now examined. In Table 4.11, two trends within marital status are witnessed. First, the percentage of married survey participants that do not use compared to survey participants that do use governmental transparency information significantly increases. Second, for widowed sample participants, the opposite trend occurs. For widowers, a significant reduction in use of governmental transparency information is found. Other marital statuses stay fairly constant between no use and use. One item to highlight, married survey participants believe positively that governmental transparency is important, and they demonstrate this belief in their governmental transparency use. The opposite is true for widowers. Widowed survey

participants believe that governmental transparency is not important and reflect that in their usage.

Table 4.11

Governmental Transparency Use by Marital Status (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Use	Married	Living with Partner	Divorced	Separated	Widowed	Never Been Married	Single
0	44.72%	5.13%	12.00%	3.69%	16.31%	15.18%	2.97%
>0	60.63%	4.80%	9.37%	1.26%	4.33%	16.61%	2.99%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Reviewing employment status data against governmental transparency use, three trends occur as witnessed in Table 4.12. First, for full-time employees, a higher percentage of Princeton survey participants use governmental transparency data versus not using the data. Second, for retirees, the reverse trend occurs. Retiree survey participants use governmental transparency data much less than the percentage that does not use governmental transparency data. These full-time and retirement trends are similar to the trends within governmental transparency perception. However, a third trend within governmental transparency use is different than the trend within governmental transparency perception.

Disabled participants use governmental transparency data less than the percentage that does not use the data. This third finding is a little alarming. Disabled citizens are primary customers to certain governmental agencies. If disabled citizens are not using governmental transparent data, this finding should be a caution to public administrators and their agencies.

Table 4.12

Governmental Transparency Use by Employment Status (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Use	Full Time	Part Time	Retired	Not Employed	Self- employed	Disabled
0	26.15%	9.54%	40.72%	16.62%	1.33%	5.33%
>0	48.02%	12.50%	18.28%	15.82%	2.69%	1.58%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Although no differences are found comparing political parties to governmental transparency perception, governmental transparency use data have differences within political parties. Reviewing political party data against governmental transparency use, two trends are exhibited in Table 4.13. Republican survey participant percentages increase between no use and use; while, Democratic survey participant percentages decrease between no use and use. Public administrators should use this data to question why this is true. Although Democrats use is still higher than Republican use, the question to investigate further is: Why does a nearly 7% drop between no use and use within the Democratic survey participants occur?

Finally, in reviewing educational levels of the survey participants, two trends appear which are similar to governmental transparency perception trends. As presented in Table 4.14, higher educated survey participants (e.g. some college, college graduate, and post graduate) have a higher percentage of governmental transparency data use than Princeton survey participants that have a high school degree or less. These results are again troubling for public administrators. This survey's educational demographics potentially manifest a digital divide issue. Less educated citizens might not have an understanding required to use governmental transparency data or less educated citizens might not have access to use governmental transparency data. Either situation needs more investigation based on this data.

Table 4.13

Governmental Transparency Use by Political Party (Percent in Category)

Governmental Transparency Use	Republican	Democrat	Independent	No Party
0	21.27%	43.63%	29.16%	5.94%
>0	26.52%	36.70%	31.81%	4.33%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

In sum, based on percentages from governmental transparency data use within subsection 4.1.2, sex and race have little effect on Princeton survey participant's use. However, marital status, employment status, political parties, and education levels show a difference within survey participant categories. Married (+) versus widowed participants (-) trend in opposite directions. Full-time (+) and retired (-) governmental transparency use also trend in opposite directions. Both of these results are similar to governmental transparency perception results.

Although disabled survey participants did not show differences in governmental transparency perceptions, a difference is found in governmental transparency use. Disabled survey participant use drops (-) between no use and use. Again, this observable trend could be alarming based on governmental agencies that are trying to help disabled citizens.

Survey participant Republicans (+) increase in percentage from no use to use of governmental transparency data; while, Democrats (-) decrease in percentage. This change is not witnessed when analyzing Princeton survey participant's governmental transparency perceptions. Finally, for educational levels, a larger trend is found. Higher educated survey participant's percentages slope upward (+) from no use to use of governmental transparency data. High school or less educated participants trend the opposite direction (-).

Table 4.14

*Governmental Transparency Use by Educational Level
(Percent in Category)*

Governmental Transparency Use	None (< 9th Grade)	High School Incomplete	High School Complete	Tech / Vocation School	Some College	College Graduate	Post Graduate
0	4.85%	12.58%	44.43%	4.02%	19.59%	9.90%	4.64%
>0	0.39%	2.99%	18.33%	2.36%	26.91%	28.01%	21.01%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

4.1.3 Research Results: Data Analysis – Trust

Like subsections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, a summary of the Princeton survey's trust in government data is found in Appendix F. The first part of subsection 4.1.3 shows demographics within the data that have little to no affect upon survey participant's trust in government. The second part of this subsection 4.1.3 analysis provides any unusual results or trends within the demographical data.

This subsection is trust in U.S. governments. Table 4.15 shows volume and percentages regarding how many Princeton survey participants trust Federal, state, and local governments. Trust categories within this subsection are nearly always, most of the time, some of the time, and never. As graphed in Figure 4.1, within all three governmental types (i.e. Federal, state, and local), the observable trends are quite similar. Some of the time has the highest category in terms of percentage; whereas, nearly always has the lowest percentage. Table 4.15 evinces that Princeton survey participants place the highest level of trust in local government, followed by state government, and finally Federal government at the lowest trust level. Since Princeton survey participants trust the U.S. Federal government least of the U.S. three governmental types and since all levels of government have nearly the same level of percentages within each

category, Federal government data are chosen as the focal governmental type to investigate demographic analysis against.

Table 4.15
Trust in Government Summary

Trust in Government (Total number)	Federal	State	Local
Nearly Always	95	104	170
Most of the Time	531	660	769
Some of the Time	1171	1126	1005
Never	378	296	254
Don't Know	55	53	48
Refused	28	19	12
Total	2258	2258	2258

Trust in Government (Percentage)	Federal	State	Local
Nearly Always	1.45%	1.59%	2.59%
Most of the Time	8.10%	10.06%	11.72%
Some of the Time	17.85%	17.17%	15.32%
Never	5.76%	4.51%	3.87%




Figure 4.1. Trust in Government by Governmental Level Graph

The first demographic to compare against survey trust data in U.S. Federal government is sex. As witnessed in Table 4.16, no observable survey participant differences are found between trust categories and sex. Male and female percentages are spread consistently throughout all four categories. Sex has no visible effect on governmental trust within the survey's sample.

Table 4.16
*Trust in Federal Government by Sex
(Percent in Category)*

Trust in Federal Government	Male	Female
Nearly Always	45.26%	54.74%
Most of the Time	44.44%	55.56%
Some of the Time	43.72%	56.28%
Never	47.35%	52.65%

Demographic results that do affect trust in the U.S. Federal government within the Princeton survey's participants are now examined. In Table 4.17, two trends within marital status are observed. First, the percentage of married survey participants increases consistently from nearly always through never trust categories. The difference between these categories is 16.11%. Additionally, for married participants, a significant increase occurs solely between nearly always and most of the time categories (8.51%). Second, for never married sample participants, a contrasting trend occurs. For never married, a percentage reduction (10.33%) occurs from nearly always through never categories. Other marital statuses do not show as much observable trending differences as married and never married participants do. Based on these trends, never married survey participants trend to a higher trust percentage in the Federal government than married participants.

Table 4.17

Trust in Federal Government by Marital Status (Percent in Category)

Trust in Federal Government	Married	Living with Partner	Divorced	Separated	Widowed	Never Married	Single
Nearly Always	41.49%	6.38%	13.83%	4.26%	8.51%	23.40%	2.13%
Most of the Time	50.00%	4.92%	8.71%	2.08%	10.61%	20.08%	3.60%
Some of the Time	56.48%	4.89%	10.39%	2.06%	9.10%	14.59%	2.49%
Never	57.60%	4.27%	11.20%	2.40%	7.73%	13.07%	3.73%

Reviewing employment status data against Federal governmental trust data, two trends arise as witnessed in Table 4.18. Retirees are the first trend. Retirees within the survey trend to never trusting the Federal government (highest category percentage within retirees at 32.27%). Disabled participants trend conversely in that disabled participants have the highest percentage within the nearly always category at 6.38%. One observable data trend to note is that full time employees within the Princeton survey have no trending regarding Federal governmental trust. This non-trend is in contrast to the full-time employment trending witnessed in governmental transparency perception and governmental transparency use.

Table 4.18

Trust in Federal Government by Employment Status (Percent in Category)

Trust in Federal Government	Full Time	Part Time	Retired	Not Employed	Self-employed	Disabled
Nearly Always	35.11%	11.70%	25.53%	21.28%	0.00%	6.38%
Most of the Time	42.64%	11.70%	24.15%	15.47%	1.51%	2.83%
Some of the Time	38.16%	11.66%	27.79%	15.69%	2.49%	3.09%
Never	36.80%	9.07%	32.27%	17.07%	1.87%	2.13%

Comparing political party data against trust in Federal government data, some general trends are witnessed (Table 4.19). Democrats overwhelmingly have the highest percentage within the nearly always trust category. Democrats trend downward to the never trust category.

The drop is 40.26%. However, all other political parties (e.g. Republicans, Independents, and No Party) trend from a lower percentage of nearly always to a highest percent in never trusting Federal government. Although this difference between Democrats versus all other political parties could be due to President Obama being in office when this survey was conducted, it is concerning that Independent and No Party survey participants trend towards never trusting the Federal government.

Table 4.19
Trust in Federal Government by Political Party (Percent in Category)

Trust in Federal Government	Republican	Democrat	Independent	No Party
Nearly Always	16.09%	59.77%	20.69%	3.45%
Most of the Time	18.04%	49.90%	28.41%	3.65%
Some of the Time	25.79%	39.61%	29.93%	4.14%
Never	32.14%	19.51%	39.01%	8.79%

The educational demographic data compared to trust data in the Federal government trends somewhat differently than governmental transparency perception and use. Table 4.20 shows these trends. First, educated participants (e.g. some college, college graduate, and post graduate) provide no observable trending between trusts in Federal government categories. However, for Princeton survey participants who have less than a high school education, trust in Federal government nearly always is the highest percentage. For high school graduates, never trust the Federal government is their highest category. The observable trending between less than high school education (-), high school educated (+), and college educated (none) are completely diverse.

Table 4.20

Trust in Federal Government by Educational Level (Percent in Category)

Trust in Federal Government	None (< 9th Grade)	High School Incomplete	High School Complete	Tech/Vocation School	Some College	College Graduate	Post Graduate
Nearly Always	8.51%	11.70%	27.66%	3.19%	22.34%	18.09%	8.51%
Most of the Time	1.70%	8.30%	25.85%	2.08%	24.15%	21.13%	16.79%
Some of the Time	1.46%	6.29%	29.20%	3.01%	23.08%	21.88%	15.07%
Never	3.72%	6.65%	35.37%	3.99%	25.53%	16.76%	7.98%

Finally, race data are analyzed against trust data in Federal government. As seen in Table 4.21, Black/African Americans, Asian or Pacific Islanders, and Native American Indians have the highest trust in Federal government compared to the other trust categories. However, whites have the least trust in Federal government. This finding supports a study in public administration research literature in that non-whites trust government more than whites (Cook, Jacobs, & Kim, 2010).

Table 4.21

Trust in Federal Government by Race (Percent in Category)

Trust in Federal Government	White	Black / African-American	Asian or Pacific Islander	Mixed Race	Native / American Indian
Nearly Always	67.02%	23.40%	4.26%	0.00%	5.32%
Most of the Time	79.15%	14.48%	2.90%	1.35%	1.35%
Some of the Time	82.78%	11.71%	1.31%	1.84%	1.40%
Never	86.83%	7.80%	0.54%	2.69%	0.54%

In sum, based on percentages within subsection 4.1.3 regarding trust in Federal government, sex has little observable effect on survey participant's trust in Federal government. However, marital status, employment status, political parties, education levels, and race do show an effect on trust in Federal government among survey participant categories.

Married (-) versus never married participants (+) trend in opposite directions. Retired (-) and disabled (+) trust in Federal government also trend in opposite directions. Republican (-), Independent (-), and no party (-) Princeton survey participants increase in percentage from nearly always to never trust in the Federal government; while, Democrats (+) decrease in percentage. For educational levels, higher educated survey participant's percentages do not have an observable slope change. However, high school educated participants (-) and participants with less than a high school educated (+) slope in opposite directions. Finally regarding race, Whites (-) trend opposite to Blacks/African-Americans (+), Asians and Pacific Islanders, and Native/American Indians (+).

4.1.4 Research Results: Data Analysis – Participation

A summary of the Princeton survey's governmental participation data is found in Appendix G. Like the previous subsections, the format is the same as other data analysis subsections. For instance, the first part of subsection 4.1.4 demonstrates demographics within the data that have little to no affect upon survey participant's governmental participation. The second part of this subsection 4.1.4 analysis provides any unusual results or trends within the demographical data.

In general, for governmental participation of the 2,258 survey respondents, as revealed in Table 4.22, 28.43% of the Princeton survey participations did not participate in government within the past year; while the other participants (71.57%) did participate. Like governmental transparency use, the bottom portion of Table 4.22 summarizes statistics regarding Princeton survey participants who did not participate in government (0) and survey participants who did

participate in government (>0). This “0” and “>0” breakout is utilized throughout the rest of this 4.1.4 subsection.

Table 4.22
Governmental Participation Summary

Governmental Participation	Total	Percent
0	642	28.43%
1	475	21.04%
2	375	16.61%
3	281	12.45%
4	205	9.09%
5	123	5.45%
6	78	3.46%
7	46	2.04%
8	19	0.84%
9	8	0.35%
10	4	0.18%
Total	2258	100%
0	642	28.43%
>0	1616	71.57%
Total	2258	100%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Similar to previous 4.1 subsections, to better understand the above general data summary, participation in government is split into separate demographic analysis. Sex is the first demographic analyzed in this subsection. As shown in Table 4.23 below, no observable percentage differences exist within each of the categories in terms of sex. Male and female percentages are essentially the same percentage representation between no participation and participation in government.

Table 4.23
*Governmental Participation by Sex
 (Percent in Category)*

Governmental Participation	Male	Female
0	44.08%	55.92%
>0	43.94%	56.06%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
 >0 = Governmental transparency use

Demographic results that do affect participation in government within the survey's participants are now examined. In Table 4.24, three trends within marital status are witnessed. The percentage of married survey participants who do not participate in government compared to survey participants who do participate in government significantly increases. However, two other marital status categories, widows and never been married, trend in the opposite direction to married participants.

Table 4.24
Governmental Participation by Marital Status (Percent in Category)

Governmental Participation	Married	Living with Partner	Divorced	Separated	Widowed	Never Been Married	Single
0	41.92%	5.65%	9.73%	3.30%	13.50%	21.66%	4.24%
>0	58.40%	4.66%	10.82%	1.93%	7.96%	13.74%	2.49%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
 >0 = Governmental transparency use

Reviewing employment status data against participation in government, two trends occur as witnessed in Table 4.25. The opposite trends of full time and retired participants are witnessed yet again in the Princeton survey data. From a percentage perspective, full-time participants participate in government more than full-time participants who do not; while, retired survey

participants participate in government less than retirees who do not participate in government at all. No other significant observable trends are witnessed within employment status data.

Table 4.25
*Governmental Participation by Employment Status
(Percent in Category)*

Governmental Participation	Full Time	Part Time	Retired	Not Employed	Self-employed	Disabled
0	33.75%	11.99%	30.91%	17.98%	1.42%	3.79%
>0	40.37%	10.90%	26.92%	15.45%	2.37%	2.99%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Reviewing political party data against participation in government, two observable trends emerge in Table 4.26. Republican survey participant percentages increase between no participation in government and participation in government categories; while, Democratic survey participant's percentages decrease. Independent and No Party do not have any observable trending. This is an interesting finding, especially since Obama was in the president at the time of this survey. Did Republican's opposition to President Obama generate more governmental participation?

Table 4.26
Governmental Participation by Political Party (Percent in Category)

Governmental Participation	Republican	Democrat	Independent	No Party
0	21.58%	43.16%	29.00%	5.93%
>0	25.34%	38.29%	31.33%	4.66%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

In reviewing educational levels of the survey participants, two trends appear which are similar to governmental transparency perception and use trends. As presented in Table 4.27,

higher educated survey participants (e.g. some college, college graduate, and post graduate) have a higher percentage of participation in government than Princeton survey participants who have a high school degree or less. These data results are again troubling for public administrators. Not only do less educated survey participants not believe or use governmental transparency data, but they also do not participate in government as much as other educational levels.

Table 4.27

Governmental Participation by Educational Status (Percent in Category)

Governmental Participation	None (< 9th Grade)	High School Incomplete	High School Complete	Tech / Vocation School	Some College	College Graduate	Post Graduate
0	5.21%	13.41%	40.54%	3.00%	21.45%	11.36%	5.05%
>0	1.18%	4.67%	25.33%	3.11%	24.64%	23.65%	17.42%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Finally, comparing race demographics to participation in government, two observable trends emerge in Table 4.28. Whites have a higher percentage of Princeton survey participants who participate in government than not participating. However, Black/African-Americans have a lower percentage of Princeton survey participants who participate in government than not participating.

Table 4.28

Governmental Participation by Race (Percent in Category)

Governmental Participation	White	Black / African-American	Asian or Pacific Islander	Mixed Race	Native / American Indian
0	77.26%	16.77%	2.10%	1.45%	1.13%
>0	83.67%	10.28%	1.58%	2.08%	1.58%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

In sum, based on percentages within subsection 4.1.4 regarding participation in government, sex has little observable effect on survey participant's participation in government. However, marital status, employment status, political parties, education levels, and race do show an observable effect on participation in government among Princeton survey participants.

Married (+) versus widowed and never married participants (-) trend in opposite directions. Full time (+) and retired (-) also trend in opposite directions in regard to participation in government. Republican (+) slopes opposite to Democrats (-). For educational levels, more general, observable trends are found. Survey participants with higher education (e.g. some college, college graduate, and post graduate) trend positively; while survey participants with lower education (e.g. high school education or less) trend negatively. Finally regarding race, Whites (+) trend opposite to Blacks/African-Americans (-) when analyzing participation in government.

4.1.5 Research Results: Data Analysis – Summary

Table 4.29 summarizes the 4.1 data analysis section. As shown in Table 4.29, sex (e.g. male or female) has no observable, manifested effect on the primary variable areas of this research study. However, other demographic data do demonstrate certain observable trending within the primary variable areas.

In general, married participants trend positively in all primary variable areas except trust in government; while, widowed and never married trend negatively within certain variable areas. Full time participants trend positively; while retired participants trend negatively. Surprisingly, disabled participants show negative trending in governmental transparency use, but positive trending in trust in Federal government. This observation appears to be at odds with one another.

Except for governmental transparency perception, Republicans trend positively in terms of governmental transparency use and participation in government; while, Democrats trend negatively within these two primary variable areas. However, the opposite is true in regard to trust. Democrats have a higher trust in government compared to Republicans, Independents, and No Party survey participants. College-educated participants trend differently than non-college

Table 4.29
Summary of Data Analysis

Demographic	Transparency Perception	Transparency Use	Federal Government Trust	Government Participation
Sex	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect	No Effect
Marital Status	Married (+) Widowed (-)	Married (+) Widowed (-)	Married (-) Never Married (+)	Married (+) Widowed (-) Never Married (-)
Employment Status	Full Time (+) Retired (-)	Full Time (+) Retired (-) Disabled (-)	Retired (-) Disabled (+)	Full Time (+) Retired (-)
Political Party	No Effect	Republican (+) Democrat (-)	Republican (-) Democrat (+) Independent (-) No Party (-)	Republican (+) Democrat (-)
Education Level	College (+) No College (-)	College (+) No College (-)	High School (-) No High School (+)	College (+) No College (-)
Race	No Effect	No Effect	White (-) Black / African American (+) Native / American Indian (+)	White (+) Black / African American (-)

educated participants. Finally, Whites trend opposite to Black/African Americans in terms of trust in Federal government and participation in government. This analysis helps to understand the next section of this research study, regression.

4.2 Research Results: Regression Analysis

Section 4.2 specifically uses binary logistic regression analysis against recoded and calculated, dummy variables to further advance the dissertation's research study. Binary logistic regression analysis is performed using the research study's two independent variables (i.e. governmental transparency perception and government transparency use) and two dependent variables (i.e. trust in government and governmental participation). Although this information was already stated in Chapter 3, it is prudent to provide the binary logistic regression modeling methodology again.

For each of the four hypotheses, two models are utilized to demonstrate the binary logistic regression in a hierarchical approach. As a foundation, Model 1 contains demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable without the hypothesized independent variable included. Model 1's purpose is to baseline any statistically significant independent demographic control variables in order to reveal if the study's independent variable is a driver in the hypothesized relationship.

Model 2 adds the hypothesized independent variable being tested to Model 1's demographic control variables and dependent variable. Model 1's results are compared against Model 2's results to understand if the hypothesize independent variable affects the dependent variable or not. This two-model hierarchical regression method is employed for each hypothesis

being tested. For comparison, regression results will include coefficient and p-values along with Nagelkerke R^2 values to determine strength or weakness of the hypothesized relationship.

4.2.1 Research Results: Regression Analysis – Governmental Transparency Perception vs. Trust in Government

In analyzing governmental transparency vs. trust in government, governmental transparency is split into two different independent variables based on the hypotheses H_1 and H_2 . The first binary logistic regression analysis compares governmental transparency perception to trust in government (H_1); the second binary logistic regression analysis focuses on governmental transparency use and trust in government (H_2).

For H_1 testing, binary logistic regression is performed against recoded and dummy variables representing governmental transparency perception (Q16a1) and trust in government (Q2T1). As shown in Table 4.30, Model 1 represents solely demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable, trust in government (Q2T1). In Model 2, a binary logistic regression is run against the same trust in government and initial demographic control variables as Model 1 but a recoded variable representing governmental transparency perception (Q16a1) is added. For H_1 , governmental transparency perception is the independent variable being analyzed.

In Table 4.30, Model 1's results demonstrate statistically significant results ($p < .001$) for the demographic variables being analyzed against trust in government. Comparing the regression results of Model 1 and Model 2, Model 2 also evinces statistical significant results ($p < .01$ for the independent variable, governmental transparency perception; $p < .001$ for Nagelkerke R^2). Therefore, adding transparency perception to the relationship does provide a statistically significant result although the increase in the model's explanation of variance is extremely weak

(Change in $R^2 = 0.014$) between the two models. Reviewing Table 4.30, why are employment status, income, and race added to the Model 2 results? The answer is that when adding governmental transparency perception to the demographic control variables, these three demographic independent variables become statistical significant. These same demographic independent variables are not significant in Model 1.

Based on these results, H_1 is supported; however, the relationship between governmental transparency perception and trust in government is extremely weak with only a 0.014 change in R^2 between models. Furthermore, the coefficient for transparency perception in Model 2 is negative (-0.136). This result provides weak support for transparency pessimists (Bannister & Connolly, 2011; Fox, 2007; O'Neill, 2006) in that an increase in governmental transparency perception has a negative effect on a survey participant's trust in government.

Table 4.30

Trust in Government Predicted by Governmental Transparency Perception and Demographics

	Trust in Government			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Transparency Perception			-0.136	.007
Demographic Variables				
Age	-0.008	.000	-0.014	.000
Education	0.090	.000	0.096	.000
Hispanic	-0.333	.000	-0.400	.000
Political Party	-0.078	.000	-0.085	.002
Employment Status			0.229	.007
Income			-0.003	.018
Race			-0.055	.037
Nagelkerke R^2	0.028	.000	0.042	.000
Change in R^2			0.014	
N	2122		1053	

4.2.2 Research Results: Regression Analysis – Governmental Transparency Use vs. Trust in Government

For H_2 testing, binary logistic regression is performed against recoded and dummy variables representing governmental transparency use (ACT27-1, Q17T1, Q21T1, and Q31T1) and trust in government (Q2T1). As shown in Table 4.31, Model 1 represents solely demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable, trust in government (Q2T1). In Model 2, a binary logistic regression is run against the same trust in government and initial demographic control variables as Model 1 but recoded variables representing governmental transparency use (ACT27-1, Q17T1, Q21T1, and Q31T1) are added. For H_2 , governmental transparency use is the independent variable being analyzed.

In Table 4.31, Model 1's results demonstrate statistically significant results ($p < .001$) for the demographic control variables being analyzed against trust in government. Comparing the binary logistic regression results of Model 1 and Model 2, Model 2 also evinces statistical significant results ($p < .001$) for Nagelkerke R^2 . However, the p-value for governmental transparency use coefficient is 0.415. Therefore, although a statistically significant ($p < .001$) but extremely weak Nagelkerke R^2 (0.072) is found in Model 2, governmental transparency use is not statistically significant within the relationship. Based on these results, H_2 is not supported.

Analyzing the results a little further, the demographic control variable, employment status, has no statistical bearing in Model 1 to the dependent variable, trust in government. However, when adding governmental transparency use, employment status has a statistical significant ($p < .001$) effect on trust in government. Additional investigation outside this dissertation should be performed to further understand this unusual result.

Table 4.31

Trust in Government Predicted by Governmental Transparency Use and Demographics

	Trust in Government			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Transparency Use			0.037	.415
Demographic Variables				
Employment Status			0.618	.000
Education	0.073	.000	0.177	.000
Age	-0.010	.000	-0.018	.000
Political Party	-0.084	.000	-0.117	.003
Race			-0.093	.003
Income			-0.005	.005
Sex	-0.152	.002	-0.204	.026
Nagelkerke R ²	0.022	.000	0.072	.000
Change in R ²			0.050	
N	2122		647	

4.2.3 Research Results: Regression Analysis – Governmental Transparency Perception vs. Governmental Participation

Like subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, in analyzing governmental transparency vs. governmental participation, governmental transparency is split into two different independent variables based on the hypotheses H₃ and H₄. The first binary logistic regression analysis compares governmental transparency perception to governmental participation (H₃); the second binary logistic regression analysis focuses on governmental transparency use and governmental participation (H₄).

For H₃ testing, binary logistic regression is performed against recoded and dummy variables representing governmental transparency perception (Q16a1) and governmental participation (Q132528T1). As shown in Table 4.32, Model 1 represents solely demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable, governmental participation

(Q132528T1). For comparison purposes, like previous 4.2 subsections, a second, more detailed, binary logistic regression test is performed. In Model 2, a binary logistic regression is run against the same governmental participation and initial demographic control variables as Model 1 but a recoded variable representing governmental transparency perception (Q16a1) is added. For H₃, governmental transparency perception is the independent variable being analyzed.

In Table 4.32, Model 1's results demonstrate statistically significant results ($p < .001$) for the demographic control variables being analyzed against governmental participation.

Comparing the regression results of Model 1 and Model 2, Model 2 also demonstrates statistical significant results ($p < .001$ for the independent variable, governmental transparency perception; $p < .001$ for Nagelkerke R^2). Therefore, adding governmental transparency perception to the relationship does provide a statistically significant result although the increase in the model's explanation of variance is extremely weak (Change in $R^2 = 0.018$) between the two models.

Based on these results, it is tempting to state that H₃ is supported although the relationship between governmental transparency perception and participation in government is extremely weak. However, H₃ hypothesizes that a "positive" relationship exists between governmental transparency perception and participation in government due to a priori research (Benito & Bastida, 2009). Yet, in this study, the coefficient for transparency perception in Model 2 is negative (-0.517). This result provides weak support that an increase in governmental transparency perception has a *negative* effect on a survey participant's participation in government. Therefore, H₃ cannot be supported in a positive direction. The results demonstrate a negative direction.

This result confirms Welch's (2012) observations that governmental transparency does not increase participation in government. However, the research study results are different from

Welch's study in that Welch utilized e-government transparency when analyzing governmental participation. The dissertation's study utilizes participant's governmental transparency *perception* as the independent variable driver. Therefore, the study expands upon the relationship between governmental transparency and governmental participation within public administration.

Table 4.32

Governmental Participation Predicted by Governmental Transparency Perception and Demographics

	Public Participation			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Transparency Perception			-0.517	.000
Demographic Variables				
Education	0.316	.000	0.300	.000
Marital Status	-0.128	.000	-0.125	.000
Income	-0.006	.017	-0.007	.004
Age	0.013	.034	0.014	.022
Government Employee	-0.311	.053	-0.356	.029
Nagelkerke R ²	0.128	.000	0.146	.000
Change in R ²			0.018	
N	422		421	

4.2.4 Research Results: Regression Analysis – Governmental Transparency Use vs. Governmental Participation

Finally, for H₄ testing, binary logistic regression is performed against recoded and dummy variables representing governmental transparency use (ACT27-1, Q17T1, Q21T1, and Q31T1) and governmental participation (Q132528T1). As shown in Table 4.33, Model 1 represents demographic control variables analyzed against the dependent variable, governmental

participation (Q132528T1). For comparison purposes, a second, more detailed, binary logistic regression test is performed. In Model 2, a binary logistic regression is run against the same governmental participation and initial demographic control variables as Model 1 but a recoded variable representing governmental transparency use (ACT27-1, Q17T1, Q21T1, and Q31T1) is added. For H₄, governmental transparency use is the independent variable being analyzed.

In Table 4.33, Model 1's results demonstrate statistically significant results ($p < .001$) for the demographic control variables being analyzed against governmental participation.

Comparing the regression results of Model 1 and Model 2, Model 2 also displays statistical significant results ($p < .001$ for the independent variable, governmental transparency use; $p < .001$ for Nagelkerke R^2). Therefore, adding governmental transparency use to the relationship does provide a statistically significant result and the increase in the model's explanation of variance is moderate (Change in $R^2 = 0.137$) between the two models.

Based on these results, H₄ is supported and the relationship between governmental transparency use and participation in government and Model 2 with governmental transparency use explains 13.7% (Change in R^2) of the variance between the models. Furthermore, the coefficient for transparency use in Model 2 is significantly positive for a binary dependent variable (0.818). This result reveals that an increase in governmental transparency use has a positive effect on a survey participant's participation in government. This result is significant for public administrators. For the participants in this survey, the more governmental transparency data are utilized, the more the participant participates in government.

Table 4.33
Governmental Participation Predicted by Governmental Transparency Use and Demographics

	Public Participation			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Transparency Use			0.818	.000
Demographic Variables				
Education	0.321	.000	0.236	.000
Age	0.013	.039	0.021	.002
Income	-0.005	.031	-0.008	.002
Marital Status	-0.132	.000	-0.077	.017
Nagelkerke R ²	0.125	.000	0.262	.000
Change in R ²			0.137	
N	422		415	

4.2.5 Research Results: Regression Analysis – Summary

For a summary of the binary logistic regression, the research hypotheses are listed again below:

H₁: A relationship exists between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public trust in government.

H₂: A relationship exists between a citizen's use of governmental transparency and public trust in government.

H₃: A positive relationship exists between a citizen's perception of governmental transparency and public participation in government.

H₄: A positive relationship exists between a citizen's use of governmental transparency and public participation in government.

Table 4.34 summarizes Section 4.2's binary logistic regression analysis. With these results, H₁ and H₄ are supported; however, H₁ is supported very weakly. H₂ is not supported through binary logistic regression analysis. H₃ is not supported in a positive direction; however,

H₃ is supported in a negative direction, meaning that an increase in governmental transparency perception causes a decrease in governmental participation.

Table 4.34

Summary of Binary logistic regression Analysis

Relationship		
Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Hypothesis Supported?
Governmental Transparency Perception	Trust in Government	<i>H₁ - Supported, but extremely weakly in a negative direction</i>
Governmental Transparency Use	Trust in Government	<i>H₂ - Not Supported</i>
Governmental Transparency Perception	Governmental Participation	<i>H₃ – Not Supported positively, but supported weakly in a negative direction</i>
Governmental Transparency Use	Governmental Participation	<i>H₄ - Supported in a positive direction</i>

Chapter 5 Summary

5.1 Why Governmental Transparency for This Dissertation?

After all the literature review, the research questions, and the data analysis regarding governmental transparency, the first question that needs to be addressed in this summary section is: Why devote an entire dissertation on governmental transparency? What is the author's motivation to study this subject? The answer, at least to this author, is easy.

Transparency is extremely relevant in today's U.S. governmental settings. A struggle between governmental transparency and secrecy constantly rages within Federal, state, and local governments. Each day, public administrators are challenged to determine what data should be published to its citizens and what data should be kept secret. For example, early in his presidency, President Trump and his administration decided not to release visitor's names to the White House and to President Trump's Maralago Estate in Palm Beach, Florida. Democrats in both the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate opposed this direction and introduced the "Making Access Records Available to Lead American Government Openness Act" or better known as the MAR-A-LAGO Act to force the current Trump Administration to be more transparent on who is being allowed access to key individuals within the Trump Administration (McCausland, 2017).

At the U.S. state level, the struggle between governmental transparency and secrecy is currently even more prevalent. For instance, just recently, according to the Associated Press (March 2017), the number of reasons to allow the Minnesota Public Records Agency to be secret versus transparent has risen to 660 reasons. Six hundred and sixty transparency exclusion reasons are a significantly higher number compared to the nine exclusion reasons in the U.S. FOIA. One of the 660 reasons is that the Minnesota Public Records Agency is not allowed to divulge train derailment disaster plans for train cars carrying flammable liquids. The Minnesota Public

Records Agency is also not allowed to divulge how Minnesota appropriates \$72M in tax subsidies to companies within its state. One final example is that Minnesota Public Records Agency is blocked from posting any state police camera videos to the public (Exceptions growing to government transparency in Minnesota, March 2017.)

Although 660 reasons are a large number of restrictions, Florida's FOIA exclusion list is even larger. Florida's Public Records Law states that any records made or received by a Florida public agency during official governmental proceedings are available for inspection, unless exempted by the Florida Legislature. The Florida Legislature currently has over 1,000 governmental transparency exclusions. In 1985, only 250 exclusions existed (Qiu, Zubak-Skees, & Lincoln, 2015).

On the opposite side of the exclusion list within the fifty U.S. states, only Idaho and Pennsylvania do not exempt any state agency from their state's FOIA laws; all other states have specific public agencies that are excluded from their state's FOIA laws. Furthermore, only Idaho, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska are found to provide all FOIA data requested from its citizens (Qiu et al., 2015). This finding is alarming. Even though states have FOIA laws in place, a vast majority of states have governmental transparency exclusions. More challenging is that only three states provide complete transparent data that is requested.

These Federal and state examples provide incentive for why this author believes governmental transparency is extremely important to the U.S. and must be studied. As stated, earlier in the dissertation, governmental transparency research is lacking in public administration, especially within the U.S. Therefore, the importance of governmental transparency in 2017 and the fact that governmental transparency research in public

administration is limited are the two driving factors to write this dissertation on the topic of governmental transparency.

5.2 Summary of Results

The main focus of the dissertation is governmental transparency and its effect on a U.S. citizen's trust in government and a U.S. citizen's participation in government. The fundamental questions are first, does governmental transparency increase trust in government? The second question is does governmental transparency increase a citizen's participation in government?

In the study, governmental transparency is the independent variable; trust in government and a citizen's participation in government are the dependent variables. To further understand transparency, governmental transparency is split into two variables, governmental transparency perception and governmental transparency use. The reason for the split is to understand if someone's belief (i.e. perception) that governmental transparency is important causes higher trust or increased governmental participation, or if someone must actually utilize government transparency data for this causal effect to emerge.

Besides the author's motivation for this dissertation, 86.01% of the Princeton survey participants perceive that governmental transparency is either very important or somewhat important. Therefore, not only is governmental transparency extremely relevant in the U.S., but U.S. citizens believe that governmental transparency is important as well. Only one out of ten survey participants (10.18%) believe that governmental transparency is not too important or not important at all. In sum, perceived governmental transparency is significantly important within the U.S. Because of this data, the term "higher perception of governmental transparency" in the next pages means that a survey participant believes that governmental transparency is important or very important.

By statistically analyzing the Princeton survey data, a few data trends are observed. First, sex has no effect on governmental transparency, citizen trust in government, or citizen participation in government. Men and women demonstrate no fundamental differences in the dissertations major variable areas. Based on this, public administrators should not treat governmental transparency documents and processes differently between males and females.

Second, married participants have higher perceptions of governmental transparency and citizen participation, meaning that married participants believe strongly that governmental transparency is important and married participants participate in government at a higher rate; however, married participants distrust government at a higher rate than those trusting government. Widowed participants, on the other hand, believe governmental transparency is not important and widowed participants show very limited participation in government. Besides widows, never-married participants demonstrate lower trust and lower governmental participation rates. Therefore, based on marital status survey data, the question for future research is if married citizens should be serviced differently than non-married individuals when processing governmental transparency requests and data.

Third, full-time employees and retired participants trend in completely opposite directions within the three overall research variables. Full-time participants have a higher perception of governmental transparency, citizen trust, and citizen participation. However, retired participants demonstrate a completely opposite trend with lower perceptions in all three variable categories. Such low percentages from retired participants should motivate public administrators into understanding why high mistrust of government and low governmental participation rates exist with retirees. Future public administration research should ask what is causing such a difference between full-time working employees and retirees.

Fourth, Republicans and Democrats are also at odds in the study's variable categories. For instance, Republicans have a much lower trust in government than Democrats. However, this finding could be specific to Republican's fundamental ideology of the government along with President Obama being in office at the time of the survey.

Fifth, education is a definite observable force in governmental transparency perception, citizen trust, and citizen participation. Higher educated participants demonstrate higher governmental transparency perception, citizen trust in government, and citizen participation; while, lower educated participants demonstrate a lower overall amount. A concern with these statistics is that a digital divide may be prevalent throughout the U.S. Public administrators need to be very conscious of a digital divide situation occurring with their constituents and how it affects governmental transparency.

Finally, regarding race, Black participants, as well as Native Americans, show a higher level of trust in government than White participants. This study's finding supports Cook, Jacobs, and Kim's (2010) finding that Blacks have a higher trust in U.S. government than Whites. The difference between the two studies is that Cook, Jacobs, and Kim's study focused on trust due to governmental services like social security. This study focuses on a U.S. citizen's general perception of governmental transparency and how it relates to trust. Therefore, this study broadens Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 2010's findings regarding Blacks and trust in U.S. government.

Moving from a general summary of the study's data to a summary of the binary logistic regression analysis using the research study's data, the research hypotheses are assessed. The study's research questions analyze the relationships between governmental transparency perception and trust in government, governmental transparency use and trust in government,

governmental transparency perception and citizen participation, and governmental transparency use and citizen participation.

For the governmental transparency perception and trust in government relationship, a statistically significant but extremely weak relationship is found. H_1 is supported in this research study. However, the study's results contradict the universal public administrative narrative that increased governmental transparency increases trust in government. The governmental transparency optimist view is refuted in the research study since the results show a negative coefficient between governmental transparency perception and trust in government. One reason for a weak, negative relationship between transparency perception and trust in government is that trust in government is made up of many other factors like family background and political party as evident in the survey's data. Governmental transparency may not be able to overcome these other factors in order to increase trust in government.

In terms of the governmental transparency use and trust in government research question, no true relationship is found in this study. H_2 cannot be supported. Even though one focus of this dissertation is on process-based trust in terms of governmental transparency, this study's results cannot support this concept. Also, even though governmental transparency perception demonstrates slight negative aspects of trust in government, actual use of governmental transparent data causes no statistical significant increase or decrease in trust in government. These results demonstrate that a survey participant's concept of governmental transparency can weakly influence a survey participant's trust in government; however, actual use of transparent data does not influence their trust.

For the governmental transparency perception and participation in government research question, the study's results are opposite to what is hypothesized. In H_3 , the hypothesis is that a

positive relationship exists between governmental transparency perception and governmental participation due to a priori research. However, the research study finds that a statistically significant relationship exists, but in a weakly negative direction. Although public administration research in this particular relationship is very limited, this research study's result contradicts current research within public administration. An interesting point to highlight within the research data is that as governmental transparency perception increases, although weakly, both trust in government and governmental participation decreases. Public administrators must understand these slight negative relationships regarding governmental transparency perception.

For the governmental transparency use and participation in government research question, a moderately correlated, *positive*, and statistically significant relationship is found in the research study. This finding means that survey participants who utilize governmental transparency data have higher rates of governmental participation. Although not highlighted in current public administration literature, this positive relationship could occur due to citizens reading and understanding governmental transparency data. A citizen's comprehension leads to taking a stance for or against the transparent data and its outcomes. This motivation manifests itself into action. The action is governmental participation. This action reinforces input legitimacy. Input legitimacy motivates citizens to participate, meaning that their participation in government can influence a future public agency's decision.

In general, this study *does* support the transparency (use)-participation relationship research question (H₄). The study's H₄ finding expands public administration literature. Other public administrative empirical studies utilize voting rates to evince governmental participation. However, the research study utilizes actual governmental participation factors (e.g. survey participants participating in an online town hall meeting in the past twelve months or joining a

group to influence public policy) to demonstrate a relationship between governmental transparency use and governmental participation. The research study's factors are more robust than simple voting rates.

In sum, H₄ is the only research question of the four research questions that is statistically significant and moderately correlated. H₂ is not supported. H₁ and H₃ findings are statistically significant, but in a negative direction. The research study validates a transparency pessimistic view (H₁) that governmental transparency decreases a citizen's trust in government. This transparency pessimistic view includes Federal, state, and local levels. Also, based on the findings, this study challenges the idea that a citizen who simply believes that governmental transparency is important will cause that particular citizen to increase their participation in government. No positive casual effect between governmental transparency perception and governmental participation is found in the research study; in fact, the finding is that the relationship is weakly negative.

5.3 Comparison of This Study to Past Studies

In this section, a brief comparison of this governmental transparency study to past public administration studies on this topic is performed. This research study does not confirm Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) and Loretan (2013) findings that culture is an influence on a governmental transparency-trust relationship. However, a difference exists between this study and the 2013 studies. The study utilizes U.S. data; Grimmelikhuijsen et al. and Loretan's study utilized non-U.S. data. Therefore, this study questions Grimmelikhuijsen et al. and Loretan's results and expands public administration's a priori knowledge regarding culture's effect on a governmental transparency-trust relationship. This difference questions that governmental

transparency and trust in government could be based on nationalistic aspects (e.g. the U.S., South Korea, and Italy) and not cultural aspects. Furthermore, the research study confirms Cook, Jacobs, and Kim's (2010) findings that Blacks trust in U.S. government is higher than other races.

One area of governmental transparency in the public administration literature that has mixed findings is in research results regarding governmental transparency and trust in government. In public administration's narratives regarding governmental transparency and trust in government, "there is a widely shared opinion that transparency will lead to an open culture in government that benefits us all. It is ultimately seen as 'something good' which will eventually increase citizen trust in government" (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, pp. 7). de Fine Licht et al. reflects this idea in their research study. de Fine Licht et al.'s (2014) finding is transparency optimistic, meaning that governmental transparency does increase trust in government.

Nakamura and Kim's (2010) findings and Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer's (2012) findings are transparent skeptic, meaning that governmental transparency neither increases or decreases trust in government. However, Grimmelikhuijsen's (2010) and de Fine Licht's (2011) findings are transparency pessimistic, meaning that governmental transparency actually decreases trust in government. This research study's results support Grimmelikhuijsen's (2010) and de Fine Licht's (2011) findings and are transparency pessimistic (H₁) for governmental transparency perception related to trust in government.

Regarding governmental transparency and participation in government, "the relationship between transparency and participation of government is not well articulated in the literature" (Welch, 2012, p. 93). This study's findings contrast Welch's (2012) findings that e-government transparency neither increases or decreases public participation in government. The research

study finds that governmental transparency use (e.g. on governmental websites) *does* increase public participation. One difference in the two studies is that Welch's study is specific to areas of a city's services; this research study focuses more broadly regarding transparency perception and use versus participation in government. Based on these findings, the research study adds to the extremely limited quantity of public administration research on the relationship between governmental transparency and participation in government.

Finally, regarding these research study findings, the dissertation's author argues that the study is more robust than the previous studies. Why? The study utilizes U.S. citizens who were 18 years old to over 97 years of age. The previous studies utilized college and high school students as participants. Furthermore, the dissertation's study utilizes randomly diverse participants creating a better sample from the overall adult U.S. population.

5.4 How to Use This Study's Findings

As stated in the last section, the study confirms certain governmental transparency findings in public administration, while refuting other findings. In general, the study adds to the limited public administration literature regarding U.S. governmental transparency. For public administrators, two major outcomes can be harvested from the study. First, the U.S. public perceives governmental transparency to be important; however, according to the research study, governmental transparency perception decreases trust in government. Public administrators need to be conscious about this first major outcome.

In addition, this study's results demonstrate that higher educated survey participants have a higher governmental transparency perception, higher trust in government, and more participation in government versus less educated participants. This finding should be alarming to

public administrators. If higher educated citizens are the people who perceive and use governmental transparent information, how can public administrators motivate less educated citizens to utilize governmental transparency data? The study strongly reveals that public administrators must understand who utilizes their agency's transparent data and how the agency's transparent data are being used. Governmental transparent data affect certain citizens more than others.

This study's second major outcome for public administration is that, in general, governmental transparency use does increase participation in government. Therefore, like the first major outcome, public administrators need to understand who is utilizing their governmental agency's transparent data and how they are using it. If public administrators only focus on certain customer populations when publishing governmental transparent data, then only those populations will participate in government. To increase customer use of transparent data, public agencies must advertise and promote their data for public use. Based on the research study's results, public use of transparent data will promote public participation in government.

This study is not without limitations. First, this Princeton survey is simply a snapshot in time. Further research is warranted in performing a time study on these same survey participants. Questions like: Do governmental transparency perceptions change over time? Do these changes affect trust in government or participation in government over time? Do participants who transition from working full-time to retiring really change their governmental transparency perceptions and use along with trust and participation in government?

Second, a more robust U.S. governmental transparency study would incorporate a qualitative case study as a second phase to this initial study using certain demographic categories (e.g. small business owners, Asians, and widowers) to understand why their trust in government

or participation in government is higher or lower than other demographic groups. This deeper qualitative case study would help alleviate the possibility of a self-reporting, mono-method bias that the Princeton survey data might have. The proposed, mixed method approach would be a sequential transformative strategy using the quantitative findings of the dissertation's study and embellishing it with future qualitative research (Creswell, 2003).

5.5 Potential Improvements to Dissertation's Research Study

No research study is perfect. Therefore, within this section, a brief criticism of this dissertation's research study is performed along with basic recommendations for future improvements in this study or similar future studies. First, this dissertation research study is based on a single data source; therefore, the flexibility to create other survey questions or variables is nonexistent. This is a research constraint when utilizing a single data source.

As a review, a goal of this dissertation's research is to determine if a relationship exists between governmental transparency and citizen trust and between government transparency and citizen participation. To perform this analysis, binary logical regression is conducted. Two models are provided to compare binary logical regression results. The first model shows relationship(s) of demographic variables against the dependent variable. The second model demonstrates any relationship(s) of the independent variable along with demographic variables against the dependent variable.

To embellish this study even more, additional links between the demographic variables and the dependent and independent variables should be explored. For instance, could a path model be created between the dependent and independent variables to better reflect these links? To perform this analysis, structural equation modeling could be utilized.

Second, to further validate the research outcomes, examination of interactions between governmental transparency use and citizen participation should be expanded. Even though H₄ is shown as a statistically significant relationship, do inherent interactions between these two variables exist? For instance, could citizen participation drive governmental transparency use? Although the current theoretical literature advocates governmental transparency causing citizen participation (Benito & Bastida, 2009; Meijer, 2012; Curtin & Meijer, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2012; Roberts, 2004; Veal et al., 2015; Welch, 2012), could the relationship be in the opposite direction? More research should be conducted to validate this directional pull between these two variables. This additional research could be performed by creating a correlation matrix and utilizing Cronbach's alpha to test out these relationships.

In general, these two potential improvements could enhance and validate this dissertation's research results even further.

5.6 Future Governmental Transparency Research

As Ortiz-Rodriguez et al. (2015) state, governmental transparency sustainability is required in governmental agencies. Studies in governmental transparency sustainability are needed to recognize how governmental agencies are dealing with the issue of sustainability. What is working in terms of governmental transparency sustainability in the U.S. at the Federal, state, and local levels of government? Are local U.S. governments struggling financially sustaining governmental transparency? In general, what is not working regarding sustainability? What is incorrect in terms of sustainability?

Embellishing on "incorrect," studies in public administration are necessary to understand the quality of published governmental transparent data. In general, no vigorous auditing is

currently performed on published governmental transparent data. In fact, only two U.S. states, Kentucky and Hawaii, track FOIA requests within their state; the Federal government has no current tracking capabilities (Qiu et al., 2015). Moreover, only Iowa actually disciplines state agencies for not processing and publishing accurate FOIA transparency data (Qiu et al., 2015). Therefore, what can be done to continually validate the data since only a very small number of public agencies are performing this functionality? Furthermore, are governmental agency's data correct, or are the data spun in a positive manner showing a governmental agency to be better than what is actually occurring within the agency?

Also, new public administration studies not only need to determine accuracy of governmental transparent data, but the robustness of the data, validating that a governmental agency is not withholding bad data from being published. Lastly, timeliness also requires assessment in regard to governmental transparency. For instance, Missouri is the only state that provides state agency FOIA data within twenty working days (one calendar month). No other state has FOIA timelines guidelines for their state agencies (Qiu et al., 2015).

Finally, more research is required for public administrators to understand when secrecy is warranted and when governmental transparency is warranted. The FOIA has nine general reasons why governmental transparency data should not be published. Minnesota now has 660 reasons why governmental transparency data should not be published; Florida has over 1000. Should a decision to publish the transparent data be made within the public agency? Should an outside organization determine what should be published? Studies to recommend what data should and should not be published are warranted in public administration.

In sum, the research study's findings are that governmental transparency does have a weak negative effect on trust in government. The study supports a transparency pessimist's view.

Finally, governmental transparency use (not perception) may increase a citizen's participation in government. U.S. public administrators should heed these findings in order to generate more governmental participation. A public administrator's challenge is incorporating these research findings within the daily governmental struggle between governmental transparency and secrecy.

Appendix A

Governmental Transparency Definitions (in descending order within literature):

Traditional Definition of Governmental Transparency:

“Transparency is discussed as a tool for enhancing the accountability of governments, as a principle to be implemented in order to reduce corruption, and a means for making information on government performance more readily available” (Cucciniello, Belle, Nasi, & Valotti, 2015, p. 572).

“Transparency is generally defined by political scientists as the principle of enabling the public to gain information about the operations and structures of a given entity. It is often considered synonymous with openness and disclosure” (Etzioni, 2014, p. 687).

“Transparency, defined as information about political decisions, justifications, and decision-making processes that is provided or at least publicly available” (de Fine Licht, 2014b, p. 310).

Transparency is “the availability of information about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the workings or performance of the first actor. This definition consists of an institutional relation in which an information exchange takes place that relates to the workings or performance of an actor” (Meijer, 2013, p. 430).

“In sum, most definitions of transparency recognize the extent to which an entity reveals relevant information about its own decision processes, procedures, functioning and performance. As such, transparency typically incorporates multiple components, including the availability of information about the internal workings or performance of an organization. This enables ‘inward observability’, which refers to the ability of individuals and groups outside the organization to monitor activities and decisions undertaken with it” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012b, p. 54)

“Transparency is citizen access to information, and facilitating citizen understanding of government decision-making processes” (Bannister & Connolly, 2011, p. 5).

“Nearly all definitions of government transparency have one element in common; they refer to the extent to which an organization reveals relevant information about its internal workings, such as decisions processes, procedures, functioning and performance” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2010, p. 9).

Transparency is “the notion that the people have the right to access the documents and proceeding of government” (Lathrop & Ruma, 2010, p. xix).

“Applied to the field of Public Administration, two types of [transparency] definition exists. The first type is a description definition... Transparency can be described through three elements: an observer, something available to be observed and a means or method

for observation. A second type of definition has a more normative nature... Transparency as ‘to open up the working procedures not immediately visible to those not directly involved in order to demonstrate the good working of an institution’. This type of definition not only indicates what transparency is, but also what it needs to do; demonstrate the good working of an institution” (Meijer, 2009, p. 258).

Transparency “allows for individuals to find out what is happening inside of government” (Heald, 2006b, p. 25).

“Transparency has been defined... as the conduct of public affairs in the open or otherwise subject to public scrutiny” (McDonald, 2006, p. 127)

“Transparency means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and that enough information is provided in easily understandable forms and media... The word ‘transparency’ carries with it a powerful array of moral and political associations, including honesty, guilelessness, and openness” (Kim, Halligan, Cho, Oh, & Eikenberry, 2005, p. 649).

Transparency is like opening “up the working procedures not immediately visible to those not directly involved in order to demonstrate the good working of an institution” (Moser, 2001, p. 3).

Transparency is “lifting the veil of secrecy” (Davis, 1998, p. 121).

Transparency is “the ability to look clearly through the windows of an institution” (Den Boer, 1998, p. 105).

Definitions Related to a Citizen’s Perception of Governmental Transparency:

“Transparency is the availability of information about an organization or actor allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organization” (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012, p. 139; Grimmelikhuijsen, Proumbescu, Hong, & Im, 2013, p. 576).

“Transparency is defined as the disclosure of information by an organization that enables external actors to monitor and assess its internal workings and performance” (Grimmelikhuijsen & Welch, 2012, p. 563).

“Transparency is defined as the active disclosure of information by an organization that enables external actors to monitor and assess its internal workings, decisions and performance” (Welch, 2012, p. 94).

“Transparency is the availability of information by an organization or actor allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organization” (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2011, p. 38).

Transparency has “three elements: an observer, something available to be observed, and a means or method for observation” (Oliver, 2004, p. 2).

“Transparency, as currently defined, is letting the truth be available for others to see if they so choose, or perhaps think to look, or have the time, means, and skills to look” (Oliver, 2004, p. 3)

Just what is transparency? Put simply, transparency is the opposite of secrecy. Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately revealing them. This element of volition makes the growing acceptance of transparency much more than a resigned surrender to the technologically facilitated intrusiveness of the Information Age. Transparency is a choice, encouraged by changing attitudes about what constitutes appropriate behavior... Transparency and secrecy are not either/or conditions. As ideals, they represent two ends of a continuum. What we are seeing now is a rapidly evolving shift of consensus among observers and actors worldwide about where states and corporations should be on that continuum (Florini, 2002, p. 13).

Appendix B

Princeton Survey Research Associates International for

The Pew Internet & American Life Project

Fall Tracking 2009

Final Questionnaire

English Version

11/30/09

PIAL Fall 2009 FINAL QQ 1130 (ENG).doc

Total n=2,250

National Tracking survey

n=1,690 landline RDD

n=560 cell phone RDD

Field Dates: November 30 – December 23, 2009

Interview language: English and Spanish

FORM SPLIT A/B: 50-50

Job#: 29087

LANDLINE INTRO:

Hello, my name is _____ and I'm calling for Princeton Survey Research. We're conducting a survey about some important issues today, and would like to include you. May I please speak with the **[RANDOMIZE: ("YOUNGEST MALE, age 18 or older, who is now at home") / ("YOUNGEST FEMALE, age 18 or older, who is now at home?")]** **(IF NO MALE/FEMALE, ASK: May I please speak with the YOUNGEST (FEMALE/MALE), age 18 or older, who is now at home?)** **GO TO MAIN INTERVIEW**

CELL PHONE INTRO:

Hello, I am ___ calling for Princeton Survey Research. We are conducting a national survey of cell phone users. I know I am calling you on a cell phone. As a small token of our appreciation for your time, we will pay all eligible respondents \$5 for participating in this survey.

This is not a sales call. **(IF R SAYS DRIVING/UNABLE TO TAKE CALL: Thank you. We will try you another time...)**

VOICE MAIL MESSAGE (LEAVE ONLY ONCE -- THE FIRST TIME A CALL GOES TO VOICEMAIL): I am calling for Princeton Survey Research. We are conducting a short national survey of cell phone users. This is NOT a sales call. We will try to reach you again.

SCREENING INTERVIEW:

S1. Are you under 18 years old, OR are you 18 or older?

- 1 Under 18
- 2 18 or older
- 9 Don't know/Refused

IF S1=2, CONTINUE WITH MAIN INTERVIEW

IF S1=1, THANK AND TERMINATE – RECORD AS INELIGIBLE: This survey is limited to adults age 18 and over. I won't take any more of your time...

IF S1=9, THANK AND TERMINATE RECORD AS SCREENING REFUSAL: This survey is limited to adults age 18 and over. I won't take any more of your time...

READ TO ALL CELL PHONE

INTRODUCTION TO MAIN INTERVIEW: We're interested in learning more about people with cell phones. If you are now driving a car or doing any activity requiring your full attention, I need to call you back later. The first question is...

INTERVIEWER:

If R says it is not a good time, try to arrange a time to call back. Offer the toll-free call-in number they can use to complete the survey before ending the conversation.

SEX **RECORD RESPONDENT SEX (DO NOT READ)**

- 1 Male
- 2 Female

ASK ALL

Q2 Now I'm going to ask you about various organizations and types of organizations. How much of the time do you think you can trust **[INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE] [READ FOR FIRST ITEM, THEN AS NECESSARY: ...just about always, most of the time, only some of the time or never]**? *{August 2009}*

- a. The federal government
- b. Your state government
- c. Your local government
- d. Large corporations

CATEGORIES

- 1 Just about always
- 2 Most of the time
- 3 Only some of the time
- 4 Never
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

Q6a Do you use the internet, at least occasionally? *{PIAL Trend}*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

Q6b Do you send or receive email, at least occasionally? *{PIAL Trend}*

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

SKIP NON-USERS (Q6a=2-9 and Q6b=2-9) TO Q9

ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

Q7 Did you happen to use the internet YESTERDAY? *{PIAL Trend}*

- 1 Yes, used the internet yesterday
- 2 No, did not use the internet yesterday
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

Q8 About how often do you use the internet or email from ... **[INSERT IN ORDER]** – several times a day, about once a day, 3-5 days a week, 1-2 days a week, every few weeks, less often or never? *{MODIFIED PIAL Trend}*

- a. Home?
- b. Work?

CATEGORIES

- 1 Several times a day
- 2 About once a day
- 3 3-5 days a week
- 4 1-2 days a week
- 5 Every few weeks
- 6 Less often
- 7 Never
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF INTERNET USERS WHO DID NOT USE THE INTERNET YESTERDAY (Q7=2-9):

WEB-A Next... Please tell me if you ever use the internet to do any of the following things. Do you ever use the internet to... **[ASK Act01 FIRST, THEN ROTATE ITEMS]**? *{PIAL trend}*

- ACT01 Send or read email *{Spring Tracking 2009}*
- ACT11 Look online for news or information about politics *{Spring 2009}*
- ACT27 Look for information from a local, state, or federal government web site *{Nov 2004}*
- ACT61 Send email to your local, state or federal government
- ACT87 Use a social networking site like MySpace, Facebook or LinkedIn.com *{August Tracking 2009}*
- ACT112 Use Twitter or another service to share updates about yourself or to see updates about others *{August Tracking 2009}*

CATEGORIES WEB-A

- 1 Yes, do this
- 2 No, do not do this
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF INTERNET USERS WHO USED THE INTERNET YESTERDAY (Q7=1):

WEB-B Next...Please tell me if you ever use the internet to do any of the following things. Do you ever use the internet to... **[ASK Act01 FIRST, THEN ROTATE ITEMS]?** *{PIAL trend}*

[IF YES ASK: Did you happen to do this YESTERDAY, or not?]

- ACT01 Send or read email *{Spring Tracking 2009}*
- ACT11 Look online for news or information about politics *{Spring 2009}*
- ACT27 Look for information from a local, state, or federal government web site *{Nov 2004}*
- ACT61 Send email to your local, state or federal government
- ACT87 Use a social networking site like MySpace, Facebook or LinkedIn.com *{August Tracking 2009}*
- ACT112 Use Twitter or another service to share updates about yourself or to see updates about others *{August Tracking 2009}*

CATEGORIES WEB-B

- 1 Yes, did this yesterday
- 2 Yes, do this (but NOT yesterday)
- 3 No, do not do this
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL

Q13 In the past 12 months, have you contacted your local, state or federal government by... **[INSERT IN ORDER]?** How about by **[INSERT]?**

- a. Calling a government office or agency on the phone
- b. Visiting a government office or agency in person
- c. Writing a letter to a government office, agency or official

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL

Q16 In general, how important do you feel it is today for a government agency to **[INSERT IN ORDER]...[READ FOR FIRST ITEM, THEN AS NECESSARY: very important, somewhat important, not too important or not important at all]**? How important is it for a government agency to **[INSERT ITEM]**?

- a. Provide general information to the public on its website
- b. Allow people to contact agency officials through the website
- c. Allow people to complete tasks on the website, such as submitting applications or renewing licenses
- d. Post information and alerts on sites such as Facebook or Twitter

CATEGORIES

- 1 Very important
- 2 Somewhat important
- 3 Not too important
- 4 Not important at all
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

Q17 Many government websites are set up to provide information and services. In the past 12 months, have you done any of the following online with your local, state or federal government? (First,/Next,) **[INSERT; RANDOMIZE]...[READ FOR FIRST ITEM, THEN AS NECESSARY: Have you done this online with the government in the past 12 months?]** {new}

- a. Renewed a driver's license or auto registration
- b. Applied for a fishing, hunting or other recreational license
- c. Paid a fine, such as a parking ticket
- d. Looked for information about a public policy or issue of interest to you
- e. Downloaded government forms
- f. Looked up what services a government agency provides
- g. Gotten advice or information from a government agency about a health or safety issue (GA)
- h. Gotten recreational or tourist information from a government agency (GB)
- i. Researched official government documents or statistics (GC)
- j. Gotten information about or applied for government benefits (GD)
- k. Gotten information about how to apply for a government job (Act112x)

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes, have done this
- 2 No, have not
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1) OR TEXTERS (Q11b=1):

Q21 Here is another list of items. For each of the following, please tell me if you have done this in the past 12 months, or not. First, in the past 12 months, have you...**[INSERT; RANDOMIZE]**? Next, have you **[INSERT ITEM] [IF NECESSARY: in the past 12 months, or not]**? {new}

ASK ITEM A IF SNS USERS (ACT87a=1 or ACT87b=1,2):

a. Followed or become a fan of a government agency or official through their page on a social networking site

ASK ITEM B IF ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

b. Read the blog of a government agency or official

ASK ITEM C IF EMAIL USERS (Q6b=1 or WebA:Act01=1 or WebB:Act01=1,2):

c. Signed up to receive EMAIL ALERTS from a government agency or official

ASK ITEM D IF Texters (Q11b=1):

d. Signed up to receive TEXT MESSAGES from a government agency or official

ASK ITEM E IF ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

e. Watched a video online on a government website

ASK ITEM F IF TWITTER USERS (ACT112a=1 or ACT112b=1,2)

f. Followed a government agency or official on Twitter

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes, have done this
- 2 No, have not
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1)

Q25 For this next list of items, please tell me if you have used the internet to do any of the following. First, in the past 12 months, have you used the internet to...**[INSERT in ORDER]**? Next, have you used the internet to **[INSERT ITEM] [IF NECESSARY: in the past 12 months, or not]**? {new}

- a. Participate in an online town hall meeting
- b. Post comments, queries or information on a blog, online discussion, listserv or other online forum about a government policy or public issue
- c. Upload photos or videos online about a government policy or public issue
- d. Join a group online that tries to influence government policies

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes, have done this
- 2 No, have not
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL

Q28 For these next few questions, I'd like you to think about activities you may or may not have done in your community. First, in the past 12 months, have you...**[INSERT; ALWAYS ASK a & b FIRST IN ORDER, THEN RANDOMIZE]**? Next, **[INSERT ITEM] [IF NECESSARY: Have you done this in the past 12 months, or not]? {new}**

- a. Talked face-to-face with your neighbors about community issues
- b. Talked on the phone with your neighbors about community issues
- ASK ITEM C IF EMAIL USERS (Q6b=1 or WebA:Act01=1 or WebB:Act01=1,2):**
- c. Exchanged email with your neighbors about community issues
- ASK ITEM D IF ALL INTERNET USERS (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):**
- d. Read a blog dealing with community issues
- ASK ITEM E IF Texters (Q11b=1):**
- e. Exchanged TEXT MESSAGES with neighbors about community issues
- ASK ITEM F IF SNS USERS (ACT87a=1 or ACT87b=1,2):**
- f. Joined an online group focused on community issues on a social networking site
- ASK IF TWITTER USERS (ACT112a=1 or ACT112b=1,2)**
- g. Followed your neighbors using Twitter or another status update service

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes, have done this
- 2 No, have not
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF INTERNET USER (Q6a=1 or Q6b=1):

Q31 There are many types of government information available online. In the past 12 months, have you used the internet to... **[INSERT; RANDOMIZE]**?

- a. Visit a site that provides access to government data, like data.gov [data-dot-guv] or recovery.gov [recovery-dot-guv] or usaspending.gov [u-s-a-spending-dot-guv]
- b. Look for information on who contributes to the campaigns of your elected officials
- c. Download or read the text of any legislation
- d. Look to see how money from the recent federal government stimulus package is being spent

CATEGORIES

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL

Q32 [IF NOT INTERNET USER (Q6a=2,8,9 AND Q6b=2,8,9), READ: On another topic,) Compared to two years ago, would you say that the federal government is now more open and accessible, less open and accessible, or about the same as it was two years ago?

- 1 More open and accessible
- 2 Less open and accessible
- 3 About the same
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

DEMOGRAPHICS

(READ) A few last questions for statistical purposes only...

ASK ALL:

AGE What is your age?

_____ years **[RECORD EXACT AGE 18-96]**

- 97 97 or older
- 98 Don't know
- 99 Refused

ASK ALL:

MAR Are you currently married, living with a partner, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been married?

- 1 Married
- 2 Living with a partner
- 3 Divorced
- 4 Separated
- 5 Widowed
- 6 Never been married
- 7 Single **(VOL.)**
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

EMPL Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired, or are you not employed for pay?

- 1 Employed full-time
- 2 Employed part-time
- 3 Retired
- 4 Not employed for pay
- 5 **(VOL.)** Have own business/self-employed
- 6 **(VOL.)** Disabled
- 7 **(VOL.)** Student
- 8 **(VOL.)** Other
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF EMPL=1,2

EMP2 Do you or does anyone else in your household work for federal, state or local government?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL

PARTY In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat or Independent?

- 1 Republican
- 2 Democrat
- 3 Independent
- 4 **(VOL.)** No Party/No Preference/Not Interested in Politics
- 5 **(VOL.)** Other party
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

EDUC What is the last grade or class you completed in school? **(DO NOT READ, BUT CAN PROBE FOR CLARITY IF NEEDED).**

- 1 None, or grades 1-8
- 2 High school incomplete (grades 9-11)
- 3 High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate)
- 4 Technical, trade or vocational school AFTER high school
- 5 Some college, no 4-year degree (includes associate degree)
- 6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)
- 7 Post-graduate training/professional school after college (toward a Masters/Ph.D., Law or Medical school)
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

HISP Are you, yourself, of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or some other Latin American background?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

RACE What is your race? Are you white, black, Asian, or some other race? **IF R SAYS HISPANIC OR LATINO, PROBE:** Do you consider yourself a WHITE (Hispanic/Latino) or a BLACK (Hispanic/Latino)? **IF R DOES NOT SAY WHITE, BLACK OR ONE OF THE RACE CATEGORIES LISTED, RECORD AS "OTHER" (CODE 6)**

- 1 White
- 2 Black or African-American
- 3 Asian or Pacific Islander
- 4 Mixed race
- 5 Native American/American Indian
- 6 Other **(SPECIFY)**
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

INC Last year, that is in 2008, what was your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category... **[READ 1-9]**

- 1 Less than \$10,000
- 2 \$10,000 to under \$20,000
- 3 \$20,000 to under \$30,000
- 4 \$30,000 to under \$40,000
- 5 \$40,000 to under \$50,000
- 6 \$50,000 to under \$75,000
- 7 \$75,000 to under \$100,000
- 8 \$100,000 to under \$150,000
- 9 \$150,000 or more
- 98 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 99 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON LANDLINE PHONE (LANDLINE SAMPLE AND (Q9c=1 OR Q9d=1)):

L2. Now thinking about your telephone use... Of all the telephone calls that you and other people in your household receive, are **[READ AND ROTATE OPTIONS 1 AND 3—KEEP 2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]**?

- 1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone
- 2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone
- 3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL CELL PHONE SAMPLE:

C1. Now thinking about your telephone use... Is there at least one telephone INSIDE your home that is currently working and is not a cell phone?

- 1 Yes, home telephone
- 2 No home telephone
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK IF DUAL REACHED ON CELL PHONE (C1=1):

C2. Of all the telephone calls that you and other people in your household receive, are
[READ AND ROTATE OPTIONS 1 AND 3—KEEP 2 ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE]?

- 1 All or almost all calls on a cell phone
- 2 Some on a cell phone and some on a regular home phone
- 3 All or almost all calls on a regular home phone
- 8 **(DO NOT READ)** Don't know
- 9 **(DO NOT READ)** Refused

ASK ALL:

ZIPCODE What is your zip code?

_____ **ENTER ZIPCODE**
99999 Don't know/Refused

THANK RESPONDENT: That concludes our interview. The results of this survey are going to be used by a non-profit research organization called the Pew Internet & American Life Project, which is looking at the impact of the internet on people's lives. A report on this survey will be issued by the project in a few months and you can find the results at its web site, which is www.pewinternet.org [w-w-w dot pew internet dot org]. Thanks again for your time. Have a nice day/evening.

Appendix C

Transparency, Trust, and Public Participation Variables for Transparency Dissertation Analysis

A Citizen's Perception of Governmental Transparency Variables					
Government Transparency Perception					
			Q16-a	How important to provide general information to the public on government agency's website	1 = Very important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Not too important; 4 = Not important at all; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
			Q16-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q16-a	1 = Very important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Not too important; 4 = Not important at all;

Governmental Transparency Use				
		Q7=1	Act27	Have you looked for info from a Fed, state, local website - Yesterday 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q7=2-9	Act27	Have you looked for info from a Fed, state, local website - Not yesterday 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
			Act27-1	<u>Recoded:</u> Act27 1 = Yes; 2 = No
			Q17-d	Have you looked up information about a public policy or issue that interested you in past 12 months 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
			Q17-d1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q17-d 1 = Yes; 2 = No
			Q17-f	Have you looked up what gov. services a gov. agency provides in past 12 months 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
			Q17-f1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q17-f 1 = Yes; 2 = No
			Q17-i	Have you researched government stats or documents in past 12 months 1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
			Q17-i1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q17-i 1 = Yes; 2 = No
			Q17T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q17-d, Q17-f, and Q17-i Values 0-3

		Q17T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q17T	0= No Q17 Yes answers (Q17T = 0); 1 = At least one Q17 Yes answer (Q17T > 0)
		Q21-c	Have you signed up to receive email alerts from gov. agency or official	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q21-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q21-c	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q21-d	Have you signed up to receive IM alerts from gov. agency or official	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q21-d1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q21-d	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q21-e	Have you watched video online on government website	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q21-3e	<u>Recoded:</u> Q21-e	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q21T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q21-c, Q21-d, and Q21-e	Values 0-3
		Q21T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q21T	0= No Q21 Yes answers (Q21T = 0); 1 = At least one Q21 Yes answer (Q21T > 0)
		Q31-a	Have you visited a major Federal website that provides access to gov. data (e.g. data.gov)	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q31-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q31-a	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q31-c	Have you download/read text on any government legislation	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q31-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q31-c	1 = Yes; 2 = No

		Q31-d	Have you looked to see how money from the recent Federal government stimulus package is being spent	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q31-d1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q31-d	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q31T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q31-a, Q31-c, and Q31-d	Values 0-3
		Q31T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q31T	0= No Q31 Yes answers (Q31T = 0); 1 = At least one Q31 Yes answer (Q31T > 0)

Trust Variables				
		Q2-a	How much of the time do you trust Fed government?	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q2-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-a	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never
		Q2-a2	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-a1	1 = High trust (values 1 & 2 of Q2-a) 0 = Low trust (values 3 & 4 of Q2-a)
		Q2-b	How much of the time do you trust state government?	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q2-b1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-b	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never
		Q2-b2	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-b1	1 = High trust (values 1 & 2 of Q2-b) 0 = Low trust (values 3 & 4 of Q2-b)
		Q2-c	How much of the time do you trust local government?	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q2-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-c	1 = Nearly always; 2 = Most of time; 3 = Some of time; 4 = Never

		Q2-c2	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2-c1	1 = High trust (values 1 & 2 of Q2-c) 0 = Low trust (values 3 & 4 of Q2-c)
		Q2T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the “1=High trust” situations for Q2-a1, Q2-b1, and Q2-c1	Values 0-3
		Q2T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q2T	0= Low trust where Q2T has no high trust answers (Q2T = 0); 1 = At least one Q2T high trust answer (Q2T > 0)

Public Participation Variables				
		Q13-a	Have you called your local, state, Fed government office or agency in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q13-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q13-a	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q13-b	Have you visited your local, state, Fed government office or agency in person in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q13-b1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q13-b	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q13-c	Have you written your local, state, Fed government office, agency, or official in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q13-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q13-c	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q13T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q13-a, Q13-b, and Q13-c	Values 0-3
		Q13T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q13T	0= No Q13 Yes answers (Q13T = 0); 1 = At least one Q13 Yes answer (Q13T > 0)
		Q25-a	Have you participated in an online town-hall meeting in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q25-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q25-a	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q25-b	Have you posted comments, queries, or information on a blog, online discussion, listserv, or other online forum about a government policy or public issue in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q25-b1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q25-b	1 = Yes; 2 = No

		Q25-c	Have you uploaded photos/videos about a government policy or public issue in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q25-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q25-c	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q25-d	Join a group to influence public policy in past 12 months	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q25-d1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q25-d	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q25T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q25-a, Q25-b, Q25-c, and Q25-d	Values 0-4
		Q25T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q25T	0= No Q25 Yes answers (Q25T = 0); 1 = At least one Q25 Yes answer (Q25T > 0)
		Q28-a	Have you talked face-to-face with your neighbors about community issues	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q28-a1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-a	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28-b	Have you talked on the phone with your neighbors about community issues	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q28-b1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-b	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28-c	Have you exchanged emails with your neighbors about community issues	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q28-c1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-c	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28-d	Have you read a blog dealing with community issues	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused

		Q28-d1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-d	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28-e	Have you exchanged text messages with your neighbors about community issues	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q28-e1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-e	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28-f	Have you joined an online group focused on community issues on a social networking site	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		Q28-f1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28-f	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		Q28T	<u>Calculated</u> variable counting all the "1=Yes" situations for Q28-a, Q28-b, Q28-c, Q28-d, Q28-e, and Q28-f	Values 0-6
		Q28T1	<u>Recoded:</u> Q28T	0= No Q28 Yes answers (Q28T = 0); 1 = At least one Q28 Yes answer (Q28T > 0)
		Q1325 28T1	<u>Recoded:</u> From Q13T1, Q25T1, and Q28T1	If (Q13T1 = 1) or (Q25T1 = 1) or (Q28T1 = 1) 1 = Yes Else 0 = No Endif

Other Variables (e.g. demographic)				
		AGE	Age of survey participant	18-96 = Exact age in years 97=97 years or older 98=Don't know 99=Refused
		SEX	Record respondent sex	1 = Male; 2 = Female
		MAR	What is your marital status	1 = Married; 2 = Living with partner; 3 = Divorced; 4 = Separated; 5 = Widowed; 6 = Never been married; 7 = Single; 8 = Don't know; 9 = Refused
		MAR-1	<u>Recoded:</u> MAR	1 = Married; 2 = Living with partner; 3 = Divorced; 4 = Separated; 5 = Widowed; 6 = Never been married; 7 = Single
		EMPL	What is your employment status	1 = Employed full time; 2 = Employed part time; 3 = Retired; 4 = Not employed for pay; 5 = Have own business/self-employed; 6 = Disabled; 7 = Student; 8 = Other; 9 = Refused

		EMP2	Does anyone in household work for Federal, state, or local government	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		EMP2-1	<u>Recoded:</u> EMP2	1 = Yes; 2 = No
		PARTY	In politics today, what do you consider yourself	1 = Republican; 2 = Democrat; 3 = Independent; 4 = No party/No Preference/No Interest; 5 = Other party; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		PARTY-1	<u>Recoded:</u> PARTY	1 = Republican; 2 = Democrat; 3 = Independent; 4 = No party/No Preference/No Interest; 5 = Other party
		EDUC	What is the last grade or class that you completed in school	1 = None, or grades 1-8; 2 = High school incomplete (9-11); 3 = High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate); 4 = Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school; 5 = Some college, no 4-year degree (including associate degree); 6 = College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree); 7 = Post graduate training/professional school after college; 8 = Don't know; 9 = Refused

		HISP	Are you, yourself, of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or some other Latin American background?	1 = Yes; 2 = No; 8 - Don't know; 9 - Refused
		RACE	What is your race	1 = White; 2 = Black or African-America; 3 = Asian or Pacific Islander; 4 = Mixed race; 5 = Native American/American Indian; 6 = Other; 8 = Don't know; 9 = Refused
		INC	What is your total family income from all sources before taxes	1 = Less than \$10K; 2 = \$10K to under \$20K; 3 = \$20K to under \$30K; 4 = \$30K to under \$40K; 5 = \$40K to under \$50K; 6 = \$50K to under \$75K; 7 = \$75K to under \$100K; 8 = \$100K to under \$150K; 9 = \$150K or more; 98 = Don't know; 99 = Refused

Appendix D

Governmental Transparency Perception and Demographic Analysis

Table D.1

*Governmental Transparency
Perception Summary*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Total	Percent
Very Important	1478	65.46%
Somewhat Important	464	20.55%
Not Too Important	106	4.69%
Not Important At All	124	5.49%
Don't Know	71	3.14%
Refused To Answer	15	0.66%
Total	2258	100.00%

Table D.2

*Governmental Transparency
Perception by Sex*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Sex	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	Male	642	28.43%	43.44%
	Female	836	37.02%	56.56%
Somewhat Important	Male	218	9.65%	46.98%
	Female	246	10.89%	53.02%
Not Too Important	Male	49	2.17%	46.23%
	Female	57	2.52%	53.77%
Not Important At All	Male	56	2.48%	45.16%
	Female	68	3.01%	54.84%
Don't Know	Male	22	0.97%	30.99%
	Female	49	2.17%	69.01%
Refused To Answer	Male	6	0.27%	40.00%
	Female	9	0.40%	60.00%
Total		2258	100.00%	

Table D.3
*Governmental Transparency Perception by
 Marital Status*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Marital Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	Married	801	35.68%	54.45%
	Living with Partner	73	3.25%	4.96%
	Divorced	155	6.90%	10.54%
	Separated	33	1.47%	2.24%
	Widowed	106	4.72%	7.21%
	Never Married	259	11.54%	17.61%
	Single	44	1.96%	2.99%
Somewhat Important	Married	256	11.40%	55.53%
	Living with Partner	21	0.94%	4.56%
	Divorced	42	1.87%	9.11%
	Separated	13	0.58%	2.82%
	Widowed	46	2.05%	9.98%
	Never Married	69	3.07%	14.97%
	Single	14	0.62%	3.04%
Not Too Important	Married	64	2.85%	60.38%
	Living with Partner	4	0.18%	3.77%
	Divorced	11	0.49%	10.38%
	Separated	3	0.13%	2.83%
	Widowed	9	0.40%	8.49%
	Never Married	12	0.53%	11.32%
	Single	3	0.13%	2.83%
Not Important At All	Married	51	2.27%	41.80%
	Living with Partner	9	0.40%	7.38%
	Divorced	16	0.71%	13.11%
	Separated	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Widowed	28	1.25%	22.95%
	Never Married	15	0.67%	12.30%
	Single	3	0.13%	2.46%
Don't Know	Married	28	1.25%	40.00%
	Living with	4	0.18%	5.71%

	Partner			
	Divorced	10	0.45%	14.29%
	Separated	3	0.13%	4.29%
	Widowed	19	0.85%	27.14%
	Never Married	3	0.13%	4.29%
	Single	3	0.13%	4.29%
Refused To Answer	Married	6	0.27%	40.00%
	Living with Partner	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Divorced	2	0.09%	13.33%
	Separated	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Widowed	6	0.27%	40.00%
	Never Married	1	0.04%	6.67%
	Single	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2245	100%	

Table D.4
*Governmental Transparency Perception by
Employment Status*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Employee Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	Full Time	627	27.90%	42.57%
	Part Time	180	8.01%	12.22%
	Retired	324	14.42%	22.00%
	Not Employed	247	10.99%	16.77%
	Self-employed	36	1.60%	2.44%
	Disabled	42	1.87%	2.85%
	Student	14	0.62%	0.95%
	Other	3	0.13%	0.20%
Somewhat Important	Full Time	168	7.48%	36.44%
	Part Time	45	2.00%	9.76%
	Retired	158	7.03%	34.27%
	Not Employed	68	3.03%	14.75%
	Self-employed	3	0.13%	0.65%
	Disabled	14	0.62%	3.04%
	Student	2	0.09%	0.43%
	Other	3	0.13%	0.65%
Not Too Important	Full Time	28	1.25%	26.42%
	Part Time	9	0.40%	8.49%
	Retired	47	2.09%	44.34%
	Not Employed	14	0.62%	13.21%
	Self-employed	4	0.18%	3.77%
	Disabled	4	0.18%	3.77%
	Student	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Not Important At All	Full Time	26	1.16%	21.14%
	Part Time	11	0.49%	8.94%
	Retired	56	2.49%	45.53%
	Not Employed	20	0.89%	16.26%
	Self-employed	3	0.13%	2.44%
	Disabled	7	0.31%	5.69%
	Student	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%

Don't Know	Full Time	10	0.45%	14.49%
	Part Time	4	0.18%	5.80%
	Retired	39	1.74%	56.52%
	Not Employed	9	0.40%	13.04%
	Self-employed	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Disabled	5	0.22%	7.25%
	Student	1	0.04%	1.45%
	Other	1	0.04%	1.45%
	Refused to Answer	Full Time	3	0.13%
Part Time		2	0.09%	13.33%
Retired		4	0.18%	26.67%
Not Employed		4	0.18%	26.67%
Self-employed		1	0.04%	6.67%
Disabled		0	0.00%	0.00%
Student		0	0.00%	0.00%
Other		1	0.04%	6.67%
Total			2247	100%

Table D.5
*Governmental Transparency Perception by
 Political Party*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Political Party	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	Republican	361	16.61%	25.05%
	Democrat	575	26.45%	39.90%
	Independent	431	19.83%	29.91%
	No Party	66	3.04%	4.58%
	Other Party	8	0.37%	0.56%
Somewhat Important	Republican	97	4.46%	21.80%
	Democrat	178	8.19%	40.00%
	Independent	151	6.95%	33.93%
	No Party	19	0.87%	4.27%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Not Too Important	Republican	25	1.15%	25.25%
	Democrat	38	1.75%	38.38%
	Independent	26	1.20%	26.26%
	No Party	10	0.46%	10.10%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Not Important At All	Republican	31	1.43%	27.19%
	Democrat	42	1.93%	36.84%
	Independent	37	1.70%	32.46%
	No Party	4	0.18%	3.51%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Don't Know	Republican	12	0.55%	19.05%
	Democrat	24	1.10%	38.10%
	Independent	18	0.83%	28.57%
	No Party	9	0.41%	14.29%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Refused to Answer	Republican	2	0.09%	16.67%
	Democrat	5	0.23%	41.67%
	Independent	4	0.18%	33.33%
	No Party	1	0.05%	8.33%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2174	100%	

Table D.6
*Governmental Transparency Perception by
 Education Level*

Governmental Transparency Perception	Education Level	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	None (< 9th Grade)	29	1.29%	1.97%
	High School Incomplete	90	4.02%	6.13%
	High School Complete	375	16.73%	25.53%
	Tech/Vocation School	39	1.74%	2.65%
	Some College	355	15.84%	24.17%
	College Graduate	337	15.04%	22.94%
	Post Graduate	244	10.89%	16.61%
Somewhat Important	None (< 9th Grade)	7	0.31%	1.51%
	High School Incomplete	36	1.61%	7.78%
	High School Complete	162	7.23%	34.99%
	Tech/Vocation School	15	0.67%	3.24%
	Some College	110	4.91%	23.76%
	College Graduate	86	3.84%	18.57%
	Post Graduate	47	2.10%	10.15%
Not Too Important	None (< 9th Grade)	4	0.18%	3.81%
	High School Incomplete	8	0.36%	7.62%
	High School Complete	35	1.56%	33.33%
	Tech/Vocation School	9	0.40%	8.57%
	Some College	27	1.20%	25.71%
	College Graduate	13	0.58%	12.38%
	Post Graduate	9	0.40%	8.57%
Not Important At All	None (< 9th Grade)	9	0.40%	7.38%
	High School Incomplete	17	0.76%	13.93%
	High School Complete	52	2.32%	42.62%
	Tech/Vocation School	3	0.13%	2.46%
	Some College	22	0.98%	18.03%
	College Graduate	12	0.54%	9.84%
	Post Graduate	7	0.31%	5.74%
Don't Know	None (< 9th Grade)	1	0.04%	1.47%
	High School Incomplete	9	0.40%	13.24%
	High School Complete	32	1.43%	47.06%

	Tech/Vocation School	3	0.13%	4.41%
	Some College	14	0.62%	20.59%
	College Graduate	4	0.18%	5.88%
	Post Graduate	5	0.22%	7.35%
Refused to Answer	None (< 9th Grade)	2	0.09%	14.29%
	High School Incomplete	0	0.00%	0.00%
	High School Complete	8	0.36%	57.14%
	Tech/Vocation School	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Some College	4	0.18%	28.57%
	College Graduate	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Post Graduate	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2241	100%	

Table D.7

Governmental Transparency Perception by Race

Governmental Transparency Perception	Race	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Very Important	White	1173	53.17%	80.95%
	Black / African-American	183	8.30%	12.63%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	29	1.31%	2.00%
	Mixed Race	27	1.22%	1.86%
	Native / American Indian	21	0.95%	1.45%
	Other	16	0.73%	1.10%
Somewhat Important	White	378	17.14%	82.89%
	Black / African-American	53	2.40%	11.62%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	5	0.23%	1.10%
	Mixed Race	9	0.41%	1.97%
	Native / American Indian	8	0.36%	1.75%
	Other	3	0.14%	0.66%
Not Too Important	White	88	3.99%	85.44%
	Black / African-American	10	0.45%	9.71%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	1	0.05%	0.97%
	Mixed Race	3	0.14%	2.91%
	Native / American Indian	1	0.05%	0.97%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Not Important At All	White	103	4.67%	85.83%
	Black / African-American	12	0.54%	10.00%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	1	0.05%	0.83%
	Mixed Race	1	0.05%	0.83%
	Native / American Indian	2	0.09%	1.67%
	Other	1	0.05%	0.83%
Don't Know	White	55	2.49%	82.09%
	Black / African-American	7	0.32%	10.45%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	2	0.09%	2.99%
	Mixed Race	2	0.09%	2.99%
	Native / American Indian	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	1	0.05%	1.49%
Refused to Answer	White	9	0.41%	81.82%
	Black / African-American	2	0.09%	18.18%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Mixed Race	0	0.00%	0.00%

	Native / American Indian	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2206	100%	

Appendix E

Governmental Transparency Use and Demographic Analysis

Table E.1

Governmental Transparency Use Summary

Governmental Transparency Use	Total	Percent
0	982	43.49%
1	247	10.94%
2	232	10.27%
3	212	9.39%
4	184	8.15%
5	147	6.51%
6	106	4.69%
7	81	3.59%
8	47	2.08%
9	15	0.66%
10	5	0.22%
Total	2258	100%
0	982	43.49%
>0	1276	56.51%
Total	2258	100%

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.2
Governmental Transparency Use by Sex

Governmental Transparency Use	Sex	Total	Percent	Percent in Category	Percent Just for Gender
0	Male	410	18.16%	41.75%	41.29%
	Female	572	25.33%	58.25%	45.22%
>0	Male	583	25.82%	45.69%	58.71%
	Female	693	30.69%	54.31%	54.78%
Total		2258	100%		

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.3
Governmental Transparency Use by Marital Status

Governmental Transparency Use	Marital Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Married	436	19.42%	44.72%
	Living with Partner	50	2.23%	5.13%
	Divorced	117	5.21%	12.00%
	Separated	36	1.60%	3.69%
	Widowed	159	7.08%	16.31%
	Never Been Married	148	6.59%	15.18%
	Single	29	1.29%	2.97%
>0	Married	770	34.30%	60.63%
	Living with Partner	61	2.72%	4.80%
	Divorced	119	5.30%	9.37%
	Separated	16	0.71%	1.26%
	Widowed	55	2.45%	4.33%
	Never Been Married	211	9.40%	16.61%
	Single	38	1.69%	2.99%
Total		2245	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.4

Governmental Transparency Use by Employment Status

Governmental Transparency Use	Employment Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Full Time	255	11.38%	26.15%
	Part Time	93	4.15%	9.54%
	Retired	397	17.72%	40.72%
	Not Employed	162	7.23%	16.62%
	Self-employed	13	0.58%	1.33%
	Disabled	52	2.32%	5.33%
	Student	3	0.13%	0.31%
	Other	2	0.09%	0.21%
>0	Full Time	607	27.09%	48.02%
	Part Time	158	7.05%	12.50%
	Retired	231	10.31%	18.28%
	Not Employed	200	8.92%	15.82%
	Self-employed	34	1.52%	2.69%
	Disabled	20	0.89%	1.58%
	Student	14	0.62%	1.11%
	Other	6	0.27%	0.47%
Total		2241	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.5
Governmental Transparency Use by Political Party

Governmental Transparency Use	Political Party	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Republican	197	9.06%	21.27%
	Democrat	404	18.58%	43.63%
	Independent	270	12.42%	29.16%
	No Party	55	2.53%	5.94%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
>0	Republican	331	15.23%	26.52%
	Democrat	458	21.07%	36.70%
	Independent	397	18.26%	31.81%
	No Party	54	2.48%	4.33%
	Other Party	8	0.37%	0.64%
Total		2174	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.6
Governmental Transparency Use by Educational Level

Governmental Transparency Use	Educational Level	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	None (< 9th Grade)	47	2.10%	4.85%
	High School Incomplete	122	5.44%	12.58%
	High School Complete	431	19.23%	44.43%
	Tech/Vocation School	39	1.74%	4.02%
	Some College	190	8.48%	19.59%
	College Graduate	96	4.28%	9.90%
	Post Graduate	45	2.01%	4.64%
	>0	None (< 9th Grade)	5	0.22%
	High School Incomplete	38	1.70%	2.99%
	High School Complete	233	10.40%	18.33%
	Tech/Vocation School	30	1.34%	2.36%
	Some College	342	15.26%	26.91%
	College Graduate	356	15.89%	28.01%
	Post Graduate	267	11.91%	21.01%
Total		2241	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table E.7
Governmental Transparency Use by Race

Governmental Transparency Use	Race	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	White	777	35.22%	81.02%
	Black / African-American	139	6.30%	14.49%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	8	0.36%	0.83%
	Mixed Race	12	0.54%	1.25%
	Native / American Indian	15	0.68%	1.56%
	Other	8	0.36%	0.83%
	>0	White	1029	46.65%
	Black / African-American	128	5.80%	10.26%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	30	1.36%	2.41%
	Mixed Race	30	1.36%	2.41%
	Native / American Indian	17	0.77%	1.36%
	Other	13	0.59%	1.04%
Total		2206	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Appendix F

Governmental Federal Trust and Demographic Analysis

Table F.1
Trust in Federal Government by Sex

Trust in Federal Government	Sex	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	Male	43	1.90%	45.26%
	Female	52	2.30%	54.74%
Most of the Time	Male	236	10.45%	44.44%
	Female	295	13.06%	55.56%
Some of the Time	Male	512	22.67%	43.72%
	Female	659	29.19%	56.28%
Never	Male	179	7.93%	47.35%
	Female	199	8.81%	52.65%
Don't Know	Male	15	0.66%	27.27%
	Female	40	1.77%	72.73%
Refused To Answer	Male	8	0.35%	28.57%
	Female	20	0.89%	71.43%
Total		2258	100.00%	

Table F.2
Trust in Federal Government by Marital Status

Trust in Federal Government	Marital Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	Married	39	1.74%	41.49%
	Living with Partner	6	0.27%	6.38%
	Divorced	13	0.58%	13.83%
	Separated	4	0.18%	4.26%
	Widowed	8	0.36%	8.51%
	Never Married	22	0.98%	23.40%
	Single	2	0.09%	2.13%
Most of the Time	Married	264	11.76%	50.00%
	Living with Partner	26	1.16%	4.92%
	Divorced	46	2.05%	8.71%
	Separated	11	0.49%	2.08%
	Widowed	56	2.49%	10.61%
	Never Married	106	4.72%	20.08%
	Single	19	0.85%	3.60%
Some of the Time	Married	658	29.31%	56.48%
	Living with Partner	57	2.54%	4.89%
	Divorced	121	5.39%	10.39%
	Separated	24	1.07%	2.06%
	Widowed	106	4.72%	9.10%
	Never Married	170	7.57%	14.59%
	Single	29	1.29%	2.49%
Never	Married	216	9.62%	57.60%
	Living with Partner	16	0.71%	4.27%
	Divorced	42	1.87%	11.20%
	Separated	9	0.40%	2.40%
	Widowed	29	1.29%	7.73%
	Never Married	49	2.18%	13.07%
	Single	14	0.62%	3.73%
Don't Know	Married	19	0.85%	34.55%
	Living with Partner	4	0.18%	7.27%
	Divorced	9	0.40%	16.36%
	Separated	3	0.13%	5.45%

	Widowed	9	0.40%	16.36%
	Never Married	8	0.36%	14.55%
	Single	3	0.13%	5.45%
Refused To Answer	Married	10	0.45%	35.71%
	Living with Partner	2	0.09%	7.14%
	Divorced	5	0.22%	17.86%
	Separated	1	0.04%	3.57%
	Widowed	6	0.27%	21.43%
	Never Married	4	0.18%	14.29%
	Single	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2245	100%	

Table F.3
Trust in Federal Government by Employment Status

Trust in Federal Government	Employment Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	Full Time	33	1.47%	35.11%
	Part Time	11	0.49%	11.70%
	Retired	24	1.07%	25.53%
	Not Employed	20	0.89%	21.28%
	Self-employed	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Disabled	6	0.27%	6.38%
	Student	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Most of the Time	Full Time	226	10.06%	42.64%
	Part Time	62	2.76%	11.70%
	Retired	128	5.70%	24.15%
	Not Employed	82	3.65%	15.47%
	Self-employed	8	0.36%	1.51%
	Disabled	15	0.67%	2.83%
	Student	7	0.31%	1.32%
	Other	2	0.09%	0.38%
Some of the Time	Full Time	445	19.80%	38.16%
	Part Time	136	6.05%	11.66%
	Retired	324	14.42%	27.79%
	Not Employed	183	8.14%	15.69%
	Self-employed	29	1.29%	2.49%
	Disabled	36	1.60%	3.09%
	Student	8	0.36%	0.69%
	Other	5	0.22%	0.43%
Never	Full Time	138	6.14%	36.80%
	Part Time	34	1.51%	9.07%
	Retired	121	5.38%	32.27%
	Not Employed	64	2.85%	17.07%
	Self-employed	7	0.31%	1.87%
	Disabled	8	0.36%	2.13%
	Student	2	0.09%	0.53%
	Other	1	0.04%	0.27%
Don't Know	Full Time	11	0.49%	20.37%
	Part Time	8	0.36%	14.81%

	Retired	19	0.85%	35.19%
	Not Employed	8	0.36%	14.81%
	Self-employed	3	0.13%	5.56%
	Disabled	5	0.22%	9.26%
	Student	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Refused to Answer	Full Time	9	0.40%	32.14%
	Part Time	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Retired	12	0.53%	42.86%
	Not Employed	5	0.22%	17.86%
	Self-employed	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Disabled	2	0.09%	7.14%
	Student	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2247	100%	

Table F.4
Trust in Federal Government by Political Party

Trust in Federal Government	Political Party	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	Republican	14	0.64%	16.09%
	Democrat	52	2.39%	59.77%
	Independent	18	0.83%	20.69%
	No Party	3	0.14%	3.45%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Most of the Time	Republican	94	4.32%	18.04%
	Democrat	260	11.96%	49.90%
	Independent	148	6.81%	28.41%
	No Party	19	0.87%	3.65%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Some of the Time	Republican	293	13.48%	25.79%
	Democrat	450	20.70%	39.61%
	Independent	340	15.64%	29.93%
	No Party	47	2.16%	4.14%
	Other Party	6	0.28%	0.53%
Never	Republican	117	5.38%	32.14%
	Democrat	71	3.27%	19.51%
	Independent	142	6.53%	39.01%
	No Party	32	1.47%	8.79%
	Other Party	2	0.09%	0.55%
Don't Know	Republican	9	0.41%	20.00%
	Democrat	18	0.83%	40.00%
	Independent	14	0.64%	31.11%
	No Party	4	0.18%	8.89%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Refused to Answer	Republican	1	0.05%	4.76%
	Democrat	11	0.51%	52.38%
	Independent	5	0.23%	23.81%
	No Party	4	0.18%	19.05%
	Other Party	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2174	100%	

Table F.5

Trust in Federal Government by Educational Level

Trust in Federal Government	Educational Level	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	None (< 9th Grade)	8	0.36%	8.51%
	High School Incomplete	11	0.49%	11.70%
	High School Complete	26	1.16%	27.66%
	Tech/Vocation School	3	0.13%	3.19%
	Some College	21	0.94%	22.34%
	College Graduate	17	0.76%	18.09%
	Post Graduate	8	0.36%	8.51%
	Most of the Time	None (< 9th Grade)	9	0.40%
High School Incomplete		44	1.96%	8.30%
High School Complete		137	6.11%	25.85%
Tech/Vocation School		11	0.49%	2.08%
Some College		128	5.71%	24.15%
College Graduate		112	5.00%	21.13%
Post Graduate		89	3.97%	16.79%
Some of the Time		None (< 9th Grade)	17	0.76%
	High School Incomplete	73	3.26%	6.29%
	High School Complete	339	15.13%	29.20%
	Tech/Vocation School	35	1.56%	3.01%
	Some College	268	11.96%	23.08%
	College Graduate	254	11.33%	21.88%
	Post Graduate	175	7.81%	15.07%
	Never	None (< 9th Grade)	14	0.62%
High School Incomplete		25	1.12%	6.65%
High School Complete		133	5.93%	35.37%
Tech/Vocation School		15	0.67%	3.99%
Some College		96	4.28%	25.53%
College Graduate		63	2.81%	16.76%
Post Graduate		30	1.34%	7.98%
Don't Know		None (< 9th Grade)	3	0.13%

	High School Incomplete	6	0.27%	11.54%
	High School Complete	18	0.80%	34.62%
	Tech/Vocation School	3	0.13%	5.77%
	Some College	11	0.49%	21.15%
	College Graduate	4	0.18%	7.69%
	Post Graduate	7	0.31%	13.46%
Refused to Answer	None (< 9th Grade)	1	0.04%	3.57%
	High School Incomplete	1	0.04%	3.57%
	High School Complete	11	0.49%	39.29%
	Tech/Vocation School	2	0.09%	7.14%
	Some College	8	0.36%	28.57%
	College Graduate	2	0.09%	7.14%
	Post Graduate	3	0.13%	10.71%
Total		2241	100%	

Table F.6
Trust in Federal Government by Race

Trust in Federal Government	Race	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
Nearly Always	White	63	2.86%	67.02%
	Black / African-American	22	1.00%	23.40%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	4	0.18%	4.26%
	Mixed Race	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Native / American Indian	5	0.23%	5.32%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Most of the Time	White	410	18.59%
Black / African-American		75	3.40%	14.48%
Asian or Pacific Islander		15	0.68%	2.90%
Mixed Race		7	0.32%	1.35%
Native / American Indian		7	0.32%	1.35%
Other		4	0.18%	0.77%
Some of the Time		White	947	42.93%
	Black / African-American	134	6.07%	11.71%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	15	0.68%	1.31%
	Mixed Race	21	0.95%	1.84%
	Native / American Indian	16	0.73%	1.40%
	Other	11	0.50%	0.96%
	Never	White	323	14.64%
Black / African-American		29	1.31%	7.80%
Asian or Pacific Islander		2	0.09%	0.54%
Mixed Race		10	0.45%	2.69%
Native / American Indian		2	0.09%	0.54%
Other		6	0.27%	1.61%
Don't Know		White	44	1.99%
	Black / African-American	2	0.09%	3.85%

	Asian or Pacific Islander	1	0.05%	1.92%
	Mixed Race	4	0.18%	7.69%
	Native / American Indian	1	0.05%	1.92%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Refused to Answer	White	19	0.86%	73.08%
	Black / African- American	5	0.23%	19.23%
	Asian or Pacific Islander	1	0.05%	3.85%
	Mixed Race	0	0.00%	0.00%
	Native / American Indian	1	0.05%	3.85%
	Other	0	0.00%	0.00%
Total		2206	100%	

Appendix G

Public Participation and Demographic Analysis

Table G.1
Governmental Participation by Sex

Governmental Participation	Sex	Total	Percent	Percent in Category	Percent Just for Gender
0	Male	283	12.53%	44.08%	28.50%
	Female	359	15.90%	55.92%	28.38%
>0	Male	710	31.44%	43.94%	71.50%
	Female	906	40.12%	56.06%	71.62%
Total		2258	100%		

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table G.2
Governmental Participation by Marital Status

Governmental Participation	Marital Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Married	267	11.89%	41.92%
	Living with Partner	36	1.60%	5.65%
	Divorced	62	2.76%	9.73%
	Separated	21	0.94%	3.30%
	Widowed	86	3.83%	13.50%
	Never Been	138	6.15%	21.66%
	Married			
>0	Single	27	1.20%	4.24%
	Married	939	41.83%	58.40%
	Living with Partner	75	3.34%	4.66%
	Divorced	174	7.75%	10.82%
	Separated	31	1.38%	1.93%
	Widowed	128	5.70%	7.96%
	Never Been	221	9.84%	13.74%
Married				
	Single	40	1.78%	2.49%
Total		2245	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table G.3

Governmental Participation by Employment Status

Governmental Participation	Employment Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Full Time	214	9.55%	33.75%
	Part Time	76	3.39%	11.99%
	Retired	196	8.74%	30.91%
	Not Employed	114	5.08%	17.98%
	Self-employed	9	0.40%	1.42%
	Disabled	24	1.07%	3.79%
	Student	1	0.04%	0.16%
	Other	3	0.13%	0.47%
>0	Full Time	648	28.90%	40.37%
	Part Time	175	7.81%	10.90%
	Retired	432	19.27%	26.92%
	Not Employed	248	11.06%	15.45%
	Self-employed	38	1.69%	2.37%
	Disabled	48	2.14%	2.99%
	Student	16	0.71%	1.00%
	Other	5	0.22%	0.31%
Total		2242	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table G.4

Governmental Participation by Political Party

Governmental Participation	Political Party	Total	Percent	Percent in Category
0	Republican	131	6.03%	21.58%
	Democrat	262	12.05%	43.16%
	Independent	176	8.10%	29.00%
	No Party	36	1.66%	5.93%
	Other Party	2	0.09%	0.33%
>0	Republican	397	18.26%	25.34%
	Democrat	600	27.60%	38.29%
	Independent	491	22.59%	31.33%
	No Party	73	3.36%	4.66%
	Other Party	6	0.28%	0.38%
Total		2174	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table G.5
Governmental Participation by Educational Status

Governmental Participation	Educational Status	Total	Percent	Percent in Category	
0	None (< 9th Grade)	33	1.47%	5.21%	
	High School Incomplete	85	3.79%	13.41%	
	High School Complete	257	11.47%	40.54%	
	Tech/Vocation School	19	0.85%	3.00%	
	Some College	136	6.07%	21.45%	
	College Graduate	72	3.21%	11.36%	
	Post Graduate	32	1.43%	5.05%	
	>0	None (< 9th Grade)	19	0.85%	1.18%
		High School Incomplete	75	3.35%	4.67%
High School Complete		407	18.16%	25.33%	
Tech/Vocation School		50	2.23%	3.11%	
Some College		396	17.67%	24.64%	
College Graduate		380	16.96%	23.65%	
Post Graduate		280	12.49%	17.42%	
Total		2241	100%		

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use

>0 = Governmental transparency use

Table G.6
Governmental Participation by Race

Governmental Participation	Race	Total	Percent	Percent in Category	
0	White	479	21.71%	77.26%	
	Black / African-American	104	4.71%	16.77%	
	Asian or Pacific Islander	13	0.59%	2.10%	
	Mixed Race	9	0.41%	1.45%	
	Native / American Indian	7	0.32%	1.13%	
	Other	8	0.36%	1.29%	
	>0	White	1327	60.15%	83.67%
		Black / African-American	163	7.39%	10.28%
Asian or Pacific Islander		25	1.13%	1.58%	
Mixed Race		33	1.50%	2.08%	
Native / American Indian		25	1.13%	1.58%	
Other		13	0.59%	0.82%	
Total			2206	100%	

Note: 0 = No governmental transparency use
>0 = Governmental transparency use

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